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This thesis is the outcome of anthropological fieldwork in Malta, focusing on 
the process of legal representation during court litigation. Paul Ricoe.urr'~ 
( 1984) theory of narration is applied to enhance understanding of legal 
representation. It highlights the social uses of narrative as a discursive vehicle 
mediating between litigants' subjective experience and paradigmatic legal 
rules. It is argued that legal representation can be fruitfully investigated from 
the standpoint of the story-telling relations involved. 
The relations of production, exchange and consumption of evidence before 
the Maltese courts are then explored. It is shown how clients' stories are often 
attempts to control socially distant lawyers by engulfing them in patronage 
relationships. Lawyers' diffident reactions are in tum derived from their efforts 
to balance between patronage and professional ideals of detachment. This is 
reflected in the way lawyers draft judicial acts during litigation, where 'patron' 
lawyers tend to give most weight to the 'subjunctive stories' of clients. This 
same tension between paradigmatic legal rules and 'subjunctive stories' also 
characterises the production of testimony in -~o_urt. ~oth court-room litigation 
and adjudication operate to produce a single narrative version of the facts. 
This reflects the moral pressure which stories place on judges, compelling 
them to reinterpret the legal rules. Finally these observations are embedded 
within Maltese society and their theoretical implications elaborated. 
This thesis demonstrates how court litigation is the site of disguised 
processes of abstraction and contextualisation, where the abstracting of 
'paradigmatic narratives' founds legal entitlement and the narrative 
contextualisation of legal rules leads to their re-interpretation. This indicates 
that legal rules are closer to social experience than is often thought and 
illuminates the relationship between legal and anthropological representation. 
Recent anthropological trends to resort to narrative modes of description are 
seen to be implicitly juridical. 
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Chapter 1: literature Review 
"An area which has been little developed is the application of the 
anthropological perspective to the study of modern Western legal 
systems. While the sociology of law has explored fields such as the 
roles of lawyers and legal institutions, the operation of law in relation 
to different social classes, and so forth, the comparative perspective 
of anthropology has been little applied in the context of modern 
industrial society" (Seymour-Smith 1992). 
1. Introduction 
This thesis is the outcome of anthropological research of a rather unusual 
kind. Rather than taking an exotic society as its primary target, it focused on 
a certain type of work and the people who carry it out. Highlighting Maltese 
legal representation foregrounds lawyers, clients and litigation and may 
appear to relegate culture to the role of an explanatory context. Moreover, 
while law has been the subject of sophisticated theorising for thousands of 
years, it has here been studied through techniques evolved for understanding 
'primitive' or 'savage' societies. This research was also conducted by a partial 
insider within the milieus observed. Clearly these paradoxical choices must 
be justified in terms of the theoretical perspective selected and the nature of 
the field itself. 
These choices will be addressed in the first three chapters of this thesis. 
These will: (a) indicate the utility of studying legal representation on the basis 
of a selective review of contemporary socio-legal research; (b) describe the 
theoretical hypothesis motivating the adoption of an anthropological 
approach to this study; and (c) discuss the methodological issues 
encountered in this thesis. This initial chapter will therefore re-trace the 
theoretical itinerary along which I have moved. This has involved a shift from 
the study of law to that of lawyers; and from a restricted focus on lawyer/client 
interaction to a holistic study of legal representation in its cultural context. 
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2. The Exclusion of law. 
The starting point is a curious discrepancy. Law is, in most contemporary 
societies, indigenously perceived as the principal tool of government. Yet an 
analysis of the specific social effects of legal rules and processes hardly 
figures within many of the major theoretical paradigms of social science. This 
assertion will be illustrated by briefly referring to the theories of Marx and 
Foucault. The reason for selecting these theorists is that they have been 
highly influential and are probably the most explicit in excluding the study of 
the specific social effects of law from their central research agendas. 
Marxist social theory views law within the framework of the division between 
the (economic) base and the (cultural) superstructure, in which the former is 
the prevailing mode of production of material life which ultimately determines 
super-structural cultural expressions. The most reductively materialistic 
Marxist interpretation considers law as part of the superstructure and 
therefore having a purely reactive role, with no social effects of its own. More 
sophisticated re-formulations have refined this theory, arguing that the 
determining effect of the mode of production only occurs in the last instance, 
that production is not simply an economic concept (Wolf 1982) and that law 
can itself promote economic change (Horwitz 1995). However these 
approaches still tend to divert attention away from the study of law to that of 
the more 'basic' social phenomenon of economics. 
The closest Marxist theory comes to discussing the specific social effects of 
law is in relation to the concept of mystification. Marx argued that the 
economically dominant class controls the means of mental production, so that 
it also dominates in the cultural sphere. He therefore saw law's operations as 
primarily a form of mystification: working to prevent a real understanding of 
social power relations because laws are framed within the constraints of the 
ideas of the dominant classes. This perspective has stimulated socio-legal 
research (Hay 1977). However the specific manner in which law exerts its 
mystifying influence remains unclear. Moreover, an easy equation between 
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economic and ideological dominance may lead scholarship to exaggerate the 
monopoly over the production of law enjoyed by the economically dominant 
class and to neglect the influence of the ideologies of dominated classes. 
Research has shown that legal systems refract many different ideologies 
(Sumner 1979). 1 Talk about mystification may obviate symbolic struggles 
(Scott 1985) in the legal field between the different beliefs of various social 
groups. 
Foucault's theory also tends to downplay the social significance of law. His 
argument is embedded within a historical study of changes in European 
styles of punishment from the eighteenth century onwards. He claimed that 
the rise of the prison and the decline in spectacular modes of punishment 
marks a shift from a social order centred around the symbolic affirmation of 
repressive legality to one pervaded by diffuse, concealed and normalising 
disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault 1977). Recent history is that of the 
progressive replacement of legal rules by social norms as the dominant way 
to produce social order. Like Marx, he therefore conceived the primary effect 
of law in contemporary societies as a mystifying discourse which diverts 
attention from the actual disciplinary mechanisms through which social power 
is exercised. He insisted that we must 'cut off the head of the King' (Foucault 
1980) and liberate ourselves from the spell of legal terminology if we are to 
conduct a proper analysis of power in contemporary societies. 
Foucault's theory has been criticised for marginalising law by concentrating 
on repressive, criminal law and ignoring fields like commercial law. In these 
fields, law appears to play a productive, facilitating, role which goes beyond 
simply disguising social power relations (Hunt & Wickham 1994). While this 
1 Indeed. E.P.Thompson ( llJIJO) has argued that in order for law to exert a mystifYing effect. it must 
also constrain the actiYities of the economically dominant class. 
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criticism has in turn been attacked,2 it is clear that the perspectives of Marx 
and Foucault converge. Their theories tend to exclude the study of the 
specific social effects of law from the centre stage of social research. They do 
so because they view law as both detached from and determined by more 
basic economic forces, or disciplinary power mechanisms. They are open to 
the criticism that law is more deeply implicated in conditioning fundamental 
economic processes and social power mechanisms than any neat separation 
between base and superstructure, or law and power, can accept. 3 
Moreover, while these perspectives downplay the social significance of law, 
they agree that it must be understood in the context of broader social 
processes. They suggest that the primary effects of law lie in its cultural 
impact, particularly its ability to mystify. But they are vague regarding the 
means by which this mystifying effect is achieved. They also tend to over-
emphasise the extent to which law reproduces the ideology of the dominant 
social class, while ignoring the possibility that law might reflect different 
ideologies and be itself a site of ideological contestation between different 
social groupings. 
This analysis identifies some causes for the curious exclusion of law from 
much contemporary social research. Once the irrelevance of law seems in-
built into key theoretical paradigms, then this becomes a self-fulfilling 
prophecy; a background assumption conditioning further research within 
these paradigms. Yet this also underlines the importance of studying the 
specific social effects of law, with the aim of clarifying the way it is related to 
other social processes and identifying the nature of its cultural impact. 
: Anthony Beck (I YY5) obserYes that far from being peripheral to Foucault"s thought, law is central, 
since power in contemporary societies is exercised: ·'by virtue of the very heterogeneity between a 
public right of soYereignty and pol~ morphous disciplinary mechanisms·· (Foucault 1980). However, 
this Yicw still seems to link the social effect of law to its ability to conceal disciplinary mechanisms. 
' This point has been made by Stephen Lukes. who obsef\'es that one could not create an economic 
organisation like a limited liability company without the inten·cntion of the super-structural 
regulations of company law (Lloyd & Freeman llJX5: 10 llJ-1 02-J. ). 
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3. Focusing on Legal Representation. 
The theories I have just considered are pitched at very broad levels and their 
neglect of the specific features of law is related to their generic orientation. 
Consequently it seems that one way to refine our understanding would be to 
single out a particular aspect of legal rules and processes. This would make 
possible an 'ascending analysis of power' (Foucault 1980), which moves from 
the particular to the generic so as to explore the wider ramifications of the 
phenomena under investigation. In this context, research of a broadly 
'cultural' sort seems particularly promising (Merry 1990).4 However these 
theories also imply that good critical analysis must avoid using mystifying 
legal terminology to describe legal rules and processes. This indicates the 
utility of an approach which is not limited to deciphering legal texts; focusing 
instead on the daily labour by which law is produced in small-scale settings. 
Because the aim of such research is to explore the specific social effects of 
law, it seems appropriate to concentrate on points of intersection between 
what we usually conceive of as the legal domain and wider social processes. 5 
There are of course many such points of intersection. 6 This thesis will focus 
on legal representation in the courts, by means of an ethnographic study of 
the daily work of Maltese lawyers. Studying legal representation means 
looking at the relationships and activities through which the stories initially 
told by clients to lawyers are translated into 'facts' during litigation. This 
includes such events as client conferences, in which clients' stories are 
1 As one legal anthropologist put it: "In the legal arena, it is not possible to draw a sharp distinction 
between the domination provided by cultural meanings and that provided by violence, between forms 
of control residing in the ability to shape consciousness and those residing in the exercise of force" 
(Mer~ llJlJO: 10). 
' Such research would treat neither law or society as unproblematic, but would seek to explore the 
dialectical manner in which each is produced in confrontation with the other. 
'' For instance. the process of drafting and promulgation of legislation represents an area in which one 
can observe the conversion of political ideas in the wider society into laws in the legal field. The same 
holds for law enforcement. in which legal nJies have to be realised in the field of social action. 
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communicated to their lawyers; lawyers' inscription of these stories when 
formulating judicial acts; the production of evidence in court and its 
evaluation in judgements. 
Consequently this study will chart the transformations clients' stories undergo 
as they pass across the boundaries socially delimiting the major institutions 
usually considered to be the 'core of the legal system' (i.e. the hierarchy of 
courts and associated administrative units). Lawyers can here be seen to 
occupy a culturally intermediate position between their clients and the courts 
and their legal representation as the attempt to symbolically mediate between 
these two charged poles. In this tense arena, legal rules may be stretched to 
accommodate particular clients and clients' desires may be transformed to 
comply with what can be obtained through the rules. 7 This is, in short, a zone 
of intersection and confrontation, where legal rules produce their social 
effects and social processes animate and reinterpret legal rules. 
There are various other reasons for selecting legal representation as an 
object of ethnographic study. Some are subjective, relating to my own access 
to the field. 8 Others are intrinsic to the theoretical hypothesis and will be 
considered in more detail in the next chapter. Such research would also focus 
on the details of daily legal work and would therefore avoid an overly generic 
and mystifying approach. Moreover since legal representation involves the 
re-telling and transformation of stories, it seems particularly suited for an 
ethnographic and cultural analysis. This is firstly because ethnographic 
description seems a good antidote against the sorcery exercised by legal 
language. Secondly, if the specific social effects of law are to be found in the 
cultural field, then studying the processing of clients' stories during legal 
representation may be a good way to explore these effects. 
From the perspecti\·e or these points or intersection bet\\'een legal ·systems. and over-arching social 
eonte'\tS. systematic and self-referential descriptions or law appear questionable and alternati,·e 
conceptions or Ia\\ possible. 
' This will be explained in chapter three. 
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Lawyers figure very prominently in managing legal representation and a good 
ethnographic study in this field cannot avoid analysing the training, 
occupational stratification and the wider social role played by lawyers. This 
thesis will therefore attempt to thread a fine line between the study of Maltese 
lawyers and that of their work. In so doing, it will seek to explore the inter-
relationship between who lawyers (socially) are and what they (socially) do. 
Here it would be a mistake to overly privilege any side of the equation; either 
by viewing lawyers' social role as a simple and direct effect of their work 
(Forgacs 1988: 304), or by seeing their work as purely dictated by the social 
relationships they are involved in. 
Through emphasising the study of legal representation, however, this thesis 
places the accent on understanding the way legal work is carried out in a 
particular social context. One reason for this is that it makes it easier to 
perceive clients' involvement in this process. Another is that it avoids 
objectifying lawyers unduly, by creating an imaginary community of lawyers 
which would be the target of research. Moreover, while the social role of 
lawyers has often been studied, their work in interpreting and applying legal 
rules has rarely been subjected to the same critical scrutiny from social 
scientists. Research has tended to focus on the interactional features of 
lawyer/client relations, neglecting connections between client conferences 
and the later stages of litigation and adjudication. This point will now be 
illustrated by a review of recent socio-legal research on lawyer/client 
relationships, which will indicate the greater analytical power of an 
ethnographic and holistic study of legal representation. 
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4. Socio-Legal Analyses of lawyer-Client Interaction 
Sociologists, linguists and other social scientists working within the area of 
socio-legal studies have paid a lot of attention to lawyers' interactions with 
their clients. Their studies highlight important aspects of the processes 
involved, particularly the relationship between power and representation. Yet 
they also suffer from deficiencies, which partly derive from hidden theoretical 
and methodological assumptions which influence their research. 
Many of these studies focus on the way in which lawyers transform disputes, 
through their representation of clients. For instance, in their analysis of the 
way in which American divorce lawyers interact with their clients, Sarat and 
Felstiner (1986) emphasise the different agendas of both parties. Lawyers 
view the dispute in terms of its monetary consequences, while clients are 
often more interested in other matters, such as emotional vindication. 
Lawyers must therefore invest a lot of time in schooling their clients to accept 
their view of what the really important issues at stake are. In the process, 
they try to lower clients' expectations, re-defining both the dispute and even 
clients' selves so as to exclude those aspects which cannot easily be inserted 
into the legal categories. Clients react to lawyers' efforts to narrow and re-
define their cases by trying to obtain their lawyers' support for their own 
claims. They attempt to create emotional ties with their lawyers, who are wary 
of this. Clients persistently try to introduce the history and moral implications 
of their marriage relationships into their conferences with their lawyers. 
Lawyers in turn respond by partially legitimating their clients' stands, but do 
not in practice act on them. The effect of lawyers' attempts to separate the 
emotional aspect of the divorce from the material ones, leaves clients feeling 
ambivalent and schizoid. They tend eventually to accept their lawyers' 
settlement of the dispute; but they feel angry and mistrustful of lawyers and 
the legal system. 
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Sarat and Felstiner have further developed these themes in two other 
articles. In one, they look at the effect of these processes on clients' views of 
the legal system (Sarat & Felstiner 1989). They observe that while American 
divorce lawyers do act as intermediaries between the legal system and their 
clients, their brokerage activities are restricted to the sort of transformation of 
clients' lives and expectations which they discussed in the previous article. 
These lawyers do not, however, attempt to translate legal rules into concepts 
which their clients can handle. Consequently lawyers operate so as to 
translate clients' lives in order to be able to describe them in terms which 
mesh with legal categories; but they do not translate these legal categories 
so as to render them comprehensible to clients. This 'one-way translation'9 of 
lawyers enables them to prevent clients from gaining independent access to 
(and knowledge of) the public discourse of the law. Such independent access 
could undermine lawyers' claims to specialised expertise and their control 
over the case. Instead lawyers propagate cynicism about the system, 
suggesting that it does not work in terms of the legal rules. In this way, they 
imply that their own usefulness lies less in their knowledge of the law, which 
a well-educated client might acquire, than in the insider contacts and 
connections which they possess. 
In the second article, (Sarat & Felstiner 1988), these issues are explored 
from the perspective of C. Wright Mills' analysis of 'vocabularies of motive'. 10 
They show how American divorce clients resort to vocabularies of motive in 
an effort to explain their own behaviour and that of the other spouse. While 
clients are very concerned to explain the motivations of their spouses' past 
activities, lawyers consider these to be legally irrelevant and do not really 
support their interpretations. However, when they attempt to impute the 
'' Lawyers· brokerage is ·one-way· according to this model. since it departs from a particular 
interpretation of the legal mles and attempts to translate clients· experiences to fit into this 
interpretation. Such a model docs not cm·isage the rules themselves changing in response to clients· 
stories. 
1
" Mills argued that distinct vocabularies of motive characterise different social strata and are 
utilised in different social situations ( Mills 1940: 904 ). 
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present actions of their spouses to negative traits in their characters, lawyers 
intervene in order to promote an alternative interpretation. They suggest 
instead that these actions are situationally determined by the stage which the 
divorce has reached. Through ensuring clients' agreement with their 
vocabulary of motive, lawyers obtain authorisation to take the legal steps 
which they perceive as necessary. Thus lawyers' transformation of clients' 
understandings of their disputes extends to persuading them to re-interpret 
the behaviour of their own spouses. 
The ultimate dominance of the lawyer's view of the dispute is an assumption 
which underlies all the three articles which have been reviewed. This 'one-
way translation' model of lawyers' brokerage ensures that they are always 
seen as the active agents who transform and re-phrase disputes against the 
backdrop of the impotent resentment of their clients. In this model, the legal 
rules constitute an unalterable backdrop, conditioning lawyers' interactions 
with clients, while themselves remaining unaffected by these processes. This 
assumption also pervades other studies. 11 Thus Blumberg (1975) observes 
that the American criminal defence lawyers he studied are embedded within 
networks of organised complicity linking them up to prosecution lawyers, 
judges and administrative personnel within a closed court community. These 
social networks are a strategic response to the organisational problems of the 
criminal courts and lawyers find that forming part of them is a necessary 
condition for success. However, the other side of the coin is that through 
these networks lawyers come to be more responsive to the needs of the court 
community than to those of their clients and they therefore become "double 
agents" (Blumberg: 1975: 328) who seek to persuade their clients to plead 
guilty and have a vested interest in limiting the scope and duration of the 
case. In this context, clients experience legal representation as a 'confidence 
game' played at their expense. 
11 lnglcby ( IIJXX) confirms many of the observations of Santi and Felstiner. showing how English 
divorce lawyers transform the way their clients ,·iew their cases so as to push them towards a mediated 
settlement and away from litigation. 
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Bogoch and Danet (1984) also adopt a 'one way translation' model of 
brokerage in order to make sense of the interaction between an Israeli legal 
aid lawyer and her client. They analyse this encounter in great linguistic 
detail so as to show the strategic way in which this lawyer used language in 
order to assert control over the conversational agenda, suppressing her 
clients' views so as to ensure the domination of her interpretation of the 
dispute. 12 Through these tactics this lawyer managed to acquire power at the 
expense of her client. They were so blatantly employed because they 
occurred in the context of a legal aid case. This lawyer was a member of a 
bureaucracy and did not stand to gain through being more responsive to her 
client. A private practitioner might be expected to show more understanding 
of clients' perceptions of the case. 
This conclusion indicates a significant problem with many of the studies 
which have been reviewed. It seems that most of the proponents of the 'one 
way translation' model of legal representation have not been sufficiently 
sensitive to the context in which their own studies have been carried out. In 
the research of Sarat and Felstiner, for example, it is initially stated that 
American divorce lawyers are the subject of research. However there is little 
attempt to relate the conclusions reached to the specific context in which 
research was carried out. Rather their conclusions, although based on the 
observation of a few cases, are often presented as iconically encapsulating 
general truths about lawyers and the law. Yet context clearly does explain 
many of the observations which are made, entering into the picture in various 
ways. To put it succinctly, there can be many different types of lawyers, a 
great diversity of cases and clients and broader cultural and social variations 
which might explain observed behaviour. 
1 2 Thus they show how she intem1pted her client frequently. especially when he was in the middle of 
an utterance: used directiyes. coercive requests and formal language: questioned the clienfs own 
knowledge: asked apparently random questions and laid claim to an intimate knowledge of her 
client· s background. 
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A related criticism is the conspicuous absence of the lawyer's point of view 
from these studies. We hear a lot about the clients' emotions and very little 
about those of their lawyers. However attention to the practical constraints 
under which lawyers labour might expose important contextual factors 
affecting the quality of legal representation. Exploring lawyers' perspectives 
might also reveal short-comings in the 'one way translation' model of legal 
brokerage. 
These points are brought home if one considers other studies, such as the 
one carried out by Flood on corporate lawyers in Chicago. His approach is 
characterised by its greater sensitivity to the practical dilemmas lawyers must 
face. He argues that from the perspective of the lawyers he studied, the 
management of uncertainty is the most prominent feature of legal work (Flood 
1991 ). Corporate lawyers feel uncertain due to a variety of factors, which 
range from their own subservient position within large law firms dominated by 
a few senior partners to the ambiguity of the legal rules themselves. An 
important cause of uncertainty is the behaviour of large business clients, who 
may withhold important information from their lawyer, leaving him in the dark 
as to the real issues which are at stake in business negotiations. This is 
consistent with the attitude such clients adopt during conferences with their 
lawyers, when they often question their expertise and assert the primacy of 
knowledge of the marketplace over knowledge of the law. In this context, 
lawyers have to struggle to assert themselves and resort to various tactics to 
reduce uncertainty. They do not always succeed in imposing their definition 
of the situation and often have to accept that of their clients. 
Flood's research depicts lawyers in a very different way from the articles 
previously reviewed. Stressing lawyers' vulnerability to client pressure raises 
doubts about the universal validity of the 'one way translation' model of legal 
brokerage, since it suggests that lawyers' perceptions of the issues at stake 
will not necessarily prevail over those of clients. Griffiths's (1986) research on 
Dutch divorce lawyers also departs from this model. In fact, he goes even 
further than Flood in claiming that lawyers are not only subject to clients' 
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pressures, but may also transform their explanation of the legal rules in order 
to cope with these pressures. His thesis is that lawyers are best viewed as 
'double intermediaries', who not only transform clients' stories so as to 
engage with legal categories, but a/so transform the legal rules when they 
explain them to their clients. This process of transformation can occur in 
very subtle ways. 13 
However, while Griffiths accepts that lawyers may modify their explanation of 
the obtaining legal position in response to clients' pressure, neither he nor 
Flood go quite so far as to state that lawyers' interpretation of the legal rules 
may change in response to clients' pressures. Consequently although 
Griffiths describes lawyers as 'double intermediaries', he does not completely 
depart from the 'one way translation' model of their activities. In his scheme 
the legal rules themselves remain largely · uninfluenced by lawyers' 
interactions with clients. At best, these interactions may condition the type of 
legal advice lawyers might give to clients. But they could have no impact on 
the way in which lawyers interpret the legal rules when representing these 
clients during court litigation. 
Despite their differences, the studies reviewed reflect a broad consensus of 
opinion that lawyers are best described as mediators between their clients 
and the legal system. They derive the theoretical interest of studying 
lawyer/client interaction from the way the power struggle between lawyers 
and clients illuminates the wider issue of the social impact of legal systems. 
At this stage it is useful to consider the recent research of Travers, who 
adopts a polemical attitude towards these assumptions on the basis of his 
field research with a firm of criminal defence solicitors in the North of England 
(Travers 1991 ). His arguments can be summarised as follows: 
1.' For instance. lawyers can change the law simply by remaining silent about legal possibilities, or 
by presenting their opinion as the attitude of the courts. In this way lawyers actually exert influence 
by effacing themscJyes. 
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1) Conventional sociological studies of lawyer-client interaction have overly 
theorised the subject. A preoccupation with grand sociological themes 
exoticises the subject unnecessarily, leading researchers to ignore the 
practical, improvisatory, character of the actual work involved. He sought to 
remedy this in his own research through adopting an ethno-methodological 
approach to observe the daily work of a legal firm. 
2) On the basis of his fieldwork, he concludes that accounts such as that of 
Blumberg (1975) are wrong in presenting a cynical view of lawyers as 'double 
agents' engaged in a 'confidence game'. He gives a detailed analysis of a 
case he witnessed in which a lawyer persuaded a client to plead guilty, 
overcoming her client's initial resistance to this plea. This analysis shows 
how the lawyer's advice was motivated by the desire to obtain the best 
possible deal for her client in a context where the outcome of the case was 
never in any doubt and where a guilty plea enabled the lawyer to minimise 
the adverse effects her client would face (Travers 1992). 
3) Travers also attacks the claimed significance of power for understanding 
lawyer/client interaction (Travers 1994 ). His argument is that lawyers are in a 
position of interactional dominance vis-a-vis their clients, but that there is 
nothing surprising or sinister about this, since it is a natural result of the fact 
that they are legal experts, possessing more knowledge of the law then their 
clients do. An analytical focus on power obscures the practical features of 
legal work and adds nothing to our understanding of it. Moreover, clients do 
not normally see themselves as involved in a power struggle with their 
lawyers. Finally, the interactional dominance of lawyers is variable, 
diminishing in proportion to clients' intelligence and experience of the system. 
These arguments directly attack the consensus of opinion underlying the 
other studies reviewed. If correct, the theoretical significance of studying 
legal representation is considerably reduced. A critique of them will therefore 
provide the basis on which to refine and develop my own perspective on the 
study of legal representation. 
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5. A Holistic Perspective on Legal Representation 
My assessment of Travers's ideas will depart from a re-evaluation of his use 
of ethnomethodology. It seems that he sees ethnomethodology as something 
more than a technique for social investigation focusing on the micro-
processes through which everyday reality is constructed. He argues that 
while conventional sociological accounts over-theorise the subject, 
ethnomethodology allows direct observation of the practical basis of everyday 
decisions. Thus it can be used to rebut 'ironical' accounts of lawyer/client 
interaction such as Blumberg's (op.cit.). This approach is more sympathetic to 
lawyers' perspectives; exposing the practical constraints they face and the 
hidden work performed for clients. Yet the argument is fundamentally flawed 
in suggesting that it is possible to observe any human activity without 
recourse to some implicit theory regarding the purpose of that activity. 
The ethnographic truism that perception is always mediated by culture is 
confirmed by Travers's own resort to an explanatory theory for the actions of 
one lawyer he observed. He claims that she: "had to make the best she could 
out of a situation where the ultimate outcome for the defendant was at no 
time in doubt" (Travers 1992: 35). Similarly his caution against undue 
exoticisation of lawyer/client interaction must be seen against the 
background of his own research, where words like 'mundane' and 'boring' 
are bandied around until they acquire an exotic halo. 14 
The problems with this approach become clearer when looking at the 
practical examples given. Travers cites Sarat and Felstiner's work as an 
example of an overly theoretical approach. Yet their conclusion that American 
divorce lawyers try to persuade their clients to abandon emotive discourse 
11 Indeed some degree of exoticisation seems indispensable if socio-legal studies are to fulfil their 
critical potential. This is because. as Bourdieu (I 977) observes, the ultimate disguise of processes of 
domination are precisely notions of what is ·ordinary· and 'natural'. In this context the only way to 
expose hegemonic power stmctures may be through questioning what is ·ordinary· and 'taken for 
granted'. 
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surely identifies a practical concern which forms part of their everyday work. 
Even more telling is the example of lawyer/client interaction which he 
provides when criticising Blumberg's description of such encounters as 
'confidence-games'. He argues that this case confirms the superiority of an 
ethnomethodological approach, since it shows that lawyers may persuade 
their clients to plead guilty without betraying professional ideals of defending 
them to the hilt. However a close analysis can easily account for the 
differences between his conclusions and Blumberg's. indeed, Travers's 
rebuttal of Blumberg depends on exposing the hidden work lawyers do for 
their clients, thus confirming Blumberg's argument that legal work leaves 
room for suspicion in clients' minds that confidence games are being played 
at their expense. Moreover Travers admits that he studied a firm of solicitors 
whose distinguishing characteristic is unusual sympathy towards their clients' 
point of view, evoking the possibility that Blumberg's insights might apply to 
the way most criminal defence lawyers handle their clients. 
Ultimately the deficiencies of Travers's analysis of legal representation derive 
from his conception of power. Here his argument revolves around the related 
claims that (a) focusing on power adds nothing to our knowledge of legal 
representation and (b) there is nothing sinister about lawyers' power, which is 
a natural outcome of their knowledge of the law. This last claim can usefully 
be approached from the standpoint of Sherr's research (1986), which set out 
to assess the quality of lawyers' communicative skills by testing the ability 
of a set of graduate lawyers to interview clients during their first meeting. 
Sherr makes practically no reference to power in his analysis, preferring to 
refer to an idealised model of how lawyer/client interaction should proceed to 
ensure optimal communication between the two sides. As a result, he can 
only interpret many of his findings as a failure in communication on the part of 
lawyers, while they would be perfectly intelligible as attempts to acquire 
power vis-a-vis clients by withholding information. 15 
1
' Sherr obscrYcs regretfully that the lawyers he studied do not inform their clients of the work they 
intend to do for them. that they tend to exercise excessive control over the conversational agenda, 
often cross-c:-;aminc clients and usc difficult language. 
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Once one accepts that power is an important feature of legal representation, 
this raises the second issue of the way in which to conceive power. Hannerz 
(1992) also derives lawyers' power from their legal knowledge. Unlike 
Travers, who sees this as natural and reassuring, Hannerz suggests that the 
routine, systematic and unintentional qualities of professional power are the 
factors which ensure domination. On the one hand Travers argues that there 
can be nothing sinister about a power which is so routinely exercised that 
most clients do not consider themselves to be involved in a power struggle 
with their lawyers. On the other, Hannerz points to the contrast between the 
insecurity of clients, whose contact with lawyers is generally a 'one-off 
experience, and the routine character of legal work for lawyers. The latter 
unintentionally dominate their clients while maintaining a view of their work as 
simply part of the division of labour (Hannerz 1992: 121 ). 
Hannerz's conception of power corresponds to that underlying much 
contemporary social research. Lukes, for instance, describes power as the 
ability to shape the mental landscape of the dominated by making certain 
possibilities unthinkable and thereby imposing misunderstanding of the 
objective situation (Lukes 1993). Bourdieu also portrays symbolic power as 
an invisible power which can be exercised: "only with the complicity of those 
who do not want to know that they are subject to it or even that they 
themselves exercise it" (Bourdieu 1992: 164). As opposed to a hierarchical 
view which identifies power with legitimate authority, this conception 
emphasises the fact that power is exerted over human beings (Aron 1964) 
and is therefore socially negotiated (Simmel 1978). For this reason, power is 
primarily seen not as an object to be possessed; but rather as something 
which must be communicated through cultural media like discourse (Foucault 
1990), or even silence. 16 This stress on the communicative nature of power 
intersects with the work of linguists and other cultural analysts who have also 
emphasised the power-laden nature of communicative relations (Bakhtin 
1
" As in Lukes· s ( I t)t) .1) concept ion. 
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1994). 17 The resulting perception of power foregrounds rhetoric and 
persuasion more than imperative commands and authority. 
In this context, it is interesting to note that Travers's own case-studies are 
replete with instances of discursive struggle, in which lawyers try to persuade 
their clients to follow their advice against the resistance of the latter. 
However, rather than describing these as attempts to exert power, Travers 
prefers to write about the: "interactional pressure" ( 1994: 24) exerted by 
lawyers, who are in a position of: "interactional dominance" (ibid: 26). A close 
reading of his writings reveals two further reasons for this careful avoidance 
of the descriptive terminology of power. The first relates to the way in which a 
power analysis tends to shift from the study of lawyer-client interviews to: 
"that of law as a macro-institution" (ibid: 28). He argues that moving from one 
to the other is incorrect, not least because it gives a distorted characterisation 
of lawyers and legal work. 
The problem with such reasoning has been identified by Bourdieu, who 
observes that one cannot understand the form of small-scale linguistic 
exchanges (such as those between lawyers and clients), if one does not take 
into account larger structural discrepancies in power: 
"That is what is ignored by the interactionist perspective, which 
treats interaction as a closed world, forgetting that what happens 
between two persons -between an employer and an employee or, 
in a colonial situation, between a French speaker and an Arabic 
speaker-- derives its particular form from the objective relation 
between the corresponding languages or usages, that is, between 
the groups who speak those languages" (Bourdieu 1992: 67). 
This integrative capacity of power, which connects minor events to larger 
social forces constitutes the most important objection to Travers's attempt to 
detach research on the everyday business of legal representation from the 
study of larger social power relations. By contrast, a more fruitful way of 
1
- Here I haYe in mind Bakhtin · s focus on the way speakers compromise between what they would like 
to conyey through their words and "·hat is realistically possible given the linguistic effects of existing 
power relations. 
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exploring legal representation is provided by Johnson (1972). In his study on 
the sociology of the professions, he argues that the increasing specialisation 
brought about by the division of labour also increases the social distance 
between lawyers and clients and gives rise to uncertainty as to how legal 
needs are to be determined and catered for. This uncertainty may be 
resolved in favour of the lawyer or his client depending on larger power 
relationships between lawyers and different categories of clients. 
Comparing Johnson's approach to Travers's brings out the second reason for 
the latter's avoidance of power. In fact, while Johnson sees uncertainty as a 
central feature of lawyer/client interviews, Travers emphasises that the 
outcome of these interviews is never in any doubt. This is because the 
lawyer's perception of the issues at stake and the necessary legal response 
must necessarily prevail over that of the client, given the lawyer's greater 
knowledge of the legal rules. Like the previously reviewed studies, Travers 
therefore promotes a 'one-way translation' model of legal representation; in 
which the lawyer translates his client's story to fit into unchanging legal 
descriptive categories. Johnson's analysis compels us to explore the other 
possibility: what if uncertainty is also resolved in favour of the client; so that it 
is the lawyer's interpretation of the legal rules which alters to accommodate 
the client's perception of the issues involved and the necessary legal 
response? In this 'two-way' model of legal brokerage, neither the distribution 
of power between lawyers and clients nor the interpretation of the legal rules 
are seen as fixed a priori by the legal system. Rather, both are socially 
negotiated between particular lawyers and clients in a manner which reflects 
broader power relationships. 
To comprehend the practical processes to which the 'two-way' model of legal 
representation refers, it is useful to refer to the analytical framework 
constructed by Mather and Yngvesson (1981 ). They identify two ways in 
which the linguistic description of a dispute can be transformed after it has 
been brought before a third party to be resolved. The first, which they call 
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'narrowing', is fundamentally a conservative act, occurring when the dispute 
is re-phrased in terms of established linguistic categories. This process of 
narrowing is equivalent to the sort of changes which lawyers must bring about 
to clients' perceptions of their cases in terms of the 'one-way translation' 
model. The second type of dispute transformation is 'expansion'. This is a 
radical phenomenon, occurring when a dispute is re-phrased in terms of 
categories which were not previously accepted by the third parties hearing 
the dispute. It corresponds to the reinterpretation of legal rules which can 
occur when, in response to client pressure, lawyers are led to regard laws in 
terms of clients' stories, rather than translating clients' stories in legal terms. 
Table one illustrates these divergent models of legal representation: 
DIAGRAM A: 
(The model of 
Sarat & Felstiner) 
DIAGRAM B: 
(The model of 
Griffiths & Flood) 
DIAGRAM C: 
(Johnson's model) 
TABLE ONE 
'One-way Translation' 
Legal Rules --)> Lawyer --)> Client's Story 
(Unchanged) (Dominates) (Translated) 
Modified 'One-way Translation' 
legal Rules ~ Lawyer ~ Client's Story 
(Unchanged) (Trys to control) (Translated) 
'Two-way' Model 
Legal Rules~ Lawyer ~ Client's Story 
(Reinterpreted) (Trys to control) (Translated) 
In Table One, Diagram A presents the 'one-way translation' model. Here the 
legal rules are seen to determine lawyers' relations with their clients. 
Lawyers' power is based on their knowledge of the rules. They intervene to 
transform, by a 'narrowing' translation, clients' perceptions of the case. The 
interpretation of the legal rules is uninfluenced by lawyer/client interactions. 
Diagram 8 maintains, but modifies, this model. Here it is accepted that clients 
may also put pressure on their lawyers, leading to changes in their 
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explanation of the legal position. However lawyers' interpretation of the legal 
rules remains unaffected by this process. By contrast, Diagram C accepts 
that both 'narrowing' and 'expansion' may occur. Lawyers may also change 
their interpretation of the legal rules so as to accommodate clients' stories. 
This 'two-way' model envisages that clients may also exercise a cultural 
power of persuasion over their lawyers. 
The greater analytical usefulness 18 of the 'two-way' model lies in the way it 
avoids pre-judging the outcome of lawyer-client interaction. Since power is 
not considered as the exclusive possession of those who know the legal 
rules, our attention is directed to the cultural power which may be exerted by 
clients and through language. Here the analytical tradition which detaches 
the study of lawyer/client interaction from the wider process of legal 
representation, can be seen to perpetuate a view of the legal rules as an 
inflexible backdrop determining the outcome of such interaction. Only by 
making the interpretation of the legal rules part of the analysis of lawyer/client 
interaction can we avoid the limitations of the 'one-way translation' model. It 
is therefore necessary to explore the interaction between the interpretation of 
legal rules and that of clients' stories throughout the entire process of legal 
representation. Research in this field should be holistic: relating lawyer/client 
interviews to the drafting of judicial acts, court litigation and adjudication. 
This literature review also indicates a number of other criteria which should 
orient research on legal representation. It seems clear that legal terminology 
should be avoided when describing the power relations involved. Instead one 
should aim for a cultural analysis focusing on linguistic negotiation and the 
1 ~ As confirmed by its ability to explain aspects of Trayers · s own analysis which he left in the dark. In 
fact. the case-study which he used in order to attack Blumberg·s description of law as a confidence 
game was clearly a case of dispute expansion. Travers notes that the client in this case resisted her 
lawyer" s attempts to persuade her to plead guilty and that the lawyer did not advise her to plead guilty 
to the facts as presented by the prosecution. but to a similar set of facts which only constituted a 
technical offence. He also observes that this offence was one which the Magistrate's Court had not 
encountered before and there was some initial confusion as to whether to allow it. Here the client's 
resistance to the insertion of her case into narrow legal categories can be seen to have led to a change 
in the legal categories. towards a closer match with the client"s understanding of her case. 
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ways in which clients' stories and legal rules are mutually re-interpreted in 
confrontation with one another. By investigating the nature of the cultural 
competence which actors in the field acquire in their daily practice, insights 
should be obtained on the broader power relations which motivate their 
interactions. Particular attention must also be paid to the context in which 
legal representation is carried out. This is composed of large-scale cultural 
and social trends. But it also consists of the specific characteristics of the 
legal system, lawyer, client and case concerned. 19 
These criteria highlight the utility of research of an ethnographic kind in this 
field. Culture is a traditional subject of anthropological inquiry and 
ethnographic writing avoids legalistic descriptive terminology. Anthropological 
approaches are also inherently comparative and possess the sort of 
sensitivity to the context of observation which was lacking in many of the 
studies reviewed. Finally, ethnographic writing mediates between the 
analysis of small-scale practices and more general and theoretical themes. It 
is therefore an ideal vehicle for research which seeks to identify general 
characteristics of law on the basis of the holistic study of particular cases of 
legal representation. The next chapter will show how an anthropological 
approach is also dictated by the specific theoretical hypothesis which has 
inspired the research carried out in this thesis. 
1 
'' It is re,·ealing that Sa rat and Felstiner. who studied American divorce lawyers, describe them as 
dominating their clients. whereas Flood. who studied American corporate lawyers, emphasises the 
pressure which their clients exert on these lawyers. 
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Chapter 2: Rules and Stories 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter explained the utility of a holistic study of legal 
representation in its social context. A 'two way' model was recommended, 
which could accept that clients' pressure may induce lawyers to reinterpret 
the law to accommodate their claims. Instead of embracing legalistic 
conceptions of power, research should explore the practical choices involved 
in acquiring and exercising cultural competence from the standpoint of their 
intended power effects. 
The present chapter will argue that focusing on narrative provides the 
necessary analytical tools for conducting this research. Narrative is a cultural 
medium employed at various stages of legal representation: from initial client 
conferences to the stories lawyers tell in court and the story of the case 
embedded in the final judgement. By studying the practical choices involved 
in telling persuasive stories, re-telling them before the court and in the judicial 
consumption of stories, one can comprehend the power effects which 
motivate these choices. Moreover the argument will not be restricted to the 
claim that legal representation is best considered as the set of relations 
involved in telling, translating and receiving stories. Narrative analysis also 
offers a new way of looking at the legal rules themselves: one which promises 
to explain how rules are reinterpreted as the 'two way' model of legal 
brokerage suggests and why this happens in some cases but not in others. 
The discussion will consequently depart from an overview of theories of 
narrative and its uses in legal representation. This will illustrate the 
significance of narrative analysis for research in legal settings. Finally, it will 
be argued that the anthropological perspective adds an important dimension 
both to studies of legal representation and to narrative analysis, which makes 
it particularly suitable for this type of research. 
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2. Two Theories of Narrative. 
Narrative can usefully be approached by way of the theories of Jerome 
Bruner; a psychologist who has tried to identify the characteristic features of 
narrative, which he sees as a particular way of thinking and speaking about 
the world. In his earlier writings (Bruner 1986), he characterises this narrative 
mode of thought by its opposition to what he calls the 'paradigmatic' mode 
utilised in the natural sciences. The narrative and paradigmatic modes are 
completely distinct and irreducible to one another. Various features 
distinguish the two modes, such as different criteria of verifiability. Whereas a 
good story convinces one of its life-likeness, a good paradigmatic argument 
convinces one of its truth. Narrative is concerned with establishing particular 
connections between specific people, their intentions and their actions. 
Paradigmatic thinking is concerned with general rules which hold true in all 
circumstances. Narrative deals with the 'vicissitudes of human intention' and 
therefore simultaneously constructs two landscapes: a landscape of action 
dealing with the actual activities of protagonists and a landscape of 
consciousness, which concerns their mental states. Stories persuade by 
connecting these two landscapes.1 Paradigmatic thought is not concerned 
with the landscape of consciousness, but only with logical, scientifically 
ascertainable, connections between universally accepted facts. 
These differences are in turn related to the specific way in which language is 
used in constructing narrative accounts. Bruner again draws contrasts with 
scientific uses of language in: a) the ways in which words are chosen; 
b) the ways in which they are combined and c) in the discourse structure of 
narratives. While scientific language selects words on the basis of their clear 
and univocal reference to reality, story tellers must try to select referents 
1 Bmncr obsciYcs: ··tn anv case. the fabula of a storv -its timeless underlying theme-seems to be a 
unity that incorporates at· least three constituents. ti contains a plight into which characters have 
fallen as a result of intentions that have gone awry either because of circumstances. of the ·character 
of characters·. or most likely of the interaction between the two ... for what one seeks in story structure 
is precisely how plight. character and consciousness arc integrated·· (Bruner: 1986: 21 ). 
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which fit the subjective landscape on which the story is being unfolded, with 
due regard for the action they aim to represent. When combining words to 
form narratives, story tellers tend to prefer metaphors and poetic language 
which evoke new possibilities and make the world strange. In this way the 
reader is invited to participate in the production and comprehension of the 
story's intention. Thus, while paradigmatic language tries to give a single 
meaning to events, stories: "initiate and guide a search for meanings among 
a spectrum of possible meanings" (Bruner 1986: 25). This same 
characteristic also unites the various features of narratives as discourse. 2 
Thus, narratives create space for alternative meanings: evoking different 
possibilities by 'subjunctivizing reality'. Bruner re-worked these ideas in a 
later publication ( 1990), listing five central features of narrative: 
1 . Inherent seguentiality: Narratives are composed of constituent elements, 
such as particular characters or incidents. Their significance is generated by 
their place in the whole sequence of events (the plot); which in turn can only 
be grasped if one understands the individual elements composing it. 
2. Factual indifference: Bruner claims that the meaning of stories is internally 
generated and stories need not refer to any extra-linguistic reality in order to 
achieve their power. Histories and fictional novels share the same narrative 
form. While this seems to derive from a human predisposition to organise 
experience in narrative forms, this does not mean that narratives simply 
reproduce the narrative structure of lived experience. 
3. Forging links between the exceptional and the ordinary: Bruner points out 
that human cultures must contain mechanisms for negotiating communal 
meanings. Because stories relate isolated incidents and characters to larger, 
ongoing social dramas, they contain an: "apparatus for dealing 
:: Bnmer argues that narrati\·e discourse aims to create :mplicit meanings, rather than explicit ones; 
emphasises subjecti\·e Yiews of reality through fore-grounding the landscape of consciousness and 
eYokes multiple ways of ,·iewing reality by intertwining yarious voices. 
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simultaneously with canonicality and exceptionality" (Bruner 1990: 47). This 
apparatus is employed in order to: "render departures from cultural norms 
meaningful in terms of established patterns of belief' (ibid.). This claim is 
supported by referring to the way in which people resort to stories when 
asked to explain unusual behaviour. Such stories attempt to explain 
behaviour by referring to intentional states which mitigate deviations from 
canonical cultural patterns and make them comprehensible. 
4. Dramatic: To explain this feature of story-telling, Bruner refers to Kenneth 
Burke's discussion of dramatism, which emphasises the role of 'trouble', or: 
"deviations from the canonical that have moral consequences" (Bruner 1990: 
50). Since stories explain the exceptional against the background of the 
commonplace; they necessarily stress the canonical moral rules in terms of 
which action is ordinarily understood in order to describe deviations from 
them. Consequently: "stories, carried to completion, are explorations in the 
limits of legitimacy" (ibid.) and "to tell a story is inescapably to take a moral 
stance, even if it is a moral stance against moral stances" (ibid.) This is why 
narratives generate drama and emotion. 
5. Constructing two landscapes: Here the previously mentioned theme of the 
dual landscapes of consciousness and action is evoked; with reference to 
modern tendencies to foreground the landscape of consciousness. 
Finally Bruner confronts the thorny issues raised by the co-existence of such 
apparently 'true' stories as historical accounts and fictional ones. His 
approach is based on his earlier discussion of the way in which stories create 
subjunctivity, or the possibility of many different readings. He sees 
subjunctivity as also characteristic of 'true' stories, as is suggested by: "the 
perpetual revisionism of historians" (ibid: 55). It ensures that the status of 
stories: "remains forever in the domain midway between the real and the 
imaginary" (ibid.) Stories are used for social negotiation and must therefore 
be open to many alternative readings in order to persuade as many people as 
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possible. People are ready to accept that human reality, unlike scientific 
accounts, is relative and uncertain. 
My own perspective on narrative will be constructed by contrasting Bruner's 
views with those of Paul Ricowr (1984), with special regard to the referential 
dimension of narrative. 3 Where Bruner sees 'factual indifference' as 
characterising narrative accounts, Ricoel.4.r follows Aristotle in seeing 
narrative as 'mimesis', or the imitation of existing human action. He explains 
the features of narrative in terms of its function, which is that of mediation in 
three analytically distinguishable realms: 
Mimesis 1: This is the initial 'borrowing from' the real world, without which 
narrative accounts would not be able to justify deviations from it. At this 
stage, reference is made to the general vocabulary and symbolic systems in 
terms of which human activity is normally understood. Because human 
actions are never ethically neutral, but are always interpreted with reference 
to norms and values, stories are also concerned with ethics. 
Mimesis2: This is the stage where narratives create their own patterns of 
meaning, by configuring reality. They do so by mediating between: 
i) Individual events and the story as a whole. 4 
ii) The temporal status of each event in the story on its own and the time of 
the story as a whole. 
iii) A series of heterogeneous factors, such as agents, goals, means, 
interaction, circumstances and unexpected results. 
While Bruner opposes narrative to paradigmatic thought, Ricoeur sees the 
transition from mimesis1 to mimesis2 as lying in: "the passage from the 
paradigmatic to the syntagmatic" (1984: 67). He therefore sees narrative as 
' Although Ricoeur dcYotcd a lot of attention to understanding the relationship between time and 
narrati\'c. this will not form a focus of my analysis. 
1 Sec the lirst feature of narrati\'c in Bruner's list. 
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developing on the basis of paradigms, which he defines as the generally 
accepted social norms and symbolic categories in terms of which human 
actions are understood. Narrative invokes these norms and values internally 
in order to explain departures from them. Conversely, specific incidents or 
characters within a story may be recounted in order to affirm general rules. 
There is therefore a dialectical interplay between generic paradigms and 
particularistic accounts within the narrative itself This constant see-sawing 
between the two poles of generic paradigms/roles and particular 
events/individuals is aptly described as 'discordant concordance'. Ricoeor is 
careful to observe that different stories are located at different ends of this 
spectrum. Moralistic tales are located closer to the paradigmatic pole, 
whereas subversive stories are found at the particularistic end. However, all 
stories mediate between these two poles and contain elements of both. 
This point is further developed in regard to the ways stories as a whole are 
classified. It is argued that the emergence of particular story types is one way 
through which new paradigmatic ways of understanding human action arise. 
New paradigms crystallise when a number of narratives converge around a 
particular theme. 5 Subversive stories both create new paradigms and 
constitute deviations from existing paradigms. Moreover, the interplay 
between paradigmatic understandings and particular circumstances within 
stories is what enables them to simultaneously challenge and affirm 
paradigmatic understandings externally. 
Mimesis3: Narratives are not isolated, self-contained texts, detachable from 
the social relations within which they are produced and consumed. As against 
Bruner's claim that narratives are 'factually indifferent': "an ability to 
communicate and a capacity to refer must be simultaneously posited" (ibid: 
' This can be e:xemplified by the way in which a series of films. such as the Rocky series. ha\'e helped 
to create the archetype of the bmtalised e:x-Vietnam soldier who seeks revenge against American 
society for his maltreatment. In this way. an originally deYiant account becomes part of the standard 
repertoire of paradigmatic understandings which is aYailable to movie-goers and against which new 
deYiant interpretations will ha\'e to eyolve. 
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78). Ricoeur sees a contradiction in assuming that narratives can influence 
the way people understand the world unless one assumes that they somehow 
refer to it. He prefers to speak of a process of narration rather than narrative 
texts, thus highlighting the need for readers' co-operation if this process to 
fulfil its aims. Successful narration requires an intersection between the world 
referred to in the text and that of the reader. The persuasive effect of 
particular narratives will depend on their ability to activate, by replicating, the 
paradigmatic cognitive categories of specific groups of readers. 6 
Ricoelllr also convincingly explains the problem of reference. The differences 
between fictional stories and historical accounts are derived from the 
positions they occupy at opposing ends of the paradigm/narrative continuum. 
While histories are closer to the paradigmatic pole, stressing generic and 
widely accepted ways of explaining behaviour, fictional accounts are closer 
to the narrative pole; insofar as they subjunctify reality and reveal alternative 
interpretations of it. However fictional accounts must also somehow refer to 
reality, even if such reference is only intended to subvert it.7 
This overview exposes critical differences relating to the alleged 'factual 
indifference' of narrative accounts and the relationship between paradigmatic 
and narrative understanding. If Ricoe.ur insists on the dialectical interplay 
between stories and paradigms, Bruner posits an unbridgeable gulf between 
paradigmatic and narrative modes of knowing: 
"It has been claimed that the one (mode of knowing) is a 
refinement of or an abstraction from the other. But this must be 
either false or true only in the most unenlightening way" (Bruner 
1986: 11 ). 
"RicoeurobseJTes that the interplay between tradition and innovation which constitutes the cultural 
impact of particular narratives is a process which can only be completed in the mind of the reader. It 
is the reader·.,. paradigmatic ways of explaining behaviour which the narrative must engage with. 
It is observed: ··Even extreme alienation in relation to reality is still a case of intersection (between 
the reality mirrored in the story and that of the reader) ... the shock of the possible, which is no less 
th:w that of the real. is amplified by the internal interplay. in the works themselves, between the 
received paradigms and the proliferation of divergences .. .Thus narrative literature is a model of 
practical actuality by its deviations as much as by its paradigms·· (Ricoe\lr 1984: 80). 
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However the way in which these theorists define the paradigmatic mode is 
conflicting and ambiguous. in Bruner's earlier text (1986), he speaks of 
'science', implying that paradigmatic reasoning is that found in so-called 
'hard' sciences, like physics or mathematics. In this view, the paradigmatic is 
equivalent to a logical and scientific mode of understanding, which finds 
expression in rule-like univocal statements due to the universally valid and 
directly referential nature of its assertions. In his later writing ( 1990), Bruner 
is less concerned with the paradigmatic mode. Here he writes about the role 
of narrative in justifying deviations from the sort of canonical cultural norms 
which Ricoeur terms paradigms in his analogous description of the way 
stories mediate between the particular and the generic. 
In the latter use of the term, the paradigmatic is therefore equivalent to 
generally accepted categories for making sense of human states and actions; 
be they rules, character types, or roles. An example would be the norm found 
in North African societies that a man preferably marries his father's brother's 
daughter. Such a norm is both a generally-held perception as to how young 
unmarried men act, a description of the way many such men do act and, if 
framed as a rule, can become a prescription as to how such men should act.8 
Its generic terminology reflects its status as a generally held belief which also 
does not refer to the specific actions of one individual but to the usual 
practices of a whole social category. It is unclear whether Bruner considers 
such canonical cultural norms to be paradigms or not. 
The explanation for this divergence may lie in the types of stories that the two 
theorists looked at. Ricoeur is concerned both with supposedly true stories as 
well as fictional accounts. By contrast, Bruner largely focuses on modern 
x Bourdicu ( IIJ'J7) has remarked on the case with which the transition from describing an observable 
norm of social bchm·iour to re-formulating this norm as a rule directing action, enables social theory 
to shift from describing social action as patterned to describing it as rule-governed. He therefore views 
honourable bchaYiour as a disposition instead of a case of obedience to the ·taw· of honour. 
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novels of accepted literary value.9 However, the ability to create a persuasive 
narrative is clearly useful in various occupational contexts, ranging from that 
of the professional historian to that of the lawyer. Unlike modern novels, the 
narratives employed in these contexts generally claim to be true and this 
claim will influence the form of these narratives. Historical accounts, for 
instance, usually avoid 'subjunctivizing' reality, by evoking an endless 
spectrum of possible interpretations. Instead they seek to persuade the 
reader that their interpretation is the correct one. Paradigmatic knowledge, 
even of the scientific sort, forms an integral part of historical or legal 
narratives. 10 Admittedly much modern fiction is not characterised by such an 
affirmation of the value of accepted paradigmatic understandings, tending to 
subjunctify reality. Yet Ricoe.ur's model can explain the different roles played 
by paradigmatic understandings in historical accounts and in modern fiction 
in terms of the diverging aims of the producers of these narratives. Bruner 
does not really explain these variations. 
Thus Ricoeur's view of paradigms and associated model of a dialectical 
interplay between stories and paradigms identifies a crucial feature of 
narrative accounts. The picture that emerges is one of a spectrum of 
narrative forms, blending into paradigmatic norms at one pole and employing 
subjunctivising language at the other. This is not a static picture, but a 
dynamic one: seeing narrative as an indispensable communicative medium 
for engaging with, producing, or reinterpreting paradigmatic norms. This is 
because it can either transform everyday experience to conform with 
paradigmatic rules or carry out the contrary operation. 11 
'' He justifies this on the grounds that these stories arc widely considered to reveal great story-telling 
ability and should therefore be treated as the ccntml case of story-telling in general. 
1
" Think of the way lawyers draw upon medical evidence when constructing a namttive account of a 
homicide. 
11 Judging by a recent interyicw. Bnmcr himself is keenly aware of the need for such a mechanism for 
moulding the group of paradigmatic norms which arc known as legal rules. He remarks on legislators· 
reliance on precedent and interpretation to adapt laws to changing situations (Shore 1997: 21 ). 
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3. legal Story-Telling. 
To mention law at this stage is to recall my promise that narrative analysis 
can explain the processes by which rules are developed and reinterpreted. 
This can be done if one takes the step of considering the legal rules 
themselves as a specific sub-set of the class of generic, paradigmatic, norms 
which Ricoeu.r sees as locked in a dialectical relationship with narratives. The 
sense in which legal rules can be considered as paradigmatic norms will be 
clarified by a brief example of an ordinary legal rule. I have before me a copy 
of the Italian Civil Code (Di Majo 1997). Opening it at random, I find section 
17 which states, on translation: 
"A juridical person cannot buy immovable things, nor accept 
donations or inheritances, nor receive any legacies unless 
authorised by the Governmental Authority. Without such 
authorisation, the purchase or the acceptance have no effect" 
(Section 17, Book 1, Codice Civile). 
Now this rule shares many of the characteristics of the earlier discussed 
cultural norm concerning marriage with the father's brother's daughter. It has 
an abstract and generic scope: referring to all juridical persons and not 
simply to one particular one. It foregrounds the 'landscape of action' and not 
that of consciousness. Rather than trying to subjunctify reality and evoke 
alternate interpretations, every word used in this rule is carefully chosen and 
has a specific technical meaning which makes it difficult to re-interpret. 12 The 
import of this rule would be acknowledged by most, if not all, Italians. By 
seeming to describe a general feature of the social world, it effectively seeks 
to prescribe general obedience to its injunctions. 
Once the paradigmatic status of legal rules is affirmed, then narrative can be 
seen to occupy an intermediate position between law and social experience 
and its significance would lie in its ability to mediate between these two 
poles. Narrative achieves this aim through its ability to create a continuous 
1 c Terms like ·juridical person· or ·immovable property· arc themselves defined by other legal rules. 
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discursive space between legal rules and individual accounts. In legal 
representation, the creation of such a continuum is indispensable if legal 
frameworks are to engage with and respond to clients' experiences. Only 
through the creation of a common discursive space can clients' experiences 
mould legal rules by reinterpreting them. Conversely, it follows that 
conservative attempts to preserve existing legal frameworks would try to 
prevent the creation of this continuous discursive space by censoring, 
fragmenting, or otherwise restricting efforts to narrativise clients' experiences. 
This view implies that the internal content of the stories produced in legal 
settings would be marked by a dialectical interplay between generic legal 
rules, other culturally specific paradigmatic understandings and particular, 
'subjunctive' experiences. This interplay would take different forms depending 
on the intended social effect of the story concerned. 13 
These points can be illustrated by referring to the earlier quoted legal rule. 
Any attempt to bring this rule to bear on a particular practical situation 
requires the creation of a paradigmatic story, the simplest form of which 
would run along these lines: 'a company bought a house with (or without) the 
authorisation of the Governmental Authority'. A story like this is 
predominantly characterised by its conformity to the central meaning of the 
paradigmatic legal categories, making the application of the rule easy and 
unproblematic. While this story refers to a particular event, this is conceived 
purely in terms of the generic legal categories; without any reference to 
idiosyncratic details or intentional states which might suggest alternative 
interpretations of events. The difference between this conservative, 
paradigmatic, story and a subjunctive narrative is easy to imagine. In any 
particular case, for instance, it might not be clear whether a juridical person in 
terms of section 17 exists or not. Does a co-operative have such a 
personality? What about a band-club? What if some of the associates in a 
1
' One would c:xpcct judges. for instance. to produce stories oriented towards the legal, paradigmatic, 
pole. On the other hand. lawyers might tend to resort to subjunctivising discourse in order to question 
e:xisting interpretations of legal norms. 
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band-club committee think that the club has bought a house when others 
think it was bought by one of the members? Clearly the particular, subjective 
features of the actual experience of clients will lead lawyers to interrogate the 
meaning of the legal rules and to develop their interpretation of them. 
The relevance of this approach is confirmed by the repetition of its salient 
points in recent attempts to relate narrative analysis to legal theory. Thus 
Winter's (1989) aptly named article: "The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon 
between Legal Power and Narrative Meaning," argues that the significance of 
narrative lies in its ability to mediate between individual/social experience 
and legal rules. In this way, narratives have the potential to transform one 
into the other. At the same time, emphasising their necessary incorporation of 
cultural norms underlines the way in which narratives are constrained by 
them. It is not possible to say anything one wants to in a story, because this 
must conform to certain culturally embedded norms if it is to be persuasive. 
Moreover, although rules can be transformed into stories, they are not 
themselves a type of story, since they possess different characteristics, such 
as generalisability, unreflexivity and reliability in communication 
A more empirical approach is that of Bennett and Feldman (1981), who 
carried out research on the tactics by which lawyers persuade juries of the 
credibility of their version of events during criminal trials. They argue that 
these tactics can only be fully understood if one relates them to the different 
narratives which prosecution and defence try to construct. The way in which 
lawyers examine witnesses, for example, cannot be understood if seen as a 
series of isolated questions. But the answers elicited make sense in terms of 
their contribution to underlying story-frames. These story-frames channel, co-
ordinate and explain all that goes on in court. 14 
1 1 They insist that racist bias in a~judication occurs because different social groups have different 
notions of causality and therefore of what constitutes a persuasiYe story. Bias is expressed and 
mediated through the story form. which unconsciously triggers it off. Similarly journalistic accounts 
which focus solely on court-room drama arc missing the wood for the trees since the significance of 
court-room tactics docs not lie in thcmscl\'es but in their contribution to the underlying stories which 
really determine the outcome. 
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Bennett and Feldman's account has inspired other studies to apply a 
narrative approach to the study of adjudication. Jackson (1991, 1994) has 
shown how apparent contradictions in case-law can be justified by the 
different narrative frameworks in terms of which apparently similar cases are 
understood. He argues that this occurs because distinct stories implicitly 
evoke different ethical reactions. He provides additional support for the view 
that legal rules and stories are locked in a dialectical and mutually 
constitutive relationship by drawing attention to the role narratives play in 
legal exposition and the narrative form in which the provisions of early legal 
codes were drafted. However he disagrees with Bennett and Feldman's view 
of lawsuits as determined by the conflict between two opposing narrative 
frames (Jackson 1994). Instead he claims that the pragmatics of court-room 
interaction 15 are independently narrativised, taking the form of narrativised 
models of successful advocacy which jurors and judges will evaluate during 
the process of adjudication. These models have an impact independently of 
the stories told in the case and may determine the outcome of the lawsuit. 
Twining (1994) has also criticised Bennett & Feldman's approach. He claims 
that they exaggerated the role story-telling plays in law-suits. There are many 
genres of legal argument which employ paradigmatic reasoning. However 
narratives do play a significant role in legal processes, as demonstrated by 
the way judges use stories when adjudicating factual evidence in court. 
Twining considers three possible descriptions of the utility of narratives in 
allowing a persuasive presentation of the 'facts' which: 
a) Presents the facts as conforming with the relevant legal rules. 
b) Makes implicit appeal to extra-legal norms of morality or common-sense. 
c) Develops and enriches legal doctrine by interpreting the legal norms in 
terms of extra-legal norms. 
1
' By referring to the ·pragmatics of courl.-room interaction·. Jackson is talking about the way lawyers, 
witnesses and judges beha\"e and interact: which he views as a separate dimension of court-room 
acti\ ity which participants eYaluate independently from the stories told during litigation. 
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So as to assess these claims, two of Lord Denning's judgments are 
compared. In 'Candler vs. Crane Christmas', the narrative presentation of the 
facts allowed Lord Denning to develop the law of tort. It did so because his 
narrative implicitly appealed to important legal principles in order to argue 
that the scope of certain rules should be extended to apply to the case in 
question. At the same time, this narrative could itself be generalised, so that 
in time a new legal rule (or paradigm) would develop out of it. In 'Miller vs 
Jackson', however, the narrative presentation of the facts did not engage with 
important legal arguments and was presented in an overly particularistic way, 
creating doubts about the propriety of the judgement. From this Twining 
concludes that narrative may indeed play several roles in legal argument, so 
that all the three descriptions he considered are potentially valid. Since they 
often need to make implicit appeals to morality or common sense, those who 
wish to challenge the existing legal position are more likely to resort to 
narrative than those who simply affirm the existing rules. 
Additional confirmation of the importance of the rule/story dialectic is 
provided by a recent article by Miller ( 1994 ), which applies narrative analysis 
to the study of legal representation. Here she follows in the footsteps of 
Cunningham (1989); who views legal representation as an act of translation 
by which lawyers try to translate their clients' stories into the conceptual 
categories of the laws and vice versa. However Miller attempts to move 
beyond these studies because the metaphor of translation suggests that 
lawyers mediate between two completely different languages which do not 
intersect and limit themselves to explaining words in one language in terms of 
the other. Since neither of the languages is altered by the translation, this 
metaphor does not allow for the possibility that the legal rules themselves 
might be reinterpreted in response to clients' stories. Also, it naively assumes 
that clients are always powerless, that their stories must always diverge from 
those of lawyers and that clients want lawyers to tell their versions. Most 
damagingly, the translation metaphor obscures the way: "legal story-telling, at 
its best, is more than either lawyer or client story-telling" (Miller 1994: 527). 
Miller's own description of legal representation rests on the insight that 
stories bridge the gap between clients' perceptions and the legal rules. 
Because stories create a discursive continuum between these two poles, they 
can be a vehicle for the expression of clients' power; enabling them to 
appropriate the meaning of the legal rules in their own interests. 16 Clients' 
narratives have the potential of enriching legal doctrine by providing a 
different perspective on the legal categories. This in turn affects the role of 
lawyers, who can no longer assume that their interpretative outlooks will 
necessarily prevail over those of their clients and must now view legal 
representation as a process for which clients are co-responsible. 
By explicitly linking the rule/story dialectic to what I have called a 'two way' 
conception of legal representation, Miller highlights the uses of narrative 
analysis to explore the way lawyers and clients negotiate power in specific 
cases of legal representation. This builds on the insights of the previous 
chapter. Yet these studies neglect another important dimension of legal 
representation, which is that of the specific cultural context and social 
relationships conditioning particular cases of legal representation. A final shift 
of focus is consequently required. This will involve adopting an 
anthropological approach to the narratives produced, exchanged and 
consumed within legal representation; as this explains specific stories by 
reference to the over-arching social contexts in which they arise. 
''' She illustrates this by referring to a case she defended. showing how attention to the clients· story 
meant giYing the client more power to participate in the decisions that were taken in regard to his case 
and also led her to Yiew both the legal mles and the factual evidence in a new light. 
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4. The Relevance of Anthropology. 
This section will explain the reasons for the adoption of an anthropological 
approach, focusing on the study of Maltese legal representation. The 
argument will have three main branches. Firstly, it will demonstrate how legal 
anthropology has already explored legal representation in a way which pays 
greater attention to the socio-cultural context. This will be followed by a 
review of anthropological studies of narrative, which will argue that this same 
stress on the cultural and social context adds a crucial missing dimension to 
narrative analysis. From this perspective, narrative analysis can be seen as a 
form of social analysis which explores the interconnections between legal 
rules, cultural norms and subjective experience. Finally the relevance of 
anthropological research will be discovered in the nature of ethnographic 
writing itself. Since ethnographic writing incorporates the rule/story dialectic 
within itself, reflexively examining the tension between these two poles, it is a 
particularly appropriate vehicle for analysing this tension. 
(a) The View from Legal Anthropology: 
While narrative analysis has not figured within the central research agenda of 
legal anthropology, this sub-discipline has constructed a broad framework for 
understanding particular cases of legal representation by relating them to 
their social and cultural context. This can be illustrated by looking at 
anthropological analyses of evidence, of legal representation as an activity, 
and of the invocation of legal rules. To start with legal evidence, a concern 
with the cultural context in which this is produced has long characterised 
legal anthropology. Thus Gluckman's (1955) research among the Barotse 
described the ways in which culturally specific understandings influenced the 
assessment of evidence by the 'kuta', or local court. Gluckman argued that 
that the over-lapping and multiple social bonds which connect individual 
Barotse to each other lead the local courts to broaden their criteria of relevant 
evidence beyond those facts which gave rise to the issue in question to 
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encompass the total history of the relations between the litigants. Local 
conceptions of reasonable behaviour, derived from Barotse morality and 
social experience, also function as a yardstick by which evidence could be 
evaluated. Similar points have been made by many other anthropologists. 17 
Anthropologists who have focused on Western legal systems have further 
shown how differing modes of describing evidence can be the tools of social 
conflict within Western societies themselves. For instance, Merry's (1990) 
study of court-room discourse identified a discursive struggle as to which of 
three genres to use in describing facts: legal discourse, moral discourse or 
therapeutic discourse. Court personnel view the lawsuits brought by working-
class plaintiffs as a waste of their time. They try to classify these disputes in 
moral or therapeutic terms, in order to remove them from their jurisdiction. On 
the other hand, plaintiffs resist these classifications by using legal discourse 
in order to describe their claims. 18 
This stress on the wider cultural context also informs anthropological views of 
the work involved in legal representation. The key metaphor here is that of 
brokerage. Thus, Campbell (1964) remarks that lawyers in Greek rural 
society act as intermediaries between shepherds and the State authorities. 
This view of legal practitioners as brokers draws attention to the existence of 
historically evolving divisions of a political (Silverman 1977), economic 
(Cohen 1969) or cultural (Geertz 1969) sort, against which specific cases of 
brokerage must be understood. So Silverman's (1977) study of a central 
Italian village, relates the demise of 'all-purpose' land-owning patrons 
1
- Such as Feifer (I% 7) in regard to Russian Courts. Said Amir Arjomand (Starr & Collier 1989) 
about Iran and Lawrence Rosen (I 989). In Rosen's research characteristic aspects of the Moroccan 
legal system. (like the emphasis on oral witnessing and on the social background of the parties), are 
deri\·ed from the way tmth and the indi\·idual arc conceived in Moroccan culture. 
1 
x Analogously. Conley and O'Barr (I 990) ha\'e shown how different social groups differ in their 
aptitude to utilise the ·mlc oriented· way of describing their claims which is most likely to result in a 
fayourable outcome in self-represented claims before tribunals. Individuals who have little previous 
experience of litigation or the commercial world tend to usc a ·relational" mode of description which 
usually fails to achicyc the desired results. 
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catering for all the outside needs/links of their peasants to the increasing 
integration of these localities within the Italian state. This perspective sees 
legal representation as indicating significant socio-cultural divisions, which 
can be read off from particular cases of legal representation. The broker's 
own position becomes problematic, since he may be closer to either of the 
two sides and the social effect of his activities is highlighted. While Barth 
( 1969) argued that brokers operate to reduce social differences, others 
(Bailey 1973) 19 claim that the opposite occurs, since brokers have an interest 
in maintaining the divisions which provide their own raison d'etre. 
In trying to comprehend the social effects of legal rules, anthropologists have 
also explored the interaction between narratives and rules by stressing the 
contextual background of particular legal cases. The issue has arisen in 
connection with the central legal anthropological debate between 
'processualist' and 'rule-centred' approaches. 'Processualists' follow 
Malinowski (1989) in rejecting explanations of social behaviour as the 
observance of a body of norms. Instead they propose that people are always 
seeking their own selfish interests and manipulating the rules in order to 
achieve them. This means that conflict is treated as endemic within human 
societies and order seen as the result of the reciprocal obligations produced 
by interaction. By contrast the 'rule-centred' paradigm draws its inspiration 
from such as Radcliffe-Brown, in seeing social life as rule-governed. 
This opposition has produced contrasting approaches to the study of law-like 
phenomena in other societies. 20 While work continues to be carried out in 
either the rule-centred (Hamnett 1977) or processual (Gulliver 1979; Caplan 
19 Reference is also made to Robert Paine's paper entitled: "Second thoughts about Barth's models." 
20 Rule-oriented approaches tend to foreground the identification and description of a separate class of 
legal norms which are broadly analogous to legal rules in Western societies. More processual 
approaches have emphasised the study of disputes in their full temporal and social context. 
1995) approaches, contemporary research has expressed dissatisfaction 
with, and tried to surmount, this opposition (Starr & Collier 1989, Reuland 
1994). One of the most successful attempts has been that of Comaroff and 
Roberts (1986), since instead of simply superimposing 'rules' or 'processes' 
as objective analytical categories, they explore indigenous perceptions of 
customary rules. A study of Tswana beliefs reveals that the contradiction 
between rules and processes is embedded within their own ideology, which 
sees human affairs as both rule-determined and inherently negotiable. 
This paradox is explained by the varying invocation of customary norms in 
different cases. Norms are explicitly invoked where litigants have generic 
goals, desiring to re-define their social relationships. An example would be 
marriage cases, where spouses attempt to challenge the prevailing normative 
framework in terms of which the central issues of their cases are defined. 
Here explicit invocation of norms accompanies spouses' attempts to broaden 
the relevant facts: narrating the entire history of their relationship to imply that 
different rules should regulate the case. 21 In these cases, the customary rules 
are experienced as to an extene2 negotiable. By contrast, when disputes 
concern specific claims for determinate objects, litigants usually agree about 
the applicable normative framework. Thus norms are not explicitly invoked in 
many property disputes; argument focusing on whether the facts are such as 
to bring these norms into play. The normative customary rules will here be 
experienced as rigidly determining the final outcome. 
Because they embed their research within the total fabric of Tswana society, 
Comaroff and Roberts can explain the indigenous ideological contradiction 
between rule-determined and manipulative views of human behaviour by 
showing how it reflects individuals' experiences of different types of cases. 
21 Thus men do their best to show that they ne\"er really married women whom they wish to repudiate. 
22 ComarofT and Roberts show how this ability to negotiate the rules is limited by litigants' own 
pre,·ious manoemTes. which they cannot contradict. and by the total socially accepted system of 
relationships and rules which define the language of manipulation itself. 
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While affirming previously reviewed research in stressing the uses of 
narrative to reinterpret the rules, they further identify cases in which 
narratives are typically used in this way and others where they are not. 
Tswana experience the rules as negotiable or determining depending on the 
case. Consequently: "rule-oriented and processual modes of settlement are 
systematically related" (Comaroff and Roberts 1986: 244). They should not 
be opposed, since: 
"Far from constituting an 'ideal' order, as distinct from the 'real' 
world, the culturally inscribed normative repertoire is constantly 
appropriated by Tswana in the contrivance of social activity, just as 
the latter provides the context in which the value of specific norms 
may be realised or transformed. In short ... norm and reality exist in 
a necessary dialectical relationship" (Ibid: 247). 
This quotation reveals that what is here at stake is the social significance to 
be attributed to legal rules; their precise role in regulating human actions. If 
rules and social processes are dialectically linked in Tswana society, then 
might this not throw light on the way in which rules structure action in 
societies which are closer to the 'Western' type? Here too it may be a mistake 
to see human action as governed either wholly by laws or by manipulative 
self-interest. Narrative analysis, which highlights the mediation between 
general rules and particular interests, might help us break out of this 
opposition. If persuasive stories invoke legal rules, this may be because 
these rules figure as part of the context in terms of which desired actions are 
conceptualised. If so, then the social effect of legal rules should be sought in 
the ways in which they are narratively embodied. 
In raising these questions, legal anthropology looks beyond particular cases 
of legal representation to interrogate the wider socio-cultural processes which 
condition them and to which they contribute. As this review illustrates, socio-
cultural context can explain the form and volume of the evidence produced, 
how and by whom it is legally represented, and whether or not stories are 
used as a means to reinterpret legal rules. Anthropology examines the 
relationship between conceptions of legal rules and beliefs concerning the 
nature of social order and, ultimately, that of human beings. 
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(b) Anthropological Perspectives on Narrative: 
The social uses of narration are emphasised in anthropology. Thus, 
Carrithers (1992) observes: 
"(Narrative thought is) a capacity to cognize not merely immediate 
relations between oneself and another, but many-sided human 
interactions taking place over a considerable period ... So narrative 
thought consists not merely in telling stories, but of understanding 
complex nets of deeds and attitudes" (1992: 82). 
According to this description, stories provide the sort of social understanding 
used to interpret one's own actions and those of others. Narratives explain 
the meaning of individual actions/thoughts by placing them in culturally 
intelligible relationships with the wider context of time (including one's own 
past and future actions and intentions) and the external world (including 
physical/moral categories/laws and the actions/reactions of other people). 
Narratives can provide social understanding because they incorporate and 
mediate between so many heterogeneous elements; mirroring and ordering 
the complexity of social life. Carrithers argues that narrative understanding 
enables people to interact by providing a frame within which such interaction 
can occur. Negotiating the terms of a shared narrative framework means 
negotiating a social relationship between the persons concerned. 23 
Consequently anthropological approaches to narrative see the content of 
particular narratives as directly responsive to the specific social and cultural 
contexts in which they are produced, exchanged and consumed. This 
suggests that the most fruitful approach to the study of narratives is one 
which constantly tacks back and forth between an analysis of the specific 
social context within which particular narratives are exchanged and the study 
of the content of the narratives themselves. 24 
::.
1 Such a relationship need not be direct and face to face. but can be an ·exploded interaction' 
occurring m·cr wide temporal and spatial gaps. 
::
1 This is the approach of many anthropologists to linguistic facts. Bourdieu ( 1992). for instance, 
argues that one must eschew idealistic Yiews of language which see it as a sort of universal capacity 
all human beings arc equally endowed with. There is. rather. an economy of linguistic exchanges, 
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An interesting connection between story content and social contexts of 
narration is traced by Macintyre (1984). He explores differences between 
Homeric narratives and modern novels. In Homeric epics individuals are not 
distinguishable from, and unselfconscious about, their roles. Their actions are 
predictable: soldiers act as soldiers and kings as kings. Reference is rarely 
made to characters' thoughts and feelings, only to their actions. Thus what 
counts in the moral evaluation of a character is not the inner 'landscape of 
thought', but the outer 'landscape of action'. At issue is whether a character 
succeeds in performing the actions required by his role and his (subjective) 
self is therefore absorbed in his (social) role. By contrast, modern novels 
play on the distinction between internal desires and external expectations. 
They celebrate the inner self which confronts, questions and rejects its social 
role; fore-grounding the 'landscape of thought' more than that of action. 
These differences reflect variations in social organisation. In Homeric 
societies, narrative patterns were clear and predictable because there was 
less individualisation than at present and greater consensus about the way 
individuals in particular social settings should act. The morally praiseworthy 
virtues were therefore those which preserve this social structure by leading 
characters to perform the actions demanded by their roles. In the modern 
'Western' world, however, greater emphasis on the inner self of individuals 
reflects societies where moral consensus is less evident and where each 
individual is expected to construct his own moral universe. Thus, 
contemporary societies produce 'subjunctive', incommensurable, narratives. 
Macintyre's depiction of Homeric society may over-emphasise its social 
cohesion. taking epics at their face value. Yet his approach is useful because 
it highlights the close relationship between narrative contents, moral norms 
and culturally-specific conceptions of selfhood. This narratively constructed 
where words can be possessed in greater or lesser quantities. accumulated. exchanged and so on. 
Speakers aim to make a profit when they engage in linguistic exchange and the profit made depends 
on their social backgrounds and the social relationship existing between them. Davis ( 1988) has also 
spoken of the ·social relations of the production of history·. relating divergent historical accounts to 
their social contexts of narration. 
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linkage between individual lives and moral norms is a fruitful locus of 
anthropological research. Basso (1988), for instance, has shown how the 
Western Apache Indians he studied used stories as a means of indirect moral 
instruction; exploiting the shock of recognition engendered by the realisation 
that a casually told story actually relates to oneself. Kavouras (1994) has also 
described how the people known as 'trimistira' on the Greek island of 
Karpathos use their ability to construct and manipulate stories25 in order to 
criticise activities transgressing shared moral understandings, thus operating 
as agents of social control. 
While the way narratives create self-hood has also been explored from purely 
psychological angles (Freeman 1995), it is the social uses of particular 
narrative constructions of self which have interested anthropologists. Thus, 
Rosaldo (Bruner & Turner 1986) shows how the llongot hunt is also a 'hunt 
for stories', given the active male pursuit of incidents which can be 
meaningfully woven into hunting narratives to shed a favourable light on their 
selves. Meyerhoff (Bruner & Turner 1986) has also pointed to the uses of 
story-telling in creating social visibility for ageing and forgotten American 
Jews. Machin (1996) has taken these ideas a step further by showing how 
different stories can enable people to convey a different and even 
contradictory sense of self in different social contexts. He uses the evocative 
metaphor of 'navigation' to describe this process, which is therefore seen as 
complex, uncertain and unfinished. These studies find the anthropological 
utility of narrative analysis in that: 
"by attending to how the story is related, narrative analysis seeks 
to uncover the multiple meanings that reflect the connections 
between an individual's life and problems and public, historical, 
social structures. In so doing, the social nature of personal 
troubles is clarified through connections to public forces" (Lempert 
1994: 438). 
c' The narrati\·e competence of the ·trimistira · deri\·es from their ability to draw upon shared 
community knowledge and moral norms to define themselves as characters who conform to the 
traditional roles and who arc therefore entitled to criticise others. 
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An anthropological approach does not lead away from a study of the literary 
qualities of narratives. Rather, it explains why particular literary tactics are 
chosen. Thus in a discussion of Venezuelan political violence, Coronil and 
Skurski (1991) show how the state acted as a scriptwriter; crafting stories 
which enable ruling elites to gain political support. The crude inattention to 
detail and lack of realism of these political script-writers left many traces 
indicating the falsity of the story. Paradoxically, however, state interests were 
best served by the obvious inadequacies in the story told: 
"Our interpretation of the Amparo massacre suggests that the 
Venezuelan state asserted its authority in a theatrical mode, 
constructing a drama whose plot re-enacted the civilising myth of 
the state as the scriptwriter. This simulacrum --the representation 
of the illusion of representing the real-- rests on the controlled 
tension between fact and appearance, between attention to 
evidence and disregard for conflicting information, and thus on the 
willingness to allow cracks in the performance to reveal the 
arbitrariness of authority. Fear grows out of these cracks" (Coronil 
& Skurski 1991: 31 0). 
Social analysis can therefore explain the lack of literary ability of narrators, 
demonstrating anthropology's power to enliven literary analysis. 
There have already been anthropological analyses of the narratives 
produced in litigation. Fiume (1996) has explored the judicial confessions of 
Sicilian women, accused of poisoning their husbands in the eighteenth 
century. Her approach is two-pronged. On one hand, she interprets these 
narratives by exposing the broader socio-cultural context they presuppose, 
characterised by fragile nuclear families, the importance of neighbourhood 
and a specific moral economy of conjugality. On the other, she shows how 
these stories also reflect specific court-room relations of narration. Thus their 
content also responds to the questions asked by judges, throwing light on 
their attitudes. 26 
~,, These stories show hmv judicial perceptions belied the formal legal dissociation between witchcraft 
and poisoning. In fact. judges subjected these women to the same punishment (i.e. death by burning) 
pre\·iously meted out to witches. 
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(c) Anthropological Representation: 
My final reason for adopting an anthropological approach is rooted in the 
nature of anthropological knowledge itself. It hardly bears repeating that 
anthropology pays attention to the social and cultural context of interaction, 
or that it aims for holistic description, especially of cultural perceptions, in 
explaining human activities. As shown, all these features of anthropology 
constitute arguments in favour of the adoption of such an approach; 
particularly in view of the special requirements which such a study should, in 
my opinion, fulfil. However, an even more compelling reason stems from the 
similarities between legal representation and anthropology; especially the 
shared centrality of what I have termed the rule/narrative dialectic. 
These similarities can be introduced by reflecting on ethnographic film. In a 
thought-provoking article (MacDougall 1994 ), the anthropologist film-maker 
MacDougall has questioned the general belief that ethnographic film is the 
anthropologist's own story about an indigenous people. He shows how such 
films can serve the purposes of the apparently objectified 'others', often in 
ways which the anthropologist film-maker is completely unaware of. This 
happens, for instance, when Australian aboriginals use the film to instruct 
younger generations on the sacred sites they must care for. MacDougall 
argues that we must consequently be wary of assuming that we know who the 
story 'belongs' to. We should be open to the possibility that representing the 
stories of others may involve the anthropologist herself; so that the film is: "no 
longer outside the situation it describes, (being) inside someone else's story" 
(MacDougall 1994: 35). When one compares this article to that by Miller on 
legal representation, 27 it seems clear that they both share a view of narrative 
as potentially subversive of the established categories of their respective 
disciplines of law and anthropology. 
:-Sec the prc\'ious section of this chapter. on ·Legal Story-Telling·. 
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This analysis therefore highlights the way both anthropologists and lawyers 
have to represent the stories of clients/informants and to align them with 
general paradigms, whether these consist of legal rules or anthropological 
theories. In the case of anthropology, this tension is heightened since its 
principal tool of investigation, participant observation, is itself guaranteed to 
produce a fund of stories which constitute the anthropologists' field 
experience. These stories must then be converted into knoweledge of a 
paradigmatic sort. Carrithers describes this process in this way: 
"Consequently anthropological knowledge begins as personal 
knowledge about particular people in a particular place at a 
particular time (1992: 148) ... Upon this basis is then erected a 
superstructure of paradigmatic knowledge" (Ibid: 150). 
Anthropological writing therefore incorporates within itself the dialectical 
tension between generic paradigms and particular stories which I have 
viewed as central to an understanding of legal representation. Moreover, 
recent ethnographies reflexively exploit this tension to explore the limitations 
of anthropological research. Thus, Abu-Lughod (1993) has deliberately 
shunned any attempt to generalise extensively about the social structure or 
the culture of the Bedouins. Instead, she has simply tried to reproduce the 
stories which female members of the family she lived with told her. In this 
way, she argues that the Western reader is left relatively free to react to the 
common existential dilemmas she shares with the Bedouin and the distancing 
effect of powerful ethnographic discourse is neutralised. Indeed, the only 
space for general paradigmatic theories in her book lies in the titles of the 
chapters. These are given names such as 'Honour' or 'Patrilineality'; so as to 
provocatively evoke time-worn anthropological themes in the context of vivid 
personal stories which ironically counterpoint them. It is hardly surprising, in 
this context, that she has been criticised for her neglect of theoretical 
generalisation (Lindholm: 1995}, or that there are concurrent calls to 'put the 
law back' into anthropology (Biolsi 1995). 
This shows how the interplay between rules and stories is reproduced at the 
level of theoretical debate itself. But precisely because anthropology mirrors 
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law in having to negotiate the gap between narrativised experience and 
paradigmatic knowledge and because it reflexively analyses this process, it is 
an ideal tool for the study of legal representation. Here the very act of 
anthropological writing can be seen to offer grounds for reflection on and 
knowledge of the process of representation. 
5. The Theoretical Hypothesis. 
At this point it is possible to be relatively brief. In this thesis, I adopt an 
anthropological approach to the study of Maltese legal representation. I do so 
by means of a holistic analysis which follows the ordinary course of a law-suit 
and focuses on the way in which evidence is elicited, censored, exchanged, 
represented and consumed during each stage of the case. In the process, I 
am particularly interested in the dialectical relationship between stories and 
legal rules. This relationship will be explored by looking at the particular 
social and cultural context within which specific narratives are produced. In 
this way, the social uses of narrative will be foregrounded, particularly the 
connections between legal rules, moral norms and subjective experience. At 
the same time, such an analysis will form the basis of broader reflections on 
the social effects of the Maltese legal system. 
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Chapter 3: Studying legcal Practice 
"Perhaps British Colonialism has produced a new sort of being, a 
dual man aimed at two ways at once: towards peace and simplicity on 
the one hand, towards an exhausted intellectual searching on the 
other" (Bianchi, Cassola & Serracino Inglett 1995: 39). 
1. The Origins of My Research Project. 
The theoretical appeal of anthropological research on legal representation 
should, by now, be clear. However traditional conceptions of anthropology 
raise doubts about my credentials for carrying out this research. These 
conceptions glorify the alien identity of the anthropologist within the culture 
he studies, seeing this as indispensable for the production of anthropological 
knowledge. By contrast, I am Maltese, having a law degree and a warrant to 
practise as a lawyer in Malta. Moreover anthropologists traditionally research 
a 'culture' or 'society', while studying legal representation foregrounds a set 
of work practices. Tackling these objections requires saying as much about 
my own life-history as about contemporary anthropology. 1 This will set the 
stage for an explanation of the fieldwork methods used, which will be 
described within the narrative context of my research. These methodological 
issues will in turn justify the selection of the specific mode of organising and 
expressing research findings employed in this thesis. 
I shall therefore begin with my story. Yet to say this is to acknowledge my 
own role in constructing the narrative which follows. One must keep in mind 
that this story is being produced in an attempt to engage with the 
paradigmatic rules structuring the writing of an anthropology thesis. This is 
1 Ethnographies increasingly acknowledge the role played by the ethnographer's own biography in the 
production of her research findings (Okely & Callaway 1992). Okely observes: ''In Britain questions 
of renexiYity and personal aspects of fieldwork were made most apparent during the 1985 ASA 
conference Anthropology at Home (Jackson: 1987). because the anthropologists were obliged to be 
self-conscious about the similarities or contrasts in the context of fieldwork in their native country" 
(Okcly & Callaway 1992: II). 
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not 'The Complete Story', but a highly selective version of events, told from 
my present standpoint in the form of a series of iconic episodes. 
The first episode of this account starts with me as a six year old transplanted 
to England by his parents. My father was studying for his Ph. D. and -given 
the closely bonded character of the Maltese nuclear family- my mother and 1 
also came to accompany him. For a child who only knew how to speak in 
Maltese, the experience of fourteen months in an English school was initially 
traumatic. Apparently I took to shouting in an attempt to make myself 
understood. Not surprisingly, I was not very popular. Certain experiences 
from that period remain imprinted in my memory; such as the burning 
sensation of being pushed on to a clump of nettles. However the situation 
altered when my mother decided to take me in hand and teach me English. 
As I gradually mastered the language, I ceased to be such an obvious target 
for bullying. I developed a taste for reading, becoming more introvert than 
before. Maltese was forgotten in my absorption with this new English world. 
The second episode of this tale sees me back in Malta, attempting to 
understand what my Maltese schoolmates were jabbering about. To my 
dismay, I now found Maltese unintelligible and had to re-learn it gradually. 
Once again I experienced the sensation of being an outsider, aggravated by 
the fact that everybody expected me to understand and to join in. Yet it took 
three years to re-learn Maltese and the process was never fully completed. 
To this day, I am prone to make silly mistakes, confusing the gender of 
words. At times, it seemed impossible to really integrate into Maltese society, 
just as I could never be English. This experience carved out within me what 
Okell has termed a 'hybrid identity', from the perspective of which all fixed 
identities seemed questionable. 
: Okcly has described the importance of her own identity as a child born in Malta in nourishing her 
:mareness of difTerence and sympathy with groups who are not incorporated within dominant 
hegemonies. Her point was that eYen apparently residual traces of a different identity (such as being 
born in Malta) may create such ··spaces of hybridity .. (Talk given to the Anthropology Programme of 
the Uni\crsity ofMalta in March 1997). 
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The third episode takes us forward another thirteen years or so. I was now a 
law-student at the University of Malta, with no clear idea of the shape of my 
future career. Having joined the course with the explicit aim of keeping 
options open, this began to seem like a big mistake. Law did not excite me 
and I did not get on with many of my fellow students. We were supposed to 
memorise hundreds of sections of the law codes, yet it was not clear to me 
how these sections could possibly influence the lives of ordinary people. My 
insecure questioning attitude was the very opposite of the self-confident 
arrogance which people expected from a law student. Indeed, telling people 
that I studied law gave them the chance to project their fantasies about 
lawyers on to me. Middle-class Maltese credited me with immense cunning 
and deceptive skills, while the working class treated me with hostility and 
suspicion. People wondered aloud about my career prospects whenever I 
told inadvertent truths or acted insecurely, openly informing me that I did not 
seem like a lawyer and doubting my ability to practise law. 
In the middle of these doubts and hesitations, the opportunity arose to spend 
a summer doing anthropology fieldwork in a Maltese village. The experience 
of 'doing fieldwork' showed me how doubts and questions could be exploited 
in order to produce social knowledge. It seemed that I had discovered work 
which was enjoyable, provided real insights into the working o~t of social life 
and allowed me to be creative. I decided to leave the law course and read for 
a B.A. in Social Anthropology, only changing my mind on realising that it 
would be possible to read for an M.A. if I stuck it out for a year or two more 
until I acquired my law degree 
On completing the law course, my inability to assume a lawyer's identity 
seemed even more obvious. After six years of studying law, it was impossible 
to advise clients purely on the strength of the abstract theories I had learned. 
This perception was reinforced by the professional socialisation I had 
undergone as a law student. The process of 'becoming' a lawyer was 
presented as consisting of two phases. In the first six years, the University 
degree is obtained. In the following two to three year period of 'prattika' (i.e. 
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practice) a law graduate attaches himself to an established lawyer as a 
glorified office-boy. In return for helping with the more mundane tasks of 
lawyering, he gains the opportunity to observe his lawyer-patron advising 
clients, drafting judicial acts and engaging in litigation in court. A rigid 
demarcation is maintained between the two phases and only those law 
graduates who undergo the second phase begin to earn the right to be 
considered as 'real' lawyers by members of the profession. Law students are 
constantly told that 'il-prattika kollox' (legal practice is what counts), and that: 
'meta tohrog mi/1-universita tkun ghadek ma taf xejn' (when you emerge from 
University, you as yet know nothing). 
On commencing my studies in anthropology, I became aware of the gulf 
which separated me from my former class-mates who were doing their 
'prattika'. They were increasingly involved in a professional world which I had 
resolutely steered clear of. Yet simultaneously anthropology too seemed to 
be moving closer towards this professional world. My studies taught me that 
there was a growing tendency for anthropologists to study their own societies 
(Jackson 1987, Hastrup 1996) and that there has also been a parallel shift in 
the objects of study. Like the lawyers, anthropologists too have began to 
emphasise the importance of studying and observing practice. Thus, 
Bourdieu, for example, has criticised classical anthropological studies for 
ignoring the specific 'practical logic' (Bourdieu 1997:80) which motivates 
social action. 3 This situation can only be remedied if anthropologists develop 
a theory of practice, which pays attention to the practical motivations of social 
action without neglecting the 'objectivist' perspective. 
' This is because anthropologists project on to the people they study their own relationship to local 
culture. which is that of a detached. ·objective·. obsen·er. On the other hand. the people studied have 
an instmmental ,·iew of culture which they primarily encounter in relation to their subjective practical 
concerns. Being produced from an ·objectiYe · theoretical position. anthropological descriptions of 
social action sYstematical!\· distort the real motivations of action. Bourdieu compares these accounts to 
a description ~f a man digging a hole in terms of the ever-rising mound of soil which he deposi~s 
around him. This mound is completely invisible for the digger. because his practical activity forces 
him to concentrate on the hole. 
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These shifts in the focus of anthropological study reflect emerging global 
trends which have also led anthropologists to query the validity of the 
traditional conception of culture. The view of cultures as 'bounded wholes' 
(Kristmundsdottir 1996: 65) is an integral part of the claim that they cannot be 
studied by indigenous anthropologists. 4 Yet this claim is not tenable in the 
light of studies which draw attention to intra-cultural variation (Okely 1996), or 
which reveal international processes impinging on local realities. Thus, Albert 
(1997) has shown how anthropologists engaged in international advocacy on 
behalf of indigenous peoples5 are well aware of the deficiencies of the 
traditional view of cultures as: "theological monads haunted by history's 
corrosive process" (Albert 1997: 61 ). 
In the light of these developments it seemed that 'prattika' was actually a form 
of indigenous participant-observation used by law students in order to 
familiarise themselves with the professional world of legal practice. My 
previous problems with assuming a lawyer's identity had kindled an interest 
in describing and exploring this professional world; the more so because I felt 
estranged from it. When choosing a field in which to conduct research, I 
understood that my law degree could be used to provide a privileged access 
to the world of legal practice which could serve the purpose of ethnographic 
description. My Maltese identity was only an obstacle if I projected a degree 
of homogeneity on to Maltese culture which both my personal history and 
1 On this point. it is interesting to follow the debate between Kristmundsdottir and Hastrup in the 
pages of ,\'ocial .lnthmpology. the journal of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (Vol 
.J part I. 19%) . Kristmundsdottir accused Hastrup of rejecting the possibility of indigenous 
anthropology on the basis of an essentialist view of cultures as separate. internally uniform, entities. 
Hastmp denied holding such a view of culture and claimed that her arguments had been 
misunderstood. She had not intended to question the possibility of doing anthropology 'at home·, but 
to affirm the impossibility of simultaneously speaking as an insider and an anthropologist, given that 
"anthropologists have to distance themselves analytically from whatever local world they are 
studying·· (Hastmp: 19%: 7X). 
'Here: "the anthropologist's ·observation· is no longer merely ·participant'; his social 'participation· 
has become both the condition and the framework of his field research" (Albert 1997: 58). 
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anthropological training led me to question. 6 Nor did I lack evidence of my 
incomplete socialisation into the professional world of legal practice. In brief, 
if naivete is an anthropologist's prime qualification, I was not lacking in it. 
Pull factors also operated. Excitingly most 'Western' legal systems were terra 
incognita for anthropology. Sociologists and linguists had also encountered 
serious methodological difficulties in conducting research. These have been 
instructively reviewed in an article tellingly entitled: "Obstacles to the Study of 
Lawyer-Client Interaction: the Biography of a Failure" (Danet, Hoffman, & 
Kermish: 1980). This recounts the failure of a research project based on 
structured interviews with lawyers and clients. This was due to a number of 
factors, ranging from lawyers' lack of interest to concerns regarding 
professional secrecy. One lesson the authors derive is: 
" ..... it may be wise to start by carrving out what are often 
called 'anthropological' observational studies, intensive 
observations of how lawyers spend their work days over a 
relatively long period of time. This approach also has the 
advantage of gaining greater trust and goodwill on the part of 
the attorney" (Ibid: 920). 
Thus, various factors motivated my decision to carry out anthropological 
research on Maltese legal representation. These included the opportunity to 
apply participant observation in a field which was accessible to me, where 
such research methods had rarely been used and to which they seemed well 
suited. In the course of my research, however, I employed a variety of 
research techniques and also redefined my understanding of participant-
observation in line with my growing familiarity with the field. So as to explore 
these issues more fully, it is necessary to tell the story of my research. As this 
is, in a sense, the aim of this thesis as a whole, only the broad outlines of my 
fieldwork experience will here be described. 
" Indeed the gap between Maltese and English cultures has been internalised and reproduced within 
Malta itself: which is a former colony of England. The Maltese constantly compare the relative 
adYantages of Maltese culture. seen as backward but authentic and English which symbolises 
modernity. This way of thinking is captured by the quotation at the beginning of this chapter. Thus, 
anthropological comparison resonates strongly with indigenous concerns. 
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2. Initial 'Prattika' in 1995. 
My research took place within a period of roughly two years stretching from 
March 1995 to May 1997. I do not remember my fieldwork as a continuous 
flow, but as a series of dead-ends; returns to the drawing board and new 
beginnings. To do justice to the episodic quality of my fieldwork experience, 1 
shall attempt to describe these shifts and turning points . 
Initial fieldwork took place between March and May 1995. During this period 
my research was modelled on the traditional pattern of 'prattika'. I attached 
myself to the office of an established Maltese lawyer who had been one of my 
professors during my days as a law student. This lawyer, whom I will here call 
Doctor Camilleri,- had taken an interest in me and encouraged me during the 
law course. He had a large practice and was considered a lawyer who could 
handle any type of case, unlike some who had specialised too narrowly. He 
was an ideal contact for my purposes, since he could show me how legal 
representation occurred across a wide social spectrum. I therefore told him 
about my research plans, requesting permission to attend his office and 
making it clear that he would have the right to veto anything I wrote. He 
generously made no objections to my proposal. At this point it seemed best to 
keep a low profile and concentrate on developing my understanding of Dr. 
Camilleri's work rather than developing other links. This was because 
'prattika' normally creates a close relationship of trust between the lawyer and 
his apprentice. The latter acquires confidential information which could be 
very useful to competitors. Attempts to contact other lawyers might therefore 
have been considered as a form of treachery. 
Following the normal pattern of 'prattika', I therefore spent every weekday 
morning in court. I followed Dr. Camilleri around as he passed from one 
court-room to another, handling an array of different cases. At around noon, 
This is a pseudonym. 
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he would generally take a coffee break in one of the cafes which surround the 
law-courts and are known lawyer haunts. Afterwards we would return to court, 
where he would wind up the day's litigation. Then we would walk to his office, 
which was situated in Valletta, close to the courts. Here he would settle 
pending paperwork with his secretary. 
In the evenings, Dr. Camilleri would listen to the clients who had come to him 
for advice in his own 'inner' office. 8 During these sessions, Dr. Camilleri 
would inform the client that I would like to be present. He generally told them 
that I was a lawyer, often adding with a smile that I was making an 
anthropological study of lawyers and clients. Clients would take this as a 
joke. They almost always accepted my presence, although Dr. Camilleri made 
it clear that they could refuse. By accepting me, clients showed their respect 
for Dr. Camilleri, which extended to anyone whom he chose to befriend. It 
was a statement that they had nothing to hide and were eager to promote the 
advance of learning. Since I had been introduced as a lawyer, they also saw 
me as a useful contact for the future. Often they would ostentatiously shake 
my hand on being introduced, thus trying to seal the relationship. 
I would sit next to the clients opposite Dr. Camilleri's desk and observe the 
interaction; trying to store everything up in my head. I tried to keep notes a 
couple of times, but the clients looked at me so suspiciously when I did so 
that I soon stopped doing so. Even taking notes in the interval between the 
departure of one set of clients and the entry of a new set seemed to disturb 
incoming clients. So I took to scribbling indecipherable mnemonics on my 
notebook, relying on memory to fill in the details later on. 
This initial phase of my fieldwork stands out in my recollection as an 
extremely 'participant' period. This was because I was conforming to all the 
requirements of the 'prattika' relationship in quite an exemplary manner. I was 
x This was separated from the outer office by a closed door which effectively ensured that each client 
would not be m·cr-heard by the others waiting patiently outside. 
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spending so much time rushing around the courts and the legal office that I 
had little time to calmly observe what was going on around me. Dr. Camilleri 
seemed pleased with my progress and started little by little to introduce me to 
the world of legal practice. He recommended that I change my clothing when 
coming to court with him. Previously, I had simply worn a shirt and trousers. 
But Dr. Camilleri advised me to wear a black tie, a white shirt and a black suit 
and my lawyer's 'toga'. 9 These new clothes entitled me to stand in the 
lawyers' section of the court-room, 10 endowing me with the identity of a lawyer 
and enabling me to observe the litigation in progress from close quarters. 
Although I had made it clear that my primary goal was to carry out my 
fieldwork, I was becoming more and more involved in the legal work carried 
out in Dr. Camilleri's office. Work also came my way simply as a result of my 
presence in court wearing the 'toga'. Twice lawyers recommended to judges 
that I be appointed a legal referee11 to deal with a pending case. I accepted 
on both occasions, since I was growing increasingly bemused by the sheer 
variety of lawsuits encountered and thought that a close involvement with 
these two cases might allow me to concentrate on the real issues at stake. 
It was becoming obvious that I had become over-involved in legal practice to 
the point where there was not enough time to distance myself from the field. 
Paradoxically, in other respects, I felt too distant from what was going on 
around me. Dr. Camilleri's practice was a large one and Maltese court-cases 
tend to proceed in fits and starts, taking years to be decided. Meanwhile, 
lawyer's work consists of servicing ongoing cases and advising clients on 
'' In Malta lawyers arc obliged to wear a black cloak. known as a 'toga' when they appear before a 
judge in court litigation. Lawyers usually go to the collective locker-room in the lawyers' chambers 
and put on their togas the moment they enter the court. only taking them off when they leave. Togas 
therefore scn·c to diiTcrcntiatc lawyers from laymen within the court building. 
1
" Sec chapter eight for a description of the spatial set-up of Maltese court-rooms. 
11 Legal referees arc court appointed experts who hear pending testimony and write a report opining 
on the points at issue in a case. While this opinion can be used by the judge in his final judgement, he 
is not obliged to agree with it. Sec chapter nine for a more detailed description of this role. 
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their strategic options. During sporadic court appearances, lawyers might 
question a witness or present a document. They might also give speeches 
explaining their position or attacking that of an adversary. Court work 
therefore presented itself as a series of disconnected, piecemeal, activities. 
Each of these activities was only explicable with reference to the story of the 
case to which it referred, which I did not know. Nor, given Dr. Camilleri's 
constant oscillation from one case to another, did I have enough time to 
unearth it. I also worried that I was intruding too heavily into the life of this 
one lawyer, who already had enough work to keep him busy, without having 
to tackle the constant negotiation required to explain my presence. 
This period came to an end in the summer of 1995, when my job at the 
University of Malta's Law Faculty12 was upgraded. At the time the faculty was 
passing through a period of administrative reorganisation which involved the 
restructuring of the law courses and t~e teaching curricu..llJm. As part of my 
job responsibilities, I was requested to formulate a catalogue of course 
descriptions of the teaching carried out by law lecturers. Although it was quite 
intensive, I was happy to be involved with this task. It gave me the 
opportunity to utilise the summer period, when legal work normally grinds to a 
standstill, for the purpose of my field research. It also gave me useful 
contacts with many of the key players in the Maltese legal scene; ranging 
from ordinary lawyers to public prosecutors, judges and magistrates. In this 
way, I gained a deeper understanding of the way in which law lecturers 
perceive law. 13 
1
' In IIJ!J.t. I had applied for and obtained the post of part-time assistant lecturer in the Faculty of 
La\\s. In the summer of I!JIJ5. my work responsibilities were upgraded. I was required to assist with 
teaching. supen·ision of students and the Law Faculty·s project on human rights in the 
Mediterranean. 
I.\ I also contacted one of the University lecturers. who was engaged in historical research on the Law 
Faculty and offered to help him in this project in exchange for access to the historical documentation 
he and his team had gathered. This documentation ranged from old minutes of faculty meetings to 
course curricula and records of the careers of particular law teachers. It provided me with valuable 
insights into the history of the Maltese legal profession. 
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3. My "Multiple Native Strategy" in 1995/96. 
With the start of the 1995/96 forensic year, I changed my fieldwork strategy, 
choosing to scale down my court visits with Dr. Camilleri. A focus on legal 
offices was partly dictated by my inability to understand what was going on in 
court; itself a result of the fast-paced and fragmented nature of court-work. In 
legal offices, by contrast, I could hear clients' stories in full and in their own 
terms. Here I could observe the subtle negotiations between lawyers and 
clients, at the intersection between their conceptions of what it is possible 
and desirable to do. Moreover, my court visits were giving me an excessively 
well defined identity as an aspiring young lawyer and linking me closely with 
Dr. Camilleri in the eyes of the court community. This was prejudicing my 
ability to project myself as a student or a researcher: to elicit other views and 
observe a variety of contexts. In short, my field of research seemed unduly 
restricted by the constraints of the 'prattika' relationship. 
To overcome these constraints I took other steps distancing me from the 
'prattika' relationship; deciding to conduct similar fieldwork in other legal 
offices. I contacted another lawyer: Dr. Borg, and a notary: Dr. Zarb; 14 
requesting permission to observe them at work. Both accepted and from then 
on I divided my evening observations among these three legal professionals, 
paying particular attention to Dr. Borg. Since Dr. Borg opened his office at 
around 7 p.m. and rarely closed before 11 p.m., most of my fieldwork in this 
year was done at night. Attending different offices allowed me to make 
comparisons between them. 
In the mornings, I started to visit the courts on my own and did not wear my 
'toga' when I went there. As a result, I no longer had access to the lawyers' 
section of the court-room. However, this was made up for since I could now 
sit among the general public and observe the way in which they experienced 
court sittings. Since I was not following anyone around, I could select a case 
11 Again. these arc both pseudonyms. Sec chapter four for the difference between lawyers and 
notaries. 
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which interested me and observe the litigation there for as long as it took. 
Meanwhile, there were now two court-cases in which I was the court 
appointed legal referee. Here I had a professional role, acting as a sort of 
substitute judge. These cases gave me a professional understanding of the 
dynamics of litigation which complemented the layman's perspective acquired 
through my other court visits. During this period, I was also involved in 
teaching in the Law Faculty. 15 Teaching provided insights into the mentality of 
law students and the specific attitudes towards knowledge, representation 
and power which they absorbed in the course of their studies. 
My fieldwork was an intensive experience because I also tried to observe my 
family, friends and my own self. I was always eager to note down any 
reference to the legal system I came across. The local media provided me 
with a lot of information, which I tried to analyse. Moreover, some of my 
friends were now practising lawyers and we used to meet in local bars. These 
meetings were a chance for them to relax and exchange information about 
the working of the system. This was necessary due to the sheer mass of 
detail they had to master in order to perform competently. It is next to 
impossible for any one person to know all the laws, regulations, cases and 
bureaucratic practices which structure legal work. Thus, these meetings 
showed me the difficulties lawyers face in establishing themselves. 
To sum up, my fieldwork strategy during the 1995/96 forensic year involved 
abandoning the social framework of 'prattika' and adopting what the native 
anthropologist Mascarenhas-Keyes has called a 'multiple native strategy'. 
This meant exploiting different facets of my own social identity so as to: 
" .. transcend an a priori ascribed social position in the society 
in order, like the Outsider, professionally to relate to the 
whole spectrum of native social categories" (Mascarenhas-
Keyes, in Jackson 1987: 180). 
1
' I taught two modules on legal anthropology and gave tutorials in philosophy of law and civil law. 
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In the course of the year, various identities were ascribed to me in the 
different domains in which I moved. In court I was initially regarded as a 
young lawyer engaged in 'prattika' with Dr. Camilleri. I was therefore given 
friendly paternalistic advice by the more established lawyers and regarded as 
a colleague by other young lawyers. To a certain extent, I maintained this 
professional identity when I went to court in connection with my duties as a 
legal referee. Here I was regarded as a legal professional in my own right by 
both the lawyers involved and their clients. However I acquired a different 
identity when I started attending court without the 'toga' and sitting with the 
general public. While I was sometimes thought to be a client; I was blatantly 
taking notes on the goings on and this was something clients do not do. My 
first clue as to the way judges regarded me came when one judge observed 
to me that he liked to explain himself clearly when journalists were present in 
his court. 16 I was quite pleased with this identity, which legitimated my 
presence in court, and did not disabuse this judge. 
Those lawyers who already knew me also found my behaviour difficult to 
explain. It was inconceivable to them that a lawyer should go to court unless 
he had some legal work to do there and no lawyer, given the option, would 
choose journalism in preference to legal work. Lawyers also largely base 
their status on the amount of their work; largely gauged by the busy image 
they project in court. By taking the time to observe court sittings in which I did 
not have a professional role, I was advertising my lack of legal work and this 
meant that I had not managed to 'catch on' as a lawyer. Many of them 
consequently regarded me as a failed lawyer, treating me with mixed pity and 
contempt. I found this identity much more difficult to come to terms with than 
that of a journalist and it took an effort to avoid internalising their view of 
me. 17 Yet this also gave me a certain obscurity which facilitated my research. 
1
'' Journalists arc normally the only persons who come to court and take notes on the proceedings. 
1
- Fortier ( 19%) has described similar ambivalent feelings towards the identities she was ascribed in 
the field. She describes how her agnostic beliefs were no obstacle to studying a Catholic community, 
because cYcryonc unquestioningly assumed she was Catholic (Fortier. A: 1996: 311). Like her, I relate 
the strength of such assumptions to the hegemonic status of the belief systems they reflect. 
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Differing identities were also ascribed to me in the legal offices I attended. 
Unlike Dr. Camilleri, Doctors Borg and Zarb, expected me to sit on their side 
of the desk facing the clients. They occasionally asked me to confirm their 
opinion on the case, especially when clients seemed loathe to accept their 
advice. Because of my position, my formal clothes 18 and the fact that I 
supported the lawyer, I was seen as being broadly 'on his side'. Moreover, 
clients were often told that I was a lawyer. Some were bemused that a lawyer 
was sitting there without doing any work. They asked me why I had not yet 
started to practise, finding this rather mysterious. Indeed, some were very 
suspicious of me and tried to say as little as possible in front of me. Most 
clients, however, welcomed my presence. Some did so because they saw me 
as a rather naive, well-brought up young man. They would try to teach me 
about the wickedness of the world; cautioning me against behaving like the 
other lawyers and deceiving people. Others saw me as a 'studjuz' (i.e. a 
scholar) and were eager to convey their life experiences to me. I was a 
godsend to them because I gave them the opportunity of telling their stories 
to a willing ear; something their lawyers did not always have the time for. 
Managing these different identities required tact and generated anxiety. In 
court, I felt that my project was a presumptuous one. Why did I believe that I 
could write anything of value about a system which had been so profoundly 
studied by eminent legal scholars? One lawyer warned me that I was 'playing 
with fire'. Another complained that I was going to 'make us look like a banana 
state'. Others claimed that there was nothing to observe and that my research 
was an exercise in futility. My departure from the normal pattern of 'prattika' 
also created problems because it meant that I might acquire valuable 
information about the strategies of opponents. The lawyers I contacted were 
aware of this and warned me not to turn up at the office on those days when 
1 
x 1 always made it a point to wear formal clothes whenever I attended legal offices. I felt that casual 
clothing would haYe implied a lack of respect to the lawyers who were helping me and that formal 
clothes helped legitimate my position in their offices. Since I was not actually involved with legal 
\\Ork. this felt rather like engaging in a "dranunaturgical exercise" (Mascarenhas-Keyes in Jackson 
IIJX7 I X2 ). Similar feelings haYe been reported by Okcly (1993 :-l3 ). 
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they were seeing clients whose opponents in litigation were represented by 
other lawyers I had observed. 
There were other ethical problems which were intrinsic to my research 
project. Thus I seemed not to be reciprocating the assistance which lawyers 
were giving me. With time I realised that this impression was rather 
misleading. After all I provided company to lawyers and also endorsed their 
advice to clients. 19 Indeed my very presence in the office signalled the 
prestige of the lawyer to his clients, showing that he had followers who were 
eager to learn from him. However, I remained uncomfortable about the fact 
that I was simply 'observing' in a context where everyone around me was 
working furiously and trying to cope with vital personal problems. In this 
setting, my research could seem a vacuous waste of time. 
This impression was reinforced by lawyers' reactions to my research. The 
most sympathetic asked me with obvious doubts whether I had observed 
anything useful. One lawyer saw me as a heaven-sent opportunity to have a 
bit of fun by parodying my attitude. He made no secret of his conviction that 
my research was simply 'hmerijief (i.e. childish nonsense) and used to 
silently fix his gaze on me whenever I entered the office. He would continue 
to look straight at me for a long while without saying a word. After some 
minutes this could be quite an unnerving experience. Eventually I understood 
that this was his way of mocking my attempt to exercise the 'anthropological 
gaze'. This made me more aware of the rather arrogant pose that I was 
adopting. In trying to become a pure observer, I was perhaps distancing 
myself excessively from the people I was studying. 
I used to show draft copies of chapters to the lawyers who collaborated with 
my research. Believing this to be an important exercise in intellectual 
1 
'' Some lawyers found it a relief to be able to tell me what they really thought about a client after 
ha,·ing to pretend to agree with his yiews. 1 grew used to comments like: ""this client is a bit obsessed 
with her case.·· or ··that man is lying. you know."· Often I was asked for my views on the psychological 
or social problems im·ol\'ed. as lawyers assumed that I had a special expertise in this area. 
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honesty, I made it clear that I was ready to amend anything they disagreed 
with. Lawyers would waive aside any suggestion that they would change 
anything, claiming that they had faith in my ability to write objectively. They 
would then look at what I wrote in complete silence and pass some comment 
like: 'this is certainly not something a lawyer would write'. Some would seize 
on some detail I wrote, asking if I had really observed this. Others questioned 
my objectivity; arguing that in order to write as I had one had to refer to many 
more statistics. Despite their good will, it was clear that they considered my 
writings as dealing with insignificant details of marginal relevance to the real 
tasks of lawyering. The fact that I wrote about matters such as the idioms 
used in disputing confirmed the marginality of my research in their eyes. 
Additional unease was caused by the task of anthropological representation 
itself. I did not want to feed on the sometimes tragic details of clients' private 
lives, nor to exploit them by laying their lives open to the scrutiny of a wider 
audience. I consoled myself with the thought that I was not interested in 
individuals as such, but only on the light they could throw on broader social 
trends. 20 My research would preserve clients' anonymity and might help them 
by reporting their views on the legal system and exposing processes by 
which they were disempowered. 
The tensions and anxieties resulting from the pursuit of a 'multiple-native 
strategy' were themselves an important source of knowledge. In this I follow 
recent trends in anthropology which: "exploit the intrusive self as an 
ethnographic resource rather than a methodological hindrance" (Okely & 
Callaway 1992: 226). My sense of the dangerous yet vacuous nature of my 
research, for instance, seemed to result partly from my internalisation of 
lawyers' views on ethnographic writing. Because their own work entails 
creating authoritative representations of their clients, lawyers are highly 
c" MY relations with mv familv and friends were not badlv affected bv my research. I made my 
inteniions clear from th~ start ;md I am grateful to my law)·er friends for their assistance with my 
work. Yet a note of unease did creep into these relationships: largely because nobody (not even I) 
knew when I was conducting fieldwork and when I was simply interacting as a family member/friend. 
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conscious of the power of written descriptions and they are also pre-disposed 
to favour representations which can be easily fitted converted into legal 
terminology and to ignore those which cannot. For this reason, lawyers 
tended to identify the value and possible danger of my research in that it was 
going to result in a written document; a book in fact. Yet on reading my 
writings, they discovered that these were describing such legally irrelevant 
features as emotions, gestures and metaphors. Lawyers were therefore 
obliged to conclude that my research dealt with trivia. 
Finally, I also learned important lessons about being a lawyer directly through 
my body (Okely 1992, Mitchell 1997). In the course of my fieldwork, I 
incorporated particular ways of moving in court. I learned how to look at 
clients, how to deal with court personnel and how to speak if I wanted judges 
to listen to me. In other situations, I learned what clients feel when they have 
to wait in the street for an hour until their lawyer comes to open his office; or 
when they sit mutely in the court while lawyers stand and argue their cases. 
The lessons I learned here were particularly effectively learned because they 
were not explicitly taught but implicitly experienced (Bourdieu 1997). The 
emphasis lawyers put on textual and linguistic reality further disguised the 
significance of this indirect physical socialisation, making it more effective. 
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4. Rediscovering law in 1996/97 
By the close of the 1995/96 forensic year, I wrote up some of my 
observations in legal offices. This allowed me to review the research I had 
carried out. On reflection it seemed that in moving away from the constraints 
of 'prattika', I had been too eager to distance myself from a lawyer's 
perspective on his work. What I had written largely consisted of 
phenomenological observations of discourse and behaviour. References to 
legal rules and written documents were conspicuous by their absence. 
Although I could not accept the views of those lawyers who denigrate any 
attempt to describe the legal system in non-legal terms, it seemed advisable 
to complement my research by a closer exploration of the legal issues 
involved in each case. 
In an attempt to come closer to the lawyers' point of view, I asked Dr. 
Camilleri for access to some of his clients files. These files were kept in Dr. 
Camilleri's outer office, under the watchful eyes of his competent secretary. 
There were literally hundreds of them and they contained all the written 
documents relating to each client he had. This meant that they contained a 
vast array of information, ranging from the applications which Dr. Camilleri 
made to the court on his client's behalf, writs of summons, by which he 
initiated law-suits, written submissions to the court, prohibitory warrants, 
letters and other legal documentation. Even more significantly, they 
contained documents used as evidence, including affidavits in which clients 
seemed to be telling their stories in their own terms and as they had 
experienced them. Reading through these files gave me a bird's eye view of 
the evolution of a case over time. In other words, they provided precisely that 
knowledge of the story of the case which had eluded me in the course of my 
earlier 'prattika'. 
These files also exposed the differing viewpoints of the lawyers, clients and 
witnesses involved in each case. Thus they served to map out contrasting 
75 
perspectives on the issues concerned, suggesting avenues for research on 
the interaction between these different perspectives. I became particularly 
intrigued by the relationship between clients' perceptions and lawyers' views 
of cases, reflected in different documents. As I pored over these files, 1 began 
to understand the way the legal rules define the field within which lawyers 
and clients elaborate their strategies. It seemed to me that viewing rules as 
irrelevant to the final decision is just as mistaken as believing they rigidly 
determine outcomes. Throughout the summer of 1996, I devoted my time to 
obtaining and reading these files. Dr. Camilleri and his secretary displayed 
great trust in me by allowing access to this material; which was of a 
confidential nature and daily utilised in the course of their work. 
As the 1996/97 forensic year started, it seemed appropriate to take a short 
visit to Durham to consult with my supervisor on the research I had carried 
out so far and the ways in which I should carry it forward. As a result of this 
visit and my growing awareness of the utility of a more participant type of 
observation, I decided to concentrate on issues which resonated more closely 
with the concerns of lawyers and their clients. This would also help me to 
carry out a series of in-depth interviews with judges, lawyers and clients and 
to collect information from court officials. It also seemed important to carry out 
more observation of court litigation, balancing my previous focus on legal 
offices. Finally I decided to continue my observations in legal offices, while 
diversifying them even further by contacting another lawyer and asking him 
for permission to stay in his office and collect even more client files. 
Between November 1996 and May 1997, I proceeded to put this strategy into 
effect. The biggest problem with observing court proceedings was that I did 
not know the underlying issues at stake. To eliminate this difficulty, I 
restricted my observations to one court-room, presided over by a Magistrate21 
whom I knew as a law student. He allowed me to observe the proceedings 
and I started spending two days a week doing so. He also gave me access to 
cl In Malta. the judges of the inferior courts arc called Magistrates. See chapter four for a description. 
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the written transcriptions of the evidence given some weeks after the sittings 
which had been observed. This enabled me to compare my field-notes with 
the official record of the case, which proved extremely helpful. 
complemented my previous observations in lawyers' offices by also 
contacting a new lawyer, Dr. Vella, who had a predominantly rural and 
working-class clientele. Having obtained his permission to observe his 
interactions with clients, I was well placed to insert my earlier observations 
within a wider comparative context. 
To make my research more relevant to the concerns of lawyers and clients, I 
decided to pay special attention to the problems encountered during personal 
separation lawsuits and to lawyers' objections to affidavits as a way to reduce 
court delays. Both issues were hot discussion topics which lawyers and 
clients were eager to talk about. 22 They could be used as a point of entry to 
explore the wider politics of legal representation, since they showed how the 
tensions inherent in legal representation were worked out in specific practical 
contexts. These topics provided the basis for around ten in-depth interviews I 
conducted with judges and lawyers. The relevance of research on separation 
and court delays was obvious to them and these interviews allowed them to 
express their opinions. 
Interviewing clients was far more difficult. Contacting clients I got to know in 
lawyer's offices was not really an option. They might easily have been put off 
by such attempts; which could have been considered an intrusion into their 
private lives. Since they associated me with their lawyers, such distrust would 
have badly influenced their relationships with them. The risk of alienating the 
clients of lawyers who had helped me seemed too great to run. In selecting 
clients to interview, I therefore chose people I knew through my normal social 
:: Sec chapter nine for an analysis of the ·affidavits question.· as lawyers referred to it and also for a 
discussion of personal separation. Malta docs not legally allow divorce and personal separation is the 
legally sanctioned altcrnatiYc. It is almost equivalent to diYorce. with the crucial difference that 
separated spouses arc not allowed to remarry. Separation is a common discussion topic due to the way 
it brings out diYcrgcnt moral stances towards the Catholic Church. tradition. the family and Maltese 
identity. The present goycrnmcnt is expected to bring legislation introducing divorce very soon. 
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contacts. I also tried to interview clients who were waiting in the court 
corridors. However, this was not a very successful strategy because clients 
were on their guard in the litigious arena of the courts and had no way of 
verifying that I was really an independent researcher. In the end, I relied on a 
voluntary organisation which carries out social work among a group of 
separated persons for access to clients whom I could interview. As a result, 
the best client interviews I conducted were those with separated persons and 
were biased towards their views of the legal system. 
Another feature of this last phase of my fieldwork was increased contact with 
the court administration. This was necessary because I wanted to collect 
statistics on such matters as the number and types of cases which were 
pending before the courts. I therefore approached officials at the Ministry of 
Justice and obtained a lot of information from them. The Acting Registrar of 
Courts also gave me access to internally generated data. In this way, I 
obtained access to the files of fifty cases which had been filed on the same 
day from the Court Registry. This gave me a more comprehensive 
understanding of the types of social problems which generated litigation in 
Malta and the different ways in which various lawyers drafted the writ of 
summons which includes the initial statement of the object of the law-suit and 
the story which lies behind it. 
Finally I continued to arrange sittings for the two cases in which I was a legal 
referee. In regard to one of these cases, judicial authorisation was obtained 
to write the final report giving my conclusions on the merits of the case. I 
treated the writing of this report as an opportunity to obtain an insider's view 
of the process of adjudication itself and took notes of the difficulties faced in 
forming my opinion and the strategies adopted to frame my conclusions. This 
was certainly the most 'participant' period of my fieldwork! 
No account of my fieldwork is complete unless I also include my failures. 
These were themselves instructive. For instance, I had to give up the idea of 
taking photographs in the court corridors on realising how tightly controlled 
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this space was. I also tried to smuggle23 a tape-recorder into court to record 
the litigation. However my equipment was not sensitive enough to register 
voices clearly from underneath my jacket. My attempts to observe a jury trial 
from beginning to end foundered when I realised that this would take around 
three weeks of full-time court-room observation at a stage when I had to 
conclude other pending research. I would also have liked to obtain more 
interviews from clients; but this was difficult to do because of factors I have 
already mentioned. As a consequence, I am uneasily aware that my research 
is rather biased towards the lawyers' perspective. However, I have tried to 
include other viewpoints and am comforted by the thought that all observation 
is necessarily perspectival. 
As my fieldwork drew to a close, it became more and more difficult to 
continue to use the 'multiple native strategy'. This was because the small size 
of Malta and the even smaller size of the court community meant that the 
various identities I had employed started to collide with one another as 
people who knew me in one context met me in another. I suspect that many 
lawyers had not taken my research very seriously. They never really believed 
that I was going to carry out my stated aim of studying the everyday tasks of 
lawyering. However, with time and as they read my writings, they became 
more aware of what I was actually doing. 24 This started to affect my 
observations and to promote greater reflexivity among lawyers. 25 At one 
point, for instance, a lawyer who had taken a keen interest in my research 
entered a court-room where I was carrying out my observations. While 
arguing the case before the judge he frequently looked at me taking notes at 
:.
1 I originally tried to obtain pennission from a judge to record sessions: however he told me that I 
must clear the matter with the Court Registrar. The Registrar in turn told me that this was the Judge's 
responsibility. Finally. I decided to risk using a tape-recorder since court proceedings were public and 
nobod~ had explicitly prohibited me from doing so. However it seemed prudent to keep it hidden. 
c 
1 At one stage. Dr. Camilleri jokingly warned a young lawyer who promised me an interview to: 
"take care lest ~ou lind yourself in a book ... Although he became more cautious when speaking to me, 
he continued to allow me access to his office and to his Iiles. I am particularly grateful for his trust. 
since he knew the risk he was taking. 
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the back of the hall; seeming to assume a scholarly style of argument for my 
benefit. On another occasion, I saw a client who I had interviewed the day 
before as an independent researcher while I was explaining the progress of a 
case26 to a judge whom I had also previously interviewed! 
Having completed my rather unorthodox fieldwork, I now realise that my 
research fell into three temporally distinct stages. In the first, I attempted to fit 
into the traditional social role of a young lawyer doing his practical 
apprenticeship. This plunged me into the world of professional practice to the 
point where I felt that my ability to maintain a necessary analytical distance 
was imperilled. Haunted by the Malinowskian image of the fieldworker as a 
stranger in an exotic society, I then attempted to distance myself from the 
world of professional practice. This was accomplished by taking a series of 
decisions which involved the manipulation of my identity so as to make me a 
'multiple native', capable of adopting different social roles within my own 
society. While this strategy was largely successful, it meant that I objectified 
my society so that I could not comprehend the role played by the legal rules 
in Maltese legal representation. It also generated a lot of anxiety on my part 
as I had to live with an ambivalent social identity which constantly violated 
people's expectations. In the third phase of my fieldwork, I again moved 
closer to a more participant type of research which tried to relate to 
indigenously perceived problems and take lawyers' perspectives into account 
while retaining the benefits of the multiple-native strategy. During this phase, 
however, it also became more difficult to act as a multiple native, as my 
identity as a researcher became known to more and more people. 
Because I was carrying out fieldwork in a distinct zone within my own society, 
it was not possible to 'bracket out' the field of research from other areas of my 
life (Fortier1996). Hastrup has argued that the truly privileged position of the 
~' On one occasion. a lawyer I know even took down his own field-notes and gave them to me to help 
my research! 
~··This was one of the cases in which I acted as legal referee. 
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ethnographer resides in the way fieldwork allows her to adopt a point of view 
which is distinct both from her own subjective opinions and from those of the 
people she is studying: 
"The ethnographer is neither I nor you, but assumes a strangely 
unknown position as 'she' or 'he' ... Also in her own culture, or in a 
parallel culture, the ethnographer --as the representative of the third 
culture (i.e. the culture of anthropology itself)-- will inevitably live and 
work in the third person. As such she is a friend to the locals and a 
stranger to herself' (Hastrup in Jackson 1987: 1 05). 
This quotation expresses my experiences perfectly. I would only add that my 
ethnographer self threatened to take over all the other aspects of life until no 
area was exempt. It is for this reason that writing this chapter has proved 
therapeutic. Perhaps the only way to return home for one who has objectified 
his own culture is to objectify the process of objectification itself. 
5. The Organisation of this Thesis 
The organisation and writing style of this thesis reflects my theoretical 
concerns and field research. Because I have resorted to an eclectic array of 
research techniques, I have also adopted a variety of writing styles. By mixing 
theoretical argument with field accounts, stories, statistics and judgements, I 
hope to reach a proper balance between personal narratives and 
paradigmatic knowledge. The topic of each chapter builds on that discussed 
in the preceding one. Thus, the theoretical introduction given in the first two 
chapters is complemented by the present one, which explores methodological 
issues. The fourth chapter then outlines the social context within which 
Maltese legal representation takes place. It provides a general description of 
Malta and its legal system, paying special attention to the occupational 
stratification and professional formation of lawyers. 
The next four chapters aim at an extended description and analysis of the 
process of legal representation, dealing with distinct and consecutive stages 
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of this process. The fifth chapter focuses on legal offices, which is where the 
process normally starts. This chapter draws on my fieldwork in legal offices to 
describe and analyse lawyer-client interaction from the standpoint of the 
story-telling relations involved and what they say about clients' perceptions. 
The sixth chapter concentrates on lawyers' reactions; showing how differing 
understandings of their social role influence their response to clients' stories 
and the drafting of judicial acts. In the seventh chapter the focus shifts to the 
court-room telling of stories; exploring the dynamics of the production of 
testimony and how they refract the relationships between lawyers, clients and 
judges. Chapter eight then looks at the way stories are 'consumed' by judges 
during the process of adjudication. This is done by means of a reflexive 
analysis of the process of judging one case in which I acted as a legal referee 
and also by analysing the way another case was judged. 
The final two chapters place the issues discussed in a wider context. Chapter 
nine does so by relating them to court delays. This chapter shows how the 
differing practical involvement with stories of clients, lawyers and judges have 
cumulative social implications which explain current political tensions 
concerning court delays. The concluding chapter explores the way legal 
representation is both conditioned by Maltese society and itself influences it. 
Finally, it returns to the theoretical points raised in the first two chapters in 
order to review them in the light of the research findings. 
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Chapter 4: litigation in Malta 
"Let us listen to the words of Paillet: Endow a man with all spiritual gifts. 
Give him too all the gifts of character. Ensure that he has fteamed 
everything and remembers everything he learned; that he has worked for 
thirty years of his life; that he ns at the same time a scholar, a critic and a 
moralist; that he has the experience of the old, the ardour of youili, the 
infallible memory of a child and maybe with all these qualities you will 
fonn a perfect advocate. Endowed with these gifts, consecrated to the 
well-being of humanity, generous and always overflowing with blessings 
because he is a gentleman of goodwill, the advocate becomes a real social 
force" (Ullo-Xuereb 1898 :8). 
"It seems that the Labour Government has in less than a year not only 
brought about peace and quiet in our country, but has also inspired 
confidence that in forthcoming years we will continue to live a life of 
peace and quiet, with almost no criminality. When I say a life of peace and 
quiet, I mean civil peace and quiet, commercial peace and quiet; in short 
peace and quiet for everyone, except, poor things, for the advocates. I am 
saying this because according to research carried out by the Nationalists 
by means of Radio 101, for the first time in I don't know how many years, 
this year, the new advocates who graduated or are about to graduate, have 
not found a job. Now I do not know where they used to find jobs before, 
the advocates who t:,'Taduate every year. 
I suppose that maybe some of them used to be given jobs as legal 
consultants with some company or other. But obviously these consultants 
are not changed every year. Apart from that, if a company ever needed to 
change its legal consultants, I think that this year, with the Nationalist 
Party in Opposition, it has more advocates to choose from. How would I 
know! It's really a case that wherever you cut blood is going to come out. 
I'm sorry for the advocates, but at the same time I am pleased if the 
advocates don't have work. It is a si1:,rn that there is peace and quiet" 
(Maria /-Maws: 7 /9/1997). 
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1. ~ntroduction 
The texts which open this chapter seem, at first glance, to have little to do 
with one another. The first is taken from the published version of a speech 
given by Professor Xuereb, a Maltese law professor, to young lawyers on the 
occasion of their graduation on the 6th June 1898. It was given in an ornate 
Italian, studded with Latin quotations and paints a glowing portrait of lawyers 
as defenders of the powerless. The second is an article written almost a 
century later, in the Malta Labour Party's Maltese weekly: IKullhadd. The 
writer conceals her name under the humorously vulgar pseudonym of I Maria 
/-Maws' (i.e. Mary the Mouse). While Professor Xuereb quotes foreign 
authors, I Maria /-Maws' prefers to cite popular sayings. 1 If the professor 
glorifies graduating lawyers, the anonymous journalist rejoices that they are 
not finding work. The professor sees lawyers as a social force. The journalist 
insinuates that they are a political force, supporting what she views as a 
corrupt Nationalist party. 2 Professor Xuereb praises learning. I Maria /-Maws' 
parades her ignorance; which authorises her to speak for ordinary people 
and to contrast their proverbial wisdom to the litigious learning of advocates. 
A deeper reading discovers traces of a common cultural context in the 
dialogic relationship between these perspectives. The journalistic article not 
only counterpoints the Professor's speech because they are opposed 
reactions to the rite of passage of the graduation of law-students. More 
subtly, its invocation of populist Maltese wisdom in support of a criticism of 
lawyers can only work in a context where lawyers are associated with an elite 
knowledge expressed through Italian. Professor Xuereb's speech is therefore 
part of the cultural background against which I Maria /-Maws' reacts and to 
which she implicitly refers by negating. Moreover, if referring to a speech 
1 Her article was entitled: ··.\finnfejn taqta 'johrog id-demm:· a Maltese saying literally translatable 
as: ·where,·er you cut. blood is going to flow.· It is equivalent to: ·you can't make an omelette without 
breaking eggs·. 
2 I haYe omitted a paragraph from the newspaper article because it made potentially libellous 
references to the alleged wrongdoing of two Nationalist la\vyer-politicians. 
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delivered a hundred years ago can help us interpret a contemporary 
newspaper article, then this can only be due to the persistence of distinctive 
Maltese attitudes towards lawyers over a long period of time. 
An appreciation of this distinctive Maltese context is necessary to grasp the 
full force of the journalistic article. One needs to know something about the 
Maltese political situation, the precise role of the Labour and Nationalist 
parties and why the Nationalist Party is associated with lawyers. Nor should 
the wider cultural context be neglected. The sense of limited good which 
pervades the article and the specific resonance of being described as a 
pitiable person, or a 'miskin', can only be grasped within this perspective.3 It 
is also significant that both quotations refer to 'avukatl, or advocates, rather 
than lawyers. This highlights the culturally distinctive features of the legal 
system itself, which must also be focused on. 
Thus these quotations provide a provocative point of departure for a chapter 
which aims to outline the context of Maltese legal representation. This is, in a 
sense, the aim of this thesis as a whole. However this chapter will limit itself 
to providing a general description of Malta and its legal system which will be 
further developed in the chapters which follow. My purpose is to supply the 
preliminary sociological background possessed by readers of accounts such 
as that of 'Maria /-Maws'. A brief overview of Malta and its legal history will be 
followed by a more detailed description of various aspects of the legal 
system. This will look at the institutional organisation of the courts, the roles 
of various legal professionals and the progress of litigation. Then the focus 
will zoom in on lawyers by exploring occupational trends among advocates 
and the effects of legal training. 
1 Pity is ,·cry close to contempt in Maltese eyes. To be called 'miskin· (pitiable) is a powerful social 
declaration of your nllncrability and the superiority of those so defining you. 'Maria /-Maws' uses this 
tcnn sarcastically to stress that lawyers arc far from being downtrodden, being more than capable of 
looking after their 0\\"1\ interests. 
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2. Malta and its Legal System. 
The Maltese archipelago is densely populated, with a population of 366,000 
in an area of 316 k.m. 2 Centrally located in the Mediterranean,4 the 
archipelago comprises the main island of Malta, the smaller island of Gozo 
and the largely uninhabited Camino. Most people (i.e. 320,000) live on Malta. 
The islands have had a long and turbulent history. In the last two thousand 
years alone, they have been occupied by Romans, Byzantines, Arabs, 
Normans, Spanish, crusading Knights of Saint John, French and the British. 
The period of Arab domination (870 to 1090 A.D.) is significant because the 
Maltese language is based on Arabic, mixed with Italian and English loan 
words and written in a Romance script. The origins of the legal profession 
can be traced to the succeeding period, in which Malta was a Sicilian 
dependency ruled first by Norman and then by Spanish feudal lords.5 The 
crusading order of the Knights of Saint John also left their mark. After settling 
in Malta in 1530 and successfully weathering a long Turkish siege in 1565, 
they ran the islands as an independent principality, building the capital of 
Valletta and founding the University. They created a separate Maltese legal 
system, with its own legislature, courts and law-codes. A legal career was 
one of the few avenues for social mobility open to the Maltese, who could not 
become Knights. Italian was the language of administration of the Knights 
and that of the small Maltese elite, while Maltese was the popular dialect. 
The Knights were expelled by Napoleon in 1797, who established French 
rule. However the Maltese rose against the French, requesting aid from the 
British fleet. This eventually resulted in Malta becoming a British colony and 
military fortress in the Mediterranean in 1800. In the early nineteenth century, 
1 The Maltese Islands arc !Jl km from the nearest part of Sicily and 288 km from the closest part of 
Tunisia. Gibraltar is I X2(, km to the West and Alexandria 1510 km to the East. 
' It seems that a group of notaries were the first legal professionals in Malta (Brese 1975: 151 ). There 
is historical proof of the existence of lawyers by I~X6 (Bonello 1996). 
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Above is a map of the Maltese Archipelago. Below see a map of the 
Mediterranean sea, with Malta clearly indicated in the middle (Source: 
Microsoft Encarta 97 Encyclopedia). 
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successive British governors tried to reform the system of administration of 
justice so as to eliminate delays and introduce institutions like the 
accusatorial system and 'viva voce' trials. These reforms were introduced 
against the resistance of many lawyers (Harding 1980: 127). During the 
second half of the century, new legal codes were promulgated in the fields of 
criminal, private and procedural law. In a pattern which has continued to the 
present, private law was based on continental models, while public law was 
modelled on British common law. The late nineteenth century saw increasing 
British efforts to replace Italian by English as the language of administration 
and education in Malta. These efforts were supported by pro-imperialist 
Maltese and opposed by the traditional elite led by lawyers and clergy. This 
latter grouping saw its defence of Italian as a patriotic stance affirming 
Catholic Maltese culture against the attacks of the Protestant English. 
This 'Language Question', as it was known, proved a catalyst stimulating 
Maltese political agitation. Eventually this produced the present political set-
up, characterised by the alternation of power between two large political 
parties. Thus the Nationalist Party grew out of the pro-Italian grouping; 
whereas the Labour Party derived from an alliance between pro-British 
imperialists and an increasingly politicised working class. In this context, 
lawyers were considered the backbone of the Nationalist Party and seen by 
pro-British groupings as an obstacle to social and linguistic progress. 6 
Matters warmed up after the grant of representative government in 1921, with 
pro-British forces pushing for the promotion of both the English and Maltese 
languages, while the Nationalist government of the 1930's tried to enhance 
the role of Italian. This brought about a reaction in 1936 when the British 
Governor revoked the Constitution and replaced Italian by Maltese in the law-
" In llJll. a pro-British Maltese told a Royal Commision that the nub of the Language Question was: 
··whether the legal profession is to be brought into line with the interests of the rest of the population. 
or whether the rest of the population is to continue to be sacrificed for the convenience of the legal 
profession. The correct solution to the problem is obvious·· (Hull llJlJJ: 257). 
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courts. The Second World War, when Malta survived heavy bombing by Axis 
forces, effectively ended the 'Language Question' by discrediting ltalian.7 
After the war, Maltese parliaments started to refer to English and 
commonwealth statutes as models when drafting new legislation (Ganado 
1996: 231 ). Malta's post-war political history has been that of a succession of 
Labour and Nationalist governments. The Nationalist Party (PN) is a Christian 
Democratic party. Its supporters are the pro-Church middle-classes together 
with the traditional elite and most businessmen. It has continued to be 
dominated by lawyers and Labour supporters often describe it as the 
'Lawyers' Party'. The Malta Labour Party (MLP) has traditionally been a 
working-class political movement, closely allied with the largest trade union 
and strongly supported by dockyard and factory workers. 
Following the failure of his proposal to integrate Malta with Britain in the 
1950's, the charismatic leader of the Labour Party, Dam Mintoff, shifted 
towards demanding complete independence and also led his followers into a 
bitter confrontation with the powerful Catholic church. In 1958, his 
government resigned en masse in protest at the British authorities. The next 
decade was characterised by Nationalist administrations. In 1964, the British 
granted political independence to Malta while retaining a large military base 
and control over important sectors of the state apparatus. The Independence 
Constitution established the framework of the present legal system, creating 
a parliamentary democracy with a single legislative chamber. Effective power 
is vested in the hands of the elected government, which is responsible for the 
executive branch of the state. Elections are held every five years under a 
system of proportional representation. The Constitution contains provisions 
safeguarding human rights and judges' tenure and salary. The present court 
- On the outbreak of hostilities. the British GoYernment interned several pro-Italian Maltese. These 
included the leader of the Nationalist Partv. the Chief Justice and a prominent lawyer who was editor 
of the Church-owned newspaper. They we~e transported to Uganda for the duration of the war. 
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buildings in Valletta were inaugurated by the Nationalist Administration in 
1970. The sixties also saw the development of the tourist industry in Malta. 
The period 1971-1987 saw three successive MLP administrations dominated 
by Oom Mintoff. In 197 4, the constitution was amended to create a republic 
and in 1979 the British military base was closed down. Mintoff's 
administration created a secularised welfare state, nationalised parts of the 
economy, and pursued a radical non-aligned foreign policy, developing links 
with Arab countries. His government generated intense opposition, reacting 
with strong arm tactics. There was an atmosphere of tacit confrontation with 
the legal profession and the government lost a number of human rights 
cases. In 1987, the PN won the elections, governing until 1997. They 
adopted a policy of national reconciliation, developing the tertiary economic 
sector and building up the infrastructure; steering Malta towards eventual 
E.U. membership.8 In 1997, a Labour administration was again voted into 
power. The new government has frozen Malta's E.U. membership application, 
claiming that membership would harm the Maltese economy. 
Having outlined its history, it is useful to briefly review other key features of 
contemporary Maltese society. To start with language, Maltese and English 
are the main media of communication. Most Maltese know both languages, 
shifting strategically between them for different purposes and reserving 
Maltese for the expression of political and religious beliefs. 9 Many also know 
Italian and linguistic usage among the legal profession is still characterised 
by a tendency to use a more ltalianate Maltese than common elsewhere (Hull 
1993: 131 ). The state provides free education up to and including the tertiary 
level, while secondary education is compulsory for all. In 1996, there were 
6368 students following courses at the University of Malta. 
x They liberalised entry into UniYersity. increasing the number of law students. They also enacted 
Yoluminous legislation and made strenuous efforts to soJye the problem of court delays which was 
percei\·ed as haYing reached worrying proportions. 
"Hull obserYes: ··the language of power and prestige in Malta is English·· (ihid.: 363) 
90 
Tourism plays a prominent economic role. Over a million tourists visit Malta 
yearly and earnings from tourism contribute substantially to foreign earnings. 
Another important economic sector is industry, especially textiles and the 
manufacture of electronics components. There is a large ship-repair firm, 
which has been operating at a loss for years. There is also a small 
agricultural and fisheries sector; but most food must still be imported. 
Quarrying and house construction are widespread forms of economic activity; 
housing being the principal target for Maltese investment. The built 
environment has greatly expanded recently, swallowing up the countryside 
(lnguanez 1996). Various specialised services are also being developed in 
fields like yachting, company and ship registration. The public sector is large, 
as is the black economy. Unemployment is comparatively low. In July 1997, 
there were 6,855 registered unemployed out of a total labour force of 
148,848. 10 In 1996, G.D.P. per capita stood at $12,000. 
The family is an important source of enduring social ties. Divorce is not as yet 
legally allowed. Statistics show that requests for personal separation are still 
low compared to the number of marriages and European divorce statistics. In 
1992, for instance, there were 2377 marriages and 136 requests for personal 
separation. 11 However, the importance of the extended family has declined in 
recent years and demographic trends favour the nuclear family with two 
children (Tabone 1995). 
The Catholic religion has played a pivotal role in Maltese social life, where: 
"Ninety eight percent of the population are members of the 
Catholic faith and, of these, eighty-five percent practise their faith 
at least once a week" (Mitchell 1997: 81 ). 
1
" Of the l.tl.lJlJ1 gainfully occupied persons in 1997. only 15Jl78 were self-employed while the rest 
were employees. 86.85-t persons worked with the private sector. while 49,030 worked in the public 
sector. This statistic is taken from the Malta Central Office of Statistics Webpage. Visit the Malta 
Go,·ernment Website for further information. 
11 These statistics were giYen in response to Parliamentary Questions. 
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While these figures suggest a hegemonic Catholic community, one should 
note traditional working class Labour Party hostility to the formal Church 
organisation. There has also been a rise of charismatic cults and Jehovah 
witnesses together with a decline in church attendance (Sant-Cassia 1993: 
306). Historically, the Church was politically active; spear-heading the 
rebellion against French rule; defending the status of Italian and combating 
MLP anti-clerical socialism (Koster 1981 ). 12 The British colonial policy of 
religious non-interference, together with a sense of political powerlessness 
engendered by colonialism also provoked increased religious activity (Zammit 
1984 ). Thus, the Church has been a focus for a sense of Maltese identity. 
The political role of the Church was not restricted to the national political 
stage. At the level of ordinary village life, the parish priest was for long the 
principal political reference point. Moreover, the village 'testa', provided a 
medium for the expression of factional conflict within the village (Boissevain 
1965, 1980). Religious activity symbolically structured political activity since 
the village patron-saint was presented as an intermediary between man and 
God. This provided a model for political activity; in which powerful political 
patrons (generally drawn from the professional classes) were political saints 
interceding with state authorities to protect their clients (Boissevain, ibid.). 
Despite the avowedly anti-clientalistic policies of Maltese Governments, 
political patronage is pervasive. Partly for this reason and because of cross-
cutting family ties, social class differentiation, while undeniably existing, 13 is 
downplayed. A recent study concludes: "class struggle in the Marxist sense is 
either absent or incorporated within a welfare state approach" (Sultana & 
Baldacchino 1994: 38). 
1 ~ The Church· s feud with the Malta Labour Party bore many similarities to the battle for ritual 
supremacy obseryed by Kertzer ( JIJXO). between Church and Communist Party in Emilia Romagna. 
1
·
1 Reference is particularly made to Zammit· s ( 198-l) study of perceptions of class among Dockyard 
workers. The manual workers he surveyed saw Maltese society as made up of two distinct classes: 
while super"Yisory workers perceiYed a society dh·ided into three or more classes. 
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3. Court Organisation and the !Progress of Litigation. 
The Maltese judicial system centres around three tiers of courts (Aquilina & 
Micallef 1992). At the base of the hierarchy are the Magistrates' Courts, 
which decide minor civil and criminal cases and act as a court of inquiry for 
all criminal cases. Above them are the Civil Courts, presided over by judges 
and deciding civil and commercial cases; together with the Criminal Court, 
where a judge and a lay jury decide important criminal cases. At the top of the 
hierarchy are the Constitutional Court and the Courts of Appeal, generally 
presided over by the Chief Justice and two other judges. There are also 
various special tribunals. Mention should be made of the Ecclesiastical 
Courts; utilised by couples wanting to annul their marriages in a manner 
recognised by the Catholic Church. Gozo has its own Magistrates' Court, with 
an expanded jurisdiction. The main professional roles within the system are: 
1) Judges. They are appointed by the government of the day but their salary 
is protected and they cannot be easily dismissed. Judges are appointed from 
lawyers who have practised their profession for at least 12 years. In 1997, 
there were fifteen judges in all. 
2) Magistrates. Their position is almost the same as that of Judges, with the 
difference that they preside over cases lodged before the Inferior Courts. 
Magistrates are appointed from lawyers who have practised for at least 7 
years. In 1997, there were fifteen magistrates. 
3) Advocates. They are the principal category of persons allowed to submit 
written or oral pleadings during court litigation. In Malta, there is no 
distinction between solicitors and barristers. Lawyers are termed advocates 14 
and have direct contact with their clients. Still, advocates are supposed to be 
'friends of the court' and should therefore avoid misleading the courts in order 
11 For this reason. I consider the two tcnns ·Iawver· and ·advocate· as practically interchangeable in 
the course of this thesis. I do. howcYcr. try to usc .the term ·advocate· when I wish to convey a stronger 
sense of the culturally distinctiYc character of lawyers in Malta. 
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to advance their clients' law-suits. Advocates must obtain the LL.D. degree (a 
doctorate in law) from the University of Malta and the professional warrant. 
Obtaining this latter qualification requires passing an additional examination 
and engagement in 'prattika' with a practising lawyer for at least one year 
following graduation. In October 1994, there were 321 practising advocates. 15 
They are considered in more detail further on. 
4) Notaries. Notaries do not engage in litigation. They give legal advice, do 
research and draft and publish public deeds. They receive almost the same 
professional training as lawyers and must also do a year's 'prattika' before 
sitting for the exam, leading to their professional warrant. While notaries are 
generally independent private practitioners, their role differs from that of 
lawyers since they are not supposed to display allegiance to any of their 
clients. Thus, the public role of notaries is stressed more than that of 
advocates, though they are even more likely to engage in private practice. 
There were 98 practising notaries in October 1994. 
5) Legal Procurators. These are a separate professional category 
responsible for reviewing the written pleadings submitted to the courts by 
advocates during litigation. In October 1994, there were 30 practising legal 
procurators. 
6) Other Officials. Various other officials compose the administrative set-up 
which underpins the judicial organisation. This is headed by the Court 
Registrar, who is assisted by various clerks and secretaries. Each adjudicator 
has his own clerk. Finally mention should be made of the court marshals and 
ushers, who can be considered as a sort of court-police who notify judicial 
acts, call laymen into court and execute warrants. 
1.' Statistics on the number of practising lawyers. notaries and legal procurators are taken from the 
·Legal and Court Directory· of 199-J/95. This is a publication of the lawyers· professional association: 
the '( 'amera degli .1\·,·ocati'. listing all practising legal professionals in its records. If there are any 
legal practitioners not listed in this Directory. the number is likely to be small since this publication 
proYided free and legitimate adYertisement of legal sen·ices. 
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Having described the key elements of the judicial system, it remains to show 
how they come together in an ordinary law-suit. Litigation normally proceed in 
three distinct phases. In the initial stage the client contacts his lawyer; telling 
his story and asking for advice. Normally the lawyer will try to reach an 
agreement with the other party. if this fails, the lawyer will then file a 
'citazzjoni', or 'writ of summons' in the court registry, opening a law-suit. This 
'citazzjoni' is a written statement of the plaintiff's legal claims, which is 
accompanied by a declaration of the facts in issue and a list of the documents 
and witnesses to be produced as evidence. It is notified on the defendant 
who, if he opposes these claims, has a few days in which to contact a lawyer 
to file his written reply, or 'nota tal-eccezzjonijief. This is drafted and filed in 
precisely the same way as the 'citazzjoni', in rebuttal of the claims made 
therein. With this exchange of documents, the written phase of litigation 
terminates. The first hearing is usually fixed for a month from this date. 
During the oral phase of litigation the lawyers present their respective 
arguments, produce documents and examine witnesses. This phase is 
described later on. 16 However, it is important to note that judges may order 
that evidence be submitted in the form of an affidavit or that it be heard 
before a legal referee rather than being orally produced before them. 
Furthermore the actual oral hearing is rarely completed in one sitting. 
Adjournments are often granted before final judgement is given. To explain 
the sort of delays which arise, an example of the course of an actual law-suit 
will now be explored. This case was instituted by a wholesaler who was trying 
to obtain payment for the equivalent of a thousand pounds sterling worth of 
merchandise sold to the defendant. I selected this case at random from a pile 
of cases in the court registry. The sum of money involved was a low one and 
it is generally recognised that minor cases generate the greatest delays. Still, 
this case does indicate why delays are inextricably associated with litigation 
1 
'' Sec chapter SC\'Cil of this thesis. 
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in Maltese popular perceptions. Below are listed the dates of hearings and 
the motives for adjournments in the case under review: 
12/1/1994 
23/2/1994 
22/6/1994 
7/12/1994 
15/2/1995 
27/2/1995 
2/5/1995 
2/6/1995 
30/10/1995 
29/1/1996 
29/4/1996 
The initial hearing. As neither of the parties' lawyers 
turned up in court, the case was adjourned to: 
Once again, no-one turned up. The court adjourned the 
case 'sine die'. 17 The plaintiff reacted by filing a written 
application requesting the court to re-appoint the case 
for a hearing. The court re-appointed the case for: 
The case was adjourned to: 
The judge was indisposed. The case was adjourned to: 
After representations by the plaintiffs lawyer, the judge 
ruled that a copy of his 'citazzjont' should be stuck to the 
door of defendant's house by court marshals, formally 
notifying him of the existence of the law-suit and 
preventing him from pleading that the lawsuit was void 
since he had not been properly notified. 
The case was adjourned to 2/5/1995. Defendant was to 
be informed that this was to be the final adjournment. 
The case was adjourned to 30/10/1995. Defendant was 
to be informed that this was to be the final adjournment. 
Defendant made his 'nota tal-eccezzjonijief, claiming 
that the law-suit was improperly instituted. 
The case was adjourned to 29/1/1996 for submission of 
remaining evidence. 
The lawyers did not turn up. The case was adjourned to 
29/4/1996 for submission of remaining evidence. 
Adjourned to 8/10/1996. 
1
- Literally ·without a date·. In this way. the judge signalled to the lawyers that if they did not act 
quickly the case was going to be thrown out of court. 
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8/10/1996 
10/12/1996 
28/2/1997 
Plaintiff took the oath and testified, confirming the facts 
as stated in his 'citazzjont' and declaring that he had no 
more proof to bring. The case was adjourned to: 
The court observed that the defendant's lawyer had 
never appeared in court to plead on his behalf. The 
case was adjourned 'ghas-sentenza' (for the final 
judgement) 'in difetto ostaco/o' (in the absence of an 
obstacle) to the: 
Judgement was given because defendant's lawyer had 
failed to appear in court. The Court ordered defendant 
to pay the debt due to the plaintiff. 
In this case, therefore, it took just over four years to order the defendant to 
pay the debt he owed to the plaintiff. In those years, the defendant's lawyer 
never appeared in court to plead his client's case. The only action he took on 
behalf of his client was to file a written statement of defence, a year and a 
half after the initial 'citazzjoni' was notified on his client and then only after the 
judge, following a special procedure, had ordered a copy of the 'citazzjoni' to 
be fixed to the door of his client's residence! The plaintiff's lawyer was more 
active. Yet he was often absent from the scene and this absence might have 
caused the case to be thrown out of court. Moreover, apart from the drafting 
of the 'citazzjoni', his actions on his client's behalf were limited to requesting 
the court to re-appoint the case, to use a special procedure to notify 
defendant and eliciting the oral testimony of the plaintiff himself. Thus this 
straightforward and largely uncontested case, 18 in which a single witness was 
heard, took twelve court sittings to be decided! 
The causes of court delays are complex and some will be examined further 
on. One can, however, note some of the causes which operated in this case. 
Firstly, there was the absence of the lawyers. Most Maltese lawyers have to 
cope with a large number of court cases, which are often heard 
1
x The only contestation the defendant made was limited to the claim that the case should not have 
been instituted against him personally. but against the company he owned. However, apart from this 
procedural plea. he did not contest the existence of the debt nor that it was due by him. 
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simultaneously in different courts. So they might not manage to make it to the 
court-room to plead in a particular case; particularly if the sum involved (and 
therefore their fees) is a low one. In this case, it also seems that the 
defendant's lawyer did not have substantial arguments to make in rebuttal of 
the plaintiffs claims. He probably believed that his client was bound to Jose 
the case and that he could only assist him by putting off this inevitable 
outcome. If so, his absence should not be interpreted as indifference, but as 
an active and successful representation of his clients' interests. Consistent 
with this interpretation is the way defendant's lawyer did not file his statement 
of defence during the legally stipulated period after the filing of the plaintiffs 
'citazzjoni'. He only did so after a special procedure had been invoked to 
ensure that he could not later assert the lack of proper notification of the law-
suit.19 One should also note the practice of adjourning cases to a date which 
is months in the future. This results from the excessive workload of the 
courts. Delays also reflect judicial tendencies to threaten stiff action against 
delaying lawyers while effectively adapting to their dilatory habits. 
Court delays have multiplied in recent years. Statistics supplied by the 
Ministry of Justice show that on the 1st January 1995, there were 983 
lawsuits pending before the Court of Appeal. 439 new lawsuits were 
introduced during that year and 305 decided or otherwise disposed of. By the 
31st December 1995, there were consequently 1117 pending cases. The 
Civil Courts started the year with 8619 pending cases. 3623 lawsuits were 
introduced and 3256 disposed of, so that there were 8986 pending cases at 
the end of the year. Statistics for 199720 indicate that by the end of January 
1997, there were a total of 22,861 cases pending before all the Maltese 
courts. Of these, 1067 cases were pending before the Court of Appeal; 8318 
before the Civil Courts and 11,150 before the Magistrates' Courts. 
19 The legal necessity of personally notifying judicial acts on litigants is a fertile field for delaying 
tactics by lawyers. who usc all their ingenuity to claim that this requirement has not been observed. 
~~~ These ligures were giYcn by Justice Minister Charles Mangion in a reply to a Parliamental}' 
Question. They were reproduced in the Maltese daily newspaper: "The Times .. of March 5th 1997. 
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4. Occupationai Distribution of Legal Professionals. 
Having looked at the institutional framework of the judicial system and 
described the ordinary course of litigation, the occupational distribution of the 
various legal professionals will now be charted. Statistical information on this 
point complements previous accounts because it roots the legal system more 
firmly within the Maltese social context. Data has been drawn from the 'Legal 
and Court Directories' of the 1992 and 1994/5 forensic years (Camera degli 
Avvocati: 1992, 1995). These directories were produced by the 'Camera deg/i 
Avvocati', which is the professional association of Maltese advocates. They 
are intended for the benefit of practising legal professionals and their clients, 
who need to contact one another regularly. Although the details they provide 
can be considered reasonably accurate, they are not comprehensive. 21 
However the names of most practising lawyers, including those who work with 
government or private business, are listed in these directories. 
These figures establish the numerical preponderance of advocates over other 
legal professionals. In fact, in 1994, there were 15 judges and 15 magistrates, 
30 legal procurators, 98 notaries and 321 lawyers listed. This numerical 
dominance reflects the cultural prestige enjoyed by advocates. Moreover, the 
profession has been expanding at a very high rate. Between 1992 and 1994, 
the number of advocates increased by 75 (an increase of 30%) and that of 
notaries by 13 (an increase of 15%).22 There has also been an increase in 
~ 1 I know of no lawyer invoiYcd in litigation who is not a member of the 'Camera·. Since it controls 
the locker room where lawyers· ·rogas · arc kept and since the legal directory offers the most 
legitimate way of advertising onc·s scn·iccs. membership is quite advantageous. Most other forms of 
advertising arc prohibited by the ·camera·. on grounds of professional ethics. There are, however, a 
number of LL.D. graduates who have either never applied for the professional warrant, or otherwise 
do not engage in legal practise. For example. a number of teachers fall in this category. These 
individuals arc generally not listed in the directories. since they are not members of the ·camera'. 
~~ This expansion reflects the educational reforms of the Nationalist Government, which multiplied 
the number of law students. It docs not seem to have brought about unemployment. In fact, a recent 
sur..-cy concludes that: .. All sampled Law graduates found work directly after graduation"' 
( Baldacchino l9lJ7: I 0 I) This may reflect the widespread consensus among employers, reported by the 
same sun·cy. that the job of a law graduate cannot be carried out by a non-graduate. 
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the proportion of female advocates, which rose from 22 (8. 9% of all 
advocates) in 1992 to 51 (15.9% of all advocates) in 1994. 
One can further explore the situation by looking at the ways in which lawyers 
and notaries advertise their services. In fact the 1994/95 directory provides 
information about the offices and office-hours of different legal practitioners 
and their employment status. On this basis, the legal professionals active in 
1994 can be divided into the following occupational categories: 
TABLE TWO: BREAKDOWN OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS (1994) 
Advocates Notaries 
M F M F 
Full-time politicians 10 2 
Employed with listed law-firms 76 13 1 
Not practising 17 3 7 3 
Maltese sole practitioners 120 15 62 9 
Gozitan sole practitioners 7 5 
Part-time Govt. employ. & private practice 3 1 1 
Full-time Government employees 25 17 6 2 
Full-time employ. with private company 11 2 
Part-time employ. with priv. co. & practice 1 
TOTAL NUMBER 270 51 84 14 
These categories bear further explanation: 
1) Full-Time Politicians: This includes the 10 advocates and 2 notaries who in 
1994 are or have been m.p.'s and who have not listed an office address or 
office hours in the directory. While this indicates that these legal 
professionals have largely abandoned their legal practice for politics, one 
should note that the boundary between a political and a legal career is very 
tenuous in Malta. Most individuals combine the two and give increased 
emphasis to one instead of the other at different phases of their lives. Many 
legal practitioners engaged in private practice are also part-time politicians. 
At the time of writing, 22 of the 69 members of Parliament are advocates or 
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notaries and one is a law-student. 23 While legal professionals are fairly 
evenly distributed throughout the two political parties, lawyers dominate the 
P.N. leadership, as reflected in the way all its post-war leaders have been 
lawyers or notaries. By contrast, post-war MLP leaders have, with one brief 
exception, been non-lawyers. Lawyers also assume a range of political roles 
which do not require election to Parliament, such as participation in local 
councils, political party committees or local band/football club committees. 
2) Government Employees: In 1994, 13% of the total number of lawyers were 
directly or indirectly employed by the Maltese Government and a few 
combined government employment with private practice. Government 
employment includes employment with the Attorney General's Office, which 
drafts legislation, or the civil service, or with Government-controlled 
companies, banks and regulatory bodies. The perceived status and salary of 
government employed lawyers is lower than that of private practitioners This 
is reflected in the high proportion of female lawyers in government 
employment, 24 the tendency to combine government employment with private 
practice and the complaints of the Attorney General's Office, which in 1995 
reported that public calls for applications were: 
"even failing to attract law graduates freshly out of University, who 
seem to manage to find jobs in private practice with conditions 
even better than those of senior legal officers at the Office" 
(Attorney General 1996: 1 ). 
3) Private Company Employees. While lawyers employed with private 
companies enjoy a greater prestige than government employees, one should 
note that they still seem to constitute a small minority. 25 
~1 According to a list of m.p. ·s obtained from the Malta Govemmenrs Department of Information on 
Friday. May 30th 1997. 
· ~· 1 l~'X• of goycrnmcnt employed full-timers arc female as opposed to an average of 15% women 
among legal practitioners in general. This is comparable to the U.S. situation (Abel 1989). 
~, The low number mav also indicate that such lawyers are less inclined to advertise their services in 
the legal directories: si~ce they may not have their ~wn clients or engage in any litigation at all. 
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4) Not Practising. This comprises 30 lawyers and notaries who have not got a 
private office or fixed times in which to meet clients. Many of these are recent 
graduates, or persons employed in other sectors, such as the University. 
5) Employed with Listed Law-Firms: The increase in law-firms was noticeable 
between 1992 and 1994. This is reflected in the separate listing of law-firms 
in the 1994 directory, when 28% of lawyers were employed in them. Table 
Three outlines the recent growth in both the number and the size of law firms: 
Table Three: IL.aw Firm Sizes in 1992 andl1994: 
NUMBER OIF LAWYERS PER FIRM. 
TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SIX EIGHT 
NO. OIF 
FIRMS 5 4 4 1 2 1 
(1992) 
NUMBER OF LAWYERS flER FIRM. 
TWO THREE FOUR FIVE SEVEN ELEVEN 
NO. OF 
FIRMS 6 4 6 2 3 1 
(1994) 
By 1994 there were 89 lawyers and one notarl6 employed with law-firms. 
This suggests that Maltese lawyers are influenced by the U.S. model, where 
large law-firms, often employing hundreds of lawyers and increasingly 
structured according to industrial models have emerged (Abel 1989). 
However when one considers the size of Maltese law firms, it seems that 
most are best considered as informal associations of professionals. 
Information collected confirms that many of these firms are actually informal 
agreements to share office space and some facilities, while keeping distinct 
~6 The absence of notaries from law-firms reflects the nature of their duties. Notarial work is relatively 
well-defined and more repetitive than that of lawyers. There is less scope for dividing labour here. 
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the finances and clientele of each lawyer/partner. 19% of the total number of 
lawyers working in law-firms have separate individual private offices. Also, 
the names of all Maltese law-firms are those of their leading partners and 
these are often close family relations of one another. On the other hand, it is 
also true that 81 % of legal professionals working with law-firms do so on a 
full-time basis and have no private practice. The very largest firms have 
adopted a more formal structure, where clients are allocated to different 
lawyers in terms of the nature of the case and the lawyer's specialisation 
rather than the personal relationship between the lawyer and her client. This 
suggests that Maltese legal practice is in a transitional state, with larger firms 
possessing a more impersonal administrative structure gradually replacing 
small informal partnerships of practising lawyers. 
6) Sole Practitioners. This includes all those lawyers and notaries who 
engage in private practice as self-employed individuals, which constitute the 
largest number of lawyers and notaries. In fact, 44% of the total number of 
lawyers listed and 78% of the total number of notaries fall within this 
category. The differences between self-employed legal professionals and law 
firms can be explored by looking at the number and location of their offices. 
99 out of the 142 lawyer sole practitioners and 65 out of the 76 self-employed 
notaries had at least one office outside the capital city of Valletta, where the 
courts are located. Also, 38% of lawyer sole-practitioners and 45% of notary 
sole practitioners had more than one office. By contrast, law firms, are almost 
solely based in Valletta. 27 61 out of 89 firm-lawyers are employed full-time by 
law-firms which do not have an office outside the city. 
These statistics indicate a growing division within the Maltese legal 
profession between those lawyers who primarily minister to large-scale 
commercial, fiscal and maritime legal practice and those who look after the 
smaller civil and commercial cases found in the villages and suburbs 
(including Gozo) together with criminal cases. The former generally belong to 
:- The IIJIJ-l/'J5 directory cites only 1 non-Valletta based law firms. employing 1J lawyers. 
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one firm with a large Valletta based central office, permitting greater 
specialisation in particular branches of law, but tending to prevent them from 
developing a private practice of their own. They represent a new class of 
what Gramsci termed 'organic intellectuals' (Forgacs 1988: 305), catering to 
the economic needs engendered by the recent growth of the Maltese services 
sector. The latter compensate for their lack of specialisation by developing a 
practice in as many peripheral zones as possible. These lawyers therefore 
specialise in clientele rather than in legal expertise. They develop a network 
of contacts with as many people and handle as many different cases as 
possible. Unlike many firm lawyers, they are always involved in litigation. Due 
to their highly developed brokerage skills and the large clientele they acquire 
in peripheral zones they are also most likely to enter politics. They conform to 
Gramsci's characterisation of the traditional Southern intellectual (ibid: 308). 
The emergent picture is therefore one of a profession gradually beginning to 
divide into two parts. On the one hand, are self-employed private practitioner 
lawyers and notaries, while on the other are the law-firms. Future trends 
seem set to promote the continued growth of law firms at the expense of self-
employed lawyers. Between 1992 and 1994, the largest proportion of the new 
intake of lawyers found employment with law firms: 24 lawyers joined law-
firms, 20 became sole practitioners and 13 became Government employees. 
Thus the market for sole practitioners seems to be reaching saturation point, 
with law-firms and Government emerging as the main new providers of work 
for new lawyers. 28 This trend ties in with the proportionate increase in female 
advocates, since these are even more likely to work with the Government or 
with law-firms instead of becoming sole practitioners. 29 However, it remains 
to be seen whether and to what extent these trends will continue. Presently 
the boundary between sole practitioners and law firms remains blurred. 
~x A recent sun·ey of Maltese law students by the University's Centre for the the Development of 
Worker Participation (W.P.D.C.) found that: ··a considerable number of law graduates are employees. 
and not necessarily employed as legal experts·· (Baldacchino I 997: 100). 
~" 2lJ new female lawyers graduated between 19lJ2 and 1994. ll found government employment, 9 
joined law firms and only 7 became sole legal practitioners. The other 2 did not practice. 
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5. learning the law. 
Legal training will now be investigated. This is more than the value-free 
acquisition of technical skills, being part of a process of professional 
socialisation through which lawyers acquire certain attitudes towards clients 
and the legal rules. In Malta, the main entry-barrier to the legal profession is 
the University course leading to the degree of Doctor of Laws (LL.D.), which 
must be obtained if one is to practise as an advocate. It is almost unheard of 
for an LL.D. graduate to fail to obtain her professional warrant to practice.30 
Thus, the legal education received at the University plays a crucial role in 
reproducing professional attitudes. Rather than providing an exhaustive 
description of all the sociologically relevant characteristics of Maltese legal 
training, this section will give a general outline and then focus on some 
features of particular relevance to the other chapters of this thesis. 
The structure and curriculum of the law course have often been modified. 
However, its central elements have remained firmly in place. The course lasts 
six years. Linguistic ability is stressed as an entry requirement; with students 
having to prove competence in English, Maltese, Italian and at least one 
other language. Upon entering the course, students have to pass a final 
examination every year to be promoted to the next. These exams consist of 
four written examinations and four oral exams in the main subjects taught 
during that year. They are gruelling because they cover a vast area and there 
is little choice of questions to answer. They serve pre-eminently to test the 
memory and self-confidence of students. Various subjects are taught during 
the first five years of the law-course, ranging from international law to forensic 
medicine. However the emphasis is on giving students a thorough grounding 
in civil and commercial law. The first year of the course is considered as a 
w This warrant is awarded following a separate professional examination, held in the year following 
graduation. Only students who pro\'e that they have done some 'prattika· are allowed to sit for this 
exam. ·f'rattika · is focused on in chapter three and also in the other chapters of this thesis. 
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filtering year, in which subjects of 'theoretical'31 interest like legal philosophy 
are taught and many students fail. As more years pass, a lower proportion of 
students fail and the teaching becomes progressively more 'practical', 
culminating in the fifth year when students are taught procedural law. 32 In the 
final year of the course, students must prepare and defend a thesis to be 
allowed to graduate. The law course is also characterised by the heavy 
teaching load and six or seven hours of lectures per day are not uncommon. 
The course structure and student intake have varied over the years. In the 
1970's and 1980's, Socialist reforms restricted student entry by a 'numerus 
clausus' and introduced a student-worker scheme in terms of which students 
had to spend six months in the year as employees and six months at 
University. In 1987, the Nationalist Government liberalised entry and 
abolished the student-worker scheme. Thus the total number of LL.D. 
students soared from 95 in 1984 to 281 by 1994. More recently the University 
has re-structured the LL.D. course, by means of a series of reforms which 
were fully implemented in the 1995/96 academic year. These involved the 
introduction of a modular system of teaching and assessment side by side 
with the final examinations. The course was also split into two: an initial B.A. 
in Legal and Humanistic Studies followed by the LL.D. course proper. During 
the first three years of the course, students must now take a number of 
humanistic modules. There are no final examinations at the end of the 
second year, but there are eight at the end of the third year, when the B.A. 
terminates. An overall 'C' grade must be obtained in the B.A. for students to 
be allowed to continue to the successive three year LL.D. course. 
While it is still early days to pronounce on the effect of these reforms, one 
should note that they have mainly involved additions to a course structure 
·
11 Here ·theoretical" means that these subjects do not directly equip lawyers to handle specific legal 
tasks. although they might provide indispensable background infonnation . 
. 
1
:: After the fourth year of the course. students graduate with the Diploma of Notary Public. Those 
students who wish to practise as notaries may tcnninatc their University studies at this point. 
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and curriculum which have remained fundamentally the same. As a result, it 
seems that the workload of students has increased, while they also have a 
more varied educational background. In the third year, an added hurdle has 
been imposed in the requirement of an overall 'C' grade in the B.A. This 
seems to have slightly reduced the overall number who graduate with the 
LL.D. degree. In recent years, attrition rates seem also to have increased33 
and the proportion of female students has risen from 27% of the total in 1984 
(26/95 LL.D. students) to 55.5% in 1994 (156/281 LL.D. students). 
To understand Maltese legal training, however, it is not enough to look at 
student statistics and the formal course curriculum. As Dahrendorf (Aubert 
1975: 294) has pointed out with reference to Germany: 
"The subject matter taught and, even more, the ways in which 
students Jearn and spend their time generally, are subtly affected 
by the place occupied by law faculties in German social structure. 
In this process the teaching of law loses its professional specificity" 
(ibid., p. 304 ). 34 
In Malta, as in Germany, lawyers constitute a dominant social elite. Law 
students often come from elite backgrounds. One study found that a third of 
Maltese law students have a parent who is a University graduate 
(Baldacchino 1997: 104). Students from private schools predominate and it is 
common for them to explain the decision to study law by the fact that there is 
already a lawyer in the family. Law students seek to distinguish the LL.D. 
course, which is considered as somehow 'special'. They also seek to 
distinguish themselves through adopting a more formal clothing and being 
more politically and socially active than other students. Elite membership is 
.~.~ In llJX5. there was a total intake of 16 new LL.D. first years. In 1991, 14 of these graduated (an 
attrition rate of 12.5%.). In l9X7. there was an intake of 97. 76 of whom graduated in 1993 (a rate of 
22%.). In llJX9. there was an intake of 103. XO ofwhom graduated in 1995 (a rate of22%). In 1991, 
there was an intake of 12lJ. 95 of whom graduated as notaries in 1995 (a rate of 26%). I have 
generated these statistics out of the student records kept by the Faculty of Laws. 
q Dahrendorfs argument was that a shared experience of legal education served to link members of 
the German elite. Few of those who have a legal education actually practise as lawyers in private 
practice. Thus. Law Faculties arc seen by law students as ways of gaining elite membership rather 
than legal knowledge. This explains student indifference to legal training and the specifically social 
and political (as opposed to legal and technical) skills they cultivate. 
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signalled through such practices as patronising the 'Casino Maltese', the 
traditional club of the Maltese pro-Italian elite; or through post-graduation 
rides to Valletta in horse-drawn carriages as in the photo on the following 
page. While such practices portray a strong group identification, one should 
note that there is also a high degree of aggressive competition among law-
students, expressed through the formation of rival cliques which conceal 
useful information from one another. Thus while it is true that law students 
develop strong internal friendship networks, the image of a homogenous and 
united body is mostly constructed for external consumption. 
As in Germany, Maltese law students often claim that legal education is 
boring. Dahrendorf saw this as reflecting the lack of interest of German 
students in legal education per se, which they valued solely for the elite 
status it conferred. However, in Malta, this claim can be a way of emphasising 
professional prestige; since the boring nature of law is seen as a confirmation 
of its practical importance. To explain this attitude, it is necessary to see how 
law-teaching is influenced by legal practice itself. Dahrendorf did not do this, 
since most German lawyers did not traditionally engage in private practice. 35 
However, it seems crucial to an understanding of legal education in Malta, 
where the prestige (and salary) of the sole private practitioner is high. Most 
ambitious law students envisage engaging in private legal practice of some 
sort (Baldacchino 1997: 101) and are keen to acquire legal know-how. 
This emphasis on private legal practice is shared by law lecturers, who have 
usually been practising lawyers engaged in part-time teaching at the 
University. As a result, the teaching law students receive is subtly influenced 
by the effective dominance of private legal practice as an ideal to aspire 
towards. Law lecturers socialise students quite explicitly by constantly oppos-
·'' One sociologist obscrycs: 
"If Germans talk about the ·tcgal profession.· they think first not about practicing 
lawyers but rather about all those who have passed two state examinations to become 
·full-fledged jurists' ( r·ulljuristen). These arc then qualified to become a judge, a public 
prosecutor. a ciYil scryant. a company employee. or an advocate.'' (Blankenburg & 
Schultz I<J<J5: <J2). 
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-ing 'theory' to 'practice', claiming that 'theory' is fine as far as it goes, but 
practice is a completely different matter. In this way, their own practical 
experience as advocates is valorised and distanced from the academic 
knowledge which students may find easier to acquire. Stressing the gap 
between theory and practice is therefore a way of empowering professional 
lawyers in regard to their students. It also serves to encourage students to 
establish the apprenticeship relations of 'prattika' with practising lawyers, 
since this is the only route by which to acquire practical knowledge. 
Moreover, as the curriculum is structured to gradually move students away 
from an initially high dose of 'theory' towards a increased emphasis on 
'practice', it strengthens the sense of the superiority of 'practical' knowledge 
(or practising lawyers' knowledge}, inculcated into law students. 
The practical orientation of law lecturers means that their reference point, 
when deciding how and what to teach, is the utility of this knowledge to a sole 
practitioner. Consequently law teaching is oriented towards the creation of a 
lawyer who is an all-rounder with a thorough grounding in private law and 
militates against the creation of specialists. Law is not primarily taught as part 
of a liberal education which can help students develop their talents, but as a 
body of practical knowledge to be absorbed and remembered. The 
continuous expansion of the curriculum, crammed teaching timetables and 
stress on examinations reflect attempts to include all the topics which a sole 
practitioner would conceivably have to know to be able to advise clients on all 
their legal problems. Since sole practitioners often do not have the time to 
consult their law books, the development of an ability to incorporate the law 
by memorising large numbers of legal provisions is also highly prized. 
Law lecturers also transmit coded messages to students by their own attitude 
to time. Because most lecturers are engaged in legal practise, they are rarely 
present on campus and sometimes have to cancel lectures. When they 
appear on campus, they are generally surrounded by a circle of law students, 
who bombard them with their requests, almost as if they were their clients. 
Lecturers convey the message that they have no time to waste on trivialities 
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and that they can only listen to legitimate queries because they are in a hurry 
to get back to work. Often they explicitly invoke their lack of time, by for 
instance telling students that legal research is interesting 'if one has the time 
for it'. In this way, students are taught to regard time as a limited good, which 
should be reserved for the really important tasks of legal practice. One effect 
of these disguised messages is that students learn to regard a busy lifestyle 
and a lack of time as signs of power and to associate weakness with having 
to wait for someone. They consequently display their own power by showing 
that they have no time to waste on particular lecturers. Through persistent 
absenteeism and late-coming for lectures, some students try to assert their 
own claims to pre-eminent power. In such ways students try to escape the 
passive position of 'clients' who have to wait for their lawyer/lecturers and 
begin to assert a lawyer's identity of their own. 
The role of 'viva voce' examinations highlights other aspects of the system. 
During these 'orals', students have to find the self-confidence to defend 
themselves before three examiners who often include judges or magistrates. 
Like lawyers, students dress formally for the occasion and try to present 
themselves in the best possible light. Their examiners sit at their ease behind 
a desk, while the student sits in front of them and answers the questions put 
to him by one of the examiners (the prosecutor). Meanwhile another examiner 
will calmly note his performance, acting as the judge. Finally, the third 
examiner acts as the defence attorney by smiling at the student and putting 
him at his ease. 36 If the organisation of 'oral' exams resembles a law-suit so 
closely, then this suggests that students become lawyers by winning their 
own cases, thus earning the right to shift from the subordinate status of 
clients to the dominant one of lawyers. This perception explains the didactic 
attitude of law lecturers who stress memory-testing examinations. This is an 
authoritarian mode of teaching, which views students as recipients to be filled 
with legal knowledge. It ties in well with a view of students as clients, who 
H· On some occasions. this role of defender is even more clear. because this lecturer will make hand 
signals to the student to lead him towards the right answer. 
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have to win the right to speak about the law by showing that they have in 
effect transformed themselves into lawyers. This transformation can only be 
effected through incorporating the law in such a way as to be able to 
reproduce it by drawing solely on their own mental resources. 
Consistently with the above, lawyers come to assess the worth of their own 
legal training primarily by reference to the time they have invested and the 
amount they have suffered in it. Their comments hint at the volume and 
complexity of the legal doctrines which they had to learn, while also 
confirming the prestige of legal study, which was capable of extracting the 
tribute of so many years of precious time from them. References to the 
'suffering' involved in the course share a similar basis. Lawyers reminisce 
about the tension and frenzied studying of their final examinations so as to 
evoke the arduous crossing of a 'rite de passage', thus re-creating and 
enlarging the distance between lawyers and laymen (Bourdieu 1992: 123).37 
Through legal education, law students acquire the practical attitudes to legal 
rules and clients' stories which they adopt as lawyers. While legal training 
might appear primarily to entail the study of actual rules, stories are 
indispensable here. This can be illustrated by looking at an extract from a 
transcription38 of a civil law lecture produced by law students in 1990: 
"It is true that with regard to contracts the connection between the 
injury and the damages is more immediate; in the sense that, if I 
agree to sell you a particular thing and I don't deliver it to you, the 
damages that you claim would normally be related to the non-
delivery of that particular thing. You had a contract which you had 
to perform in order to use that particular thing -the equipment that 
I promised which you cannot use. Therefore, if I am responsible for 
the damages myself, then you claim damages from me. The 
connection is generally clearer. When it is a question of tort there 
is no earlier relationship and therefore this is purely accidental. A 
person may be walking near a swimming pool. He slips because 
.r Characteristically. one practising lawyer who is also an M.P. recently remarked in Parliament that: 
··the LL.D. course at UniYcrsity is difficult and requires a great deal of dedication" (Taken from the 
speech by John Attard Montalto. reported in the Maltese daily ·fn -Nazzjon· on the 1st April 1996) . 
. ~x Transcriptions arc produced by law-students who record lectures. type them and distribute them 
among members of their cliques 
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the floor is slippery. He falls into the swimming pool and fractures 
his head ... So when there is a direct connection between the injury 
and the damages, then of course, the immediate and direct effect. 
It would not be the case that he had to stay at a particular place 
and then he became enamoured of a nurse who went there, 
because this is not immediate although it has happened. II 
What I would like to underline here is the way in which the lecturer oscillates 
between enunciating the legal rule39 and telling stories which illustrate its 
meaning. Three distinct narratives are smuggled into this explanation of legal 
doctrine. These concern: (a) the non-delivery of promised equipment, (b) a 
man who slips while walking past a swimming pool and (c) a patient who falls 
in love with his nurse. These stories are clearly of a 'paradigmatic' type, 
which serve to exemplify the practical applicability of the legal rules. 
Lecturers abstract skeletal narratives from the richness of lived experience to 
throw light on the meaning and application of legal rules. In this way, they 
also tacitly import specific sociological understandings. The picture of 
Maltese society which is transmitted to law-students is one which highlights 
the commercial and tourist sector, where equipment is bought and swimming 
pools common. Thus, students are taught to apprehend the abstract wording 
of legal rules through the medium of paradigmatic stories. These stories will 
later be used by them to justify the legal claims of their clients. 
Law students are also encouraged to use impersonal forms of speech and to 
organise their essays around legal categories rather than narratives, which 
would tend to foreground subjective opinions. The effect aimed at is one 
where the legal framework is impersonally expounded so that the solution to 
the essay problem appears to be simply the one demanded by the rules. 
Here the creative intervention of the student is largely utilised so as to deny 
its own existence. In these essays, the voice of the law student is a muted 
one which expresses itself through the choice of particular quotations from 
1
'' The mlc that damages arc to be compensated only if they arc directly and immediately caused by 
illicit bchm·iour. 
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rules, cases and authors and through the overall organisation of the work. 40 
When law students do refer to their own opinion, they generally add some 
expression acknowledging their own insignificance. References are made to 
'my humble opinion', or to: 'adding my weak voice to the opinion of these 
illustrious writers'. The use of these expressions shows how law students are 
led to connect the right to articulate the law with the suppression of their own 
subjective individuality and also with the acquisition of the legal experience 
possessed by practising lawyers. Most law students share these assumptions 
which induce them to place a low premium on personal creativitl1 and to 
stress the hierarchical divide between lawyers and clients. For this reason, 
they record lectures and produce printed transcriptions, which are often 
memorised 'verbatim'. There also seems to be a significant amount of 
plagiarism among law students. Many seek to excel primarily through the 
volume of the knowledge they accumulate rather than the originality of their 
contributions to it. Thus, law students suppress their own subjective narrative 
voice, in the process of shifting from the passive role of clients to the active 
one of lawyers. This explains the genesis of lawyers' attitudes to their client's 
stories, which will be explored in the next chapter. 
·
1
" The way students conceal their subjective voice behind quotations can be seen from the circular on 
the following page. put up by final year law students in 1995. It advertises the holding of a dinner to 
celebrate the end of the final examinations. It is written in three languages: Latin, Maltese and 
English. The English text is mostly factual and refers to such details as the location and date of the 
meaL The Maltese text. by contrast. consists of two lines printed in a small font near the bottom of the 
page stating in a sort of rhyming couplet that: "only pigs are invited because this is the final meal. .. 
This creates a sense of informal humour evoking complicitous involvement within a small group. 
Finally the Latin text occupies a grandiose central position. Yet its first term is not really Latin, but 
the im·ented word: ·zihlatio·. produced by combining the Latin word juhi/atio · (festivity) with the 
Maltese word ·ziher. "lihe/" means ·rubbish· if used as a noun and 'getting drunk' (literally 
"becoming rubbish") when used as a verb. The students arc announcing their final feast, but they are 
also proclaiming that they intend to get drunk! The beauty of the joke lies in using the most formal 
language to conYcy the most nllgar message. 
11 The WPDC survey (Baldacchino. op.cit.) requested the law graduates interviewed to rank different 
aspects of University life. From the six aspects listed. students ranked the ··oevelopmcnt of Creativity 
and Originality .. in the bottom place: as the aspect of University life which contributed least to their 
occupational competence (Baldacchino 1997: 102). 
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Chapter 5: Self~Scripting in legal Offices 
1 . introduction 
This chapter will study the process of legal representation by focusing on 
lawyer-client interviews in Maltese legal offices. Such interviews are a 
necessary prelude to court-room litigation, representing an appropriate point 
of departure. However it is important to keep in mind that clients encounter 
lawyers in many settings and for a variety of reasons which are only 
imperfectly described as seeking legal advice. 1 A special focus on office 
interviews is required both by the theoretical hypothesis which informed my 
observations (and was itself shaped by them) and by the specific nature of 
legal representation itself. Compared to medical doctors, lawyers rely much 
more on their clients' stories to understand their situation; which they must 
also re-present before the court. Moreover, my theoretical hypothesis leads 
me to focus on those moments when narratives are most thoroughly and 
completely invoked and this generally occurs in the space of the office and 
during initial interviews. Such moments are crucial because they condition 
later encounters, when clients' stories need not be elaborated at such length. 
The starting point is a detailed case-study of one lawyer/client interview 
drawn from my field-notes. This is followed by a more general discussion of 
the discursive dynamics of these interviews. This draws on anthropological 
theory to explain the social significance of clients' stories as ways of creating 
patronage relationships. Clients' attitudes are explored in the final section, 
which discusses popular perceptions of lawyers to explain why clients try to 
involve them in patronage relationships. 
1 Often the adYicc sought is social or commercial as much as it is legal. One must also distinguish 
those clients who want adYice in relation to a specific issue from those who are involved in litigation. 
The latter category can be sub-di,·ided into clients who arc having their initial interviews and those 
who arc ·following up· on ongoing cases. Finally although the most intensive lawyer/client interaction 
occurs in lawyers· offices. they also interact in other settings. such as the court-room itself 
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2. The Case of the 'Honorable Businessman' 
"It is nine o'clock on a cold February night. The orange glow of the Valletta 
street lights only serves to highlight the emptiness of the city street. Dim 
baroque facades loom, half seen through the office window. The Dickensian 
aura is accentuated by the furnishing of the legal office, where everything 
seems to testify to the dead weight of the past. Century old legal tomes jostle 
with piles of papers, files and documents. Images of the Crucified Christ 
decorate the walls and the grumbling2 of clients waiting in the corridor has a 
tired, patient, tone. Even the computers, a symbol of modernity, seem slowly 
to be getting encrusted with dust. However the atmosphere is tense within the 
inner sanctum of the lawyer's office; where a middle-aged couple are 
recounting recent events regarding the winding-up of a family-run company 
they partly own. The uneasy blend of suspicion and deference which defines 
their attitude to the lawyer, their clothes and speech style all testify to their 
rural origins. The lawyer, whom I will call Doctor Borg, is a well-built man in 
his thirties who conveys a sympathetic and reliable impression. He listens 
patiently, alternately weary and empathetic, only occasionally interrupting the 
clients. I have been introduced to them as a young lawyer and am sitting on 
Dr. Borg's side of the paper-loaded desk, symbolically aligned with the Law. 
The husband describes how a creditor had informed him that the mal-
administration of the company directors was increasing the debts it owed. 
Apparently they already amount to 50,000 Malta pounds. The husband is very 
upset. He tells the lawyer: 'We have to take action. I am very worried'. Fixing 
his eyes steadily on the lawyer, he declares: 'we have decided to appoint you 
as our agent. You will take care of everything for us. Because I can't stand 
any more of these upsets! Where necessary we have to take action. Because 
I always walk straight and I can't stand people who try to take my property 
from me'. He repeats this theme with variations throughout the interview, 
thumping on the desk with his fingers to underline his point. 'If we must 
trample on other peoples' feet, let's do so. Because I really respect you, 
Dr. Borg, but you have only one defect. You're too kind with these people. I 
walk straight and I can't take such behaviour'. He continues to elaborate this 
stance at such length that he comes across as a very vindictive person. He 
seems to realise that I am shocked by his harsh attitude and, to justify 
himself, adds: 'if necessary, I am prepared to give things to people for free, 
but I can't tolerate people who try to take my property for nothing'. Dr Borg 
agrees at intervals, saying: 'of course, o.k.' The client occasionally looks at 
me for confirmation of his views, as if he were frustrated by the lawyer's 
silences. I feel embarrassed at this and look at Dr Borg, in order to ward off 
any suspicion that I might be trying to steal his clients. I note with satisfaction 
that the client takes the hint and continues to address his lawyer. 
~ During the colonial period. British administrators used to complain about Maltese grumbling, or 
·gemgem·. Zammit ( I9X.t) relates this attitude to the prevailing state of powerlessness. My own 
fieldwork suggests that clients t~· to project a dissatisfied image in order to exert pressure on their 
lawyers. Grumbling also denects attention from one's successes. averting jealousy and competition. 
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Then the wife asks the lawyer in an outraged tone: 'How can they {the 
company directors) do this?' Dr. Borg replies: 'they have to be careful. 
According to the new company law, they can't do this so easily. Can you see 
it, lady? It's that fat book on the shelf behind you. Directors are personally 
liable for such debts. These sorts of actions should become impossible'. The 
wife is not convinced: 'why are you saying should?' 'Well it depends on a 
judge noticing these changes', the lawyer replies. 'They should do so, but 
God knows when they will'. Then the husband takes the baton again, 
repeating the whole story and dramatising his anger and anxiety. Dr. Borg 
only disagrees twice. When the husband claims that he has not taken enough 
action, he observes sharply: 'when was the last time you came to this office?' 
Also, when the husband says: 'I can't bear to receive any more legal papers 
at home', Dr Borg replies: 'Look, in order to start a case, you have to come 
with me to the Registry to sign the writ of summons. Do you see? I will take 
action; but you have to come here'. The husband seems to accept this, but 
continues to elaborate his grievances until the lawyer cuts him short by 
asking abruptly: '0. K. is this what we'll do?' The client agrees, fixing his gaze 
on the lawyer and saying: 'but Dr Borg, let me love you', as a parting shot". 
{Fieldwork Diary: February 1996} 
One reason for starting with this excerpt from my field-notes is that it 
illustrates the deficiencies of the 'one-way translation model' of lawyer/client 
interaction discussed in my first chapter. It seems obvious that to describe 
this episode purely in terms of the lawyer's domination over his clients does 
not do justice to the complexity of the power relations involved. It is clear that 
these clients are trying to put pressure on the lawyer to take more care of 
their case and it also seems that their efforts are partially successful. 
Narrating their story allows these clients to attract Dr. Borg's sense of pity 
and moral indignation at their plight. The husband describes his anxiety as 
something he is physically incapable of bearing with. He describes himself as 
an upright person who is being destroyed by rogues. This narrative depiction 
of self derives its morally persuasive force from the way it appropriates and 
creatively develops Maltese understandings of social relations. These stress 
the importance of forming personal relationships of reciprocal obligation with 
significant others as a means of fulfilling individual ambitions. 3 This is 
' It is no coincidence that one of the seminal texts in network analysis. Boissevain's 'Friends of 
Friends· ( I!J7.f). was based on fieldwork in Malta. Its central argument is that the study of the 
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metaphorically expressed through the active verb 'qabad, meaning 'to grab 
hold of' and used for such socially approved activities as finding a girlfriend 
or attracting a clientele. Simultaneously, however, the creation of such 
relationships is seen as a potentially corrupting threat to individual autonomy. 
Particularly feared are the obligations such relationships create, since they 
allow others to influence one's actions and this can place one in a 
dishonourably passive position. 
The link between honourable moral purity and individual autonomy is 
explicitly made in metaphors such as that of 'il-mixja' (the walk). This can be 
used to refer to a person's 'walk through life', (i.e. her life-course as shaped 
by herself) or to the way a person 'walks with others' (i.e. the way in which 
she treats others). The significance of talking about an individual's walk in the 
context of a morality of self-fulfilment or inter-personal behaviour lies in the 
way this metaphor highlights individual liberty, the ability to choose one's own 
route, as a precondition for morally correct action. Not surprisingly, 
entanglement in social obligations is described by the passive verb: 'inqabad', 
which refers to such other socially disapproved states as falling foul of the 
law, being caught in a lie or being an unmarried mother. Thus one 
contradiction which runs through Maltese culture is that between honourable 
individual autonomy and the acknowledged social utility of creating networks 
of personalised obligations with others. 4 
This is the contradiction this businessman is confronting. His desire to take 
legal action requires that he terminate his relationship with the company 
directors. This is why he evokes his honourable autonomy, as symbolised by 
his 'straight walk' and the fact that he is prepared to give free gifts but not to 
be robbed by others. This invocation of autonomy aims at authorising his 
personalised moral relationships individuals create can explain social behaviour by making visible a 
field of social action which lies between the state and the individual. Such networking is nourished by 
the relatiYe weakness of state institutions in the Mediterranean. 
1 My treatment of metaphors is inspired by that of Brandes ( 1992), who explores the systematic 
relations between metaphors. Lederach ( 1991) has similarly analysed conflict talk in Costa Rica. 
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desire to make the company directors pay for their mistakes. He therefore 
extends the walking metaphor and gives it a new twist, saying: "if we are 
obliged to trample on other peoples' feet, let's do so." 
There is yet another level of irony to this narrative, which refers directly to the 
lawyer/client relationship. Indeed, the businessman's desire to act 
autonomously itself places him in the passive position of a client. This irony is 
both revealed and denied by the businessman's reference to the 
'straightness' of his 'walk'. The term used for 'straight' is the Maltese word 
'drift'. While meaning morally correct action, this term can also refer to a legal 
right and, in a conservative usage, the whole spectrum of law and morality 
conceived as a unitary set of norms. By using such expressions, this client is 
also claiming to act in a manner which is legally correct. 'Drift' is being used 
as a vehicle to translate honour into legal entitlement. 5 This client wants the 
lawyer to legally intercede for him on the basis of his recognition of the 
honourable nature of his conduct. In this way the potentially dishonourable 
nature of the lawyer/client relationship to the client is denied. 
Thus this extract shows how clients strategically utilise the: "inescapably 
moral" (Bruner 1990: 50) aspect of what might seem to be the purely 
communicative activity of telling their stories. His narrative self-depiction as 
an upright man being destroyed by thieves authorises this client to implicitly 
threaten his lawyer: raising his voice and thumping on his desk. This is very 
different from the deferential attitude such rural clients usually adopt. Thus, 
narratives can invoke moral norms to release emotions which discursively 
empower clients vis-a-vis their lawyers. They operate as what Tannen (1989) 
calls 'involvement strategies', obliging lawyers to operate within the 
framework of their client's perceptions. 
' In this case it seems that if one is Drill (morally upright). then Drill (the Law) gives one the drift 
(right) to walk drill (straight) oyer others. thus stepping on them. The underlying notion is that the 
law authorises a morally upright person to tcnninate personal relationships. 
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Still this businessman can only go so far in asserting his own honour. He 
must be careful not to openly offend his lawyer, as the latter might refuse to 
represent him. Thus he presents his frustration at the delays he is 
experiencing in the form of a complaint about Dr. Borg's excessive kindliness. 
One should also note that the businessman's wife co-operates with him in 
jointly authoring a narrative to put pressure on the lawyer. 6 In the story they 
jointly enact, their roles are complementary. The husband expresses anxiety 
and aggression. When his rhetorical flow runs dry, the wife intervenes in a 
less aggressive, moralising, tone. She is more insistent then her husband, 
and extracts more legal information from the lawyer. Consequently, by 
exposing him to their 'joint performance', these clients compel the lawyer to 
explain his advice before different audiences, obtaining a more 
comprehensive understanding of their situation. 
In the face of this pressure, Dr. Borg's most effective strategy is refusing to 
noticeably respond to his clients' story. By listening wearily and giving 
occasional monosyllabic responses, the lawyer conveys to them that he has 
heard such stories many times before. Thus, he detaches himself from the 
narrative within which clients try to frame their interactions and eludes the 
pressures placed on him within it. His occasional expressions of empathy are 
the minimum necessary to maintain clients' confidence while avoiding 
entanglement in their messy, emotive, stories. 
The success of this tactic can be gauged from clients' reactions. Highly 
significant are the businessman's attempts to look at me rather than his 
lawyer while telling his story. This is perhaps the most common experience I 
had while conducting research in lawyers' offices. Clients would turn and 
address their stories to me, obviously hoping to obtain more feedback than 
their lawyers gave them. Meanwhile, the latter would try to get clients to stop 
talking. In this case, the husband's attempts to engage my interest, his 
''This is consistent with the beha,·iour of other couples I have observed in legal offices. 
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insistent repetition of his story and his wife's suspicious questions all indicate 
their dissatisfaction with the lawyer's response. 
To provoke Dr. Borg, both spouses come close to questioning his 
professional authority. The husband does this directly, stating: "we have not 
taken enough action." His wife adopts a suspicious attitude. However the 
lawyer counters both these moves. He meets the husband's direct challenge 
head on, questioning his dedication in pursuing his interests. The wife's 
arguments are defused by patronisingly showing her the law books; 
displaying his learning, while implying that she is only capable of appreciating 
its outward manifestations, or the size of the books. When she continues to 
question him, he invokes his insider knowledge of judges'7 attitudes, like the 
lawyers observed by Sarat and Felstiner (1989). By refusing to explain the 
delays experienced, the lawyer distances himself from responsibility for them. 
Consequently, in this case, the businessman and his wife co-authored a 
narrative to pressurise their lawyer to take action. They utilised the capacity 
of stories to foreground moral norms to create sympathy for the story-teller. 
This strategy also allowed them to appropriate the legal rules in their support. 
Their attempt to convert honour into legal entitlement was countered by 
Dr. Borg, who tried to restrict clients' attempts to narrate their experience. 
The outcome was that these clients got their feelings across to their lawyer, 
compelling him to justify himself and to promise to take more action. On the 
other hand, they were also made aware of their dependence on him and of 
his ability to detach himself by ignoring their story. While this case-study is 
fairly typical, it should be clear that it reflects the attitudes of particular types 
of clients and lawyers. As will be seen, it is not characteristic of interactions 
involving top urban businessmen, or lawyers who adopt a more 'legalistic' 
client-handling style. 
- It is signilican: that Dr. Borg refers primarily to juc(~es instead of courts. Rural clients might easily 
confuse lawyers with the courts in which they practise. Referring to judges serves to distance the 
lawyer c\·cn more from inyoJyement in a system which his clients perceive as hostile. 
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3. The Social Uses of Clients' Narratives 
The focus will now expand to encompass the field of discursive strategies 
which underlies individual cases. One issue left unexplained by the previous 
account is that of the truthfulness of clients' stories. In a sense my analysis 
may seem to have prejudged the matter. I have spoken of 'involvement 
strategies', and 'tactics' because this corresponds to the reasons for which 
stories were produced by clients. These stories were not narrated by people 
who were trying to recall the past before oral historians. They were told by 
clients to their lawyers in attempts to master difficult practical situations. 
The strategic telling of stories was obvious to me because I could observe the 
way clients' behaviour altered the minute they entered lawyers' offices. While 
still in the outer office, they would either maintain a suspicious silence or chat 
about neutral topics. I grew used to listening to discussions about the price of 
housing, politics and the building industry. In short, clients would talk about 
everything except their cases. 8 Once inside the inner office, however, their 
behaviour would change dramatically. I watched one businessman shift from 
a leisurely debate on the merits of old Maltese silver to an intensely serious 
avowal of the honour of his family as he moved from the outer office to the 
inner one. At times, even the language changed, as the English used for 
technical topics was replaced by the Maltese reserved for personal matters. 
Another time a female teacher calmly discussed the educational system with 
me in the outer office. Yet on entering before her lawyer, she burst into floods 
of tears as she recounted her mistreatment by her parents. 
Yet, accounts like these have a double-edged quality. While their timing and 
manner of telling betray strategic purposes, it is often equally clear that they 
evoke genuine emotions and that clients believe them to be true. Indeed a 
source of frustration for clients is when stories they consider true are valued 
only for their strategic significance by their lawyers. This is one reason why 
~They were clearly scared that their words would reach the cars of their opponents in litigation. 
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clients keep trying to tell their stories even when lawyers 'switch off and pay 
them little attention. It also explains why most clients were pleased with my 
presence in the office. When lawyers ignored their stories, they would 
address them to me, since I seemed readier to endorse them. 9 
An event which occurred during my fieldwork led me to speculate on the 
truthfulness of stories. I was observing the interviews of a separating wife 
with Dr. Camilleri, in a case which I will call that of the 'Impotent Husband'. 
This woman pressurised Dr. Camilleri to open a law-suit instead of trying for a 
contractual settlement. She became angry and emotional when telling the 
story of her marriage, contrasting her husband's obsessive nature to her own 
reasonableness. She described his obsession with buying a Ferrari Cinque 
sports car when they did not need such a showy car. Pointing to her father, 
who was also present, she observed that her husband had always resented 
him because he was impotent and her father was more of a man. Having 
established a narrative context stressing her husband's abnormality, the wife 
talked about his behaviour during the separation itself. When listing their 
property for division purposes he had even mentioned flower bulbs he 
planted in the garden. She insisted that this was crazy behaviour, which 
made it impossible to reach a reasonable agreement with him. 
As I was following these interviews, I was also attending Dr. Borg's office. 
One of his most assiduous clients was a separating man. He described his 
wife as a dangerous woman who was constantly quarrelling with him, posing 
a physical threat to his life. She kept trying to get her hands on his property. 
However he told Dr. Borg with a satisfied smile that he was not going to be 
swindled and that he had made a detailed list of everything he possessed. He 
" I felt uncomfortable. since I knew listening to these stories helped clients elude their lawyers· efforts 
to focus their attention elsewhere. I used to compromise by giYing the client some attention and then 
ignoring him and looking at the lawyer. When I told one client about my research, she looked 
delighted and said: "Good! Make sure you come to us (clients). as only we can tell you what really 
goes on .. At this. her lawyer intermpted. telling me: "No. come to us (lawyers).'' He told the client 
that: "you can·t tell him the tmth because you cannot be objective! .. Friends engaged in 'prattika' told 
me their lawyers trained them not to pay too much attention to clients· stories. 
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produced a large file and handed it over, boasting of the way he had used his 
business expertise to produce a comprehensive report. 
While I did not initially make the connection, later events confirmed10 that the 
man was actually the 'impotent Husband' Dr. Camilleri's client had 
complained about. On discovering this, I felt they had made a fool of me since 
both parties had convinced me of the credibility of their respective stories. 
Each story had so thoroughly engaged my sympathy that I could not 
recognise either spouse after having heard the other. On reflection, however, 
I realised that both stories could in a way be true. The righteous anger the 
wife showed before Dr. Camilleri translated into the aggressive behaviour her 
husband complained of. Conversely what the wife saw as the abnormal 
obsession of her husband to list even the smallest pieces of property he 
owned, became an understandable defensive reaction in his version. Equally 
clearly, however, both parties had focused on those aspects which put them 
in a more sympathetic light. The husband's description of his wife's frustrated 
behaviour had not mentioned that he might be responsible for her feelings, 
just as his wife did not mention that she was intimidating her husband. It 
follows that true stories can also be strategically fabricated and told. 
Once one abandons the false opposition between verisimilitude and strategic 
telling, then lawyers' attitudes become more comprehensible. While being 
cagey about endorsing clients' stories, lawyers are also vehement about the 
need to respect them. 'It is his story', they told me; highlighting the way 
clients' stories construct their own sense of self-hood and observing that 
objectively incredible stories might be subjectively true for clients. This also 
conforms to the way Maltese talk about a story. The indigenous term, 'storja' 
differs from the English 'story', since it is also the only term for 'history'. There 
is Jess expectation that a story will be false. 11 Indeed lawyers only claim a 
1
" When Doctors Borg and Camilleri had a discussion about trying to settle this case, Dr. Borg 
requested me to stay away. since: ··there could be a problem of confidentiality here." 
11 Because it means a history. a ·storja· is thought to take a long time to recount and to revolve around 
dramatic incidents. One who unduly dramatises ordinary e\·ents is said to be ·trying to create a storja ·. 
125 
client is lying when he contradicts his own narratives. In such cases they are 
adept at the art of communicating their opinion without alienating clients. 
Thus after one of his witnesses had altered his testimony in court, his lawyer 
later told a client: "as a rule, when people are telling the truth, they don't 
change their version because the Magistrate starts to shout at them." 
Consequently lawyers' ambivalent attitude to stories 12 reflects the way they 
mediate between reality as experienced and as strategically re-figured. This 
confirms RicoeUlr's (1984) analysis which, as chapter two showed, 
acknowledges both the poetic activity by which narratives configure the world 
and the way they refer to reality in order to persuade. It was also seen how 
Bruner (1990) relates the emotional impact of narratives to their inescapably 
ethical descriptive terminology. This is why stories evoke the genuine 
emotions of clients although strategically fabricated by them. 13 
On the basis of this analysis it is possible to summarise the discursive 
features of the lawyer/client interviews I observed. Particularly noticeable is 
the way clients use narratives to evoke culturally paradigmatic moral norms 
which present their selves in an upright light. These stories empower them 
vis-a-vis their lawyers; aiming to induce the latter to represent them in terms 
of their views of their cases. This can be exemplified by other client interviews 
I observed. In one case, which will be called that of the 'Friendly Landlord', a 
lessor wanted to increase the rent his tenants paid him. He told a story which 
cloaked what would otherwise have seemed his naked exploitation beneath 
an account stressing the previous gentlemanly relationship existing between 
him and his tenants. Analogously, in the case of the 'Impartial Widow', a 
woman who wanted to repatriate her dead husband's savings told her notary 
that this was in order to be able to leave the money equally to her children on 
her own death. A story like this is effective since the avoidance of favouritism 
1
: Lawyers told me that criminal lawyers have a different attitude towards clients· stories. While civil 
lawyers ask their clients what their story is. criminal lawyers suggest a story to them. asking: 'could 
this be what happened'~" I could not veril)' this. since my fieldwork was carried out with civil lawyers. 
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is especially praised in Maltese culture; given the bitter family quarrels which 
often follow the reading of a dead parent's will. These narratives are used by 
clients to construct a discursive bridge between their experiences and the 
legal framework; asserting a continuum between moral norms and legal rules. 
Lawyers generally avoid responding to these stories, treading the fine line 
between a sceptical attitude and total rejection of them. This is because while 
lawyers must listen to their narratives to win clients' trust and adequately 
represent them, they also consider them as potential time-wasters 
threatening their professional independence. Consequently they tend to 
provide minimal endorsement to these narratives, occasionally passing 
ironical comments whose contextual absurdity indicates they are not 'taken 
in'. Thus his lawyer told the 'Friendly Landlord' that it was not legally possible 
for him to 'screw' his tenants; while the notary told the 'Impartial Widow' that 
she could gamble away her husband's savings if she wanted to. 
Furthermore, lawyers often resort to a stance of selective inattention; 
seeming to ignore their clients while actually taking note of what they say. 
They 'switch on' again the moment clients say something they consider 
legally relevant. This can be illustrated by one separation case in which the 
lawyer read some legal papers while his client droned on about the way his 
wife had turned his daughter against him. However the lawyer came alert 
again when the client said his daughter had sent a card saying she still loved 
him. He told him to bring this card to court with him as it was useful evidence. 
Even when lawyers confirm their clients' stories, they usually do so in terms 
which subtly transform them; making the infringement of legal rather than 
moral norms the central issue. Thus, one client of Dr. Camilleri's owned a 
restaurant in a popular tourist resort. He had been given a police license to 
place tables in the street and had built a little wall around these tables, 
enclosing the dining area. The Planning Authority had now served notice on 
L' I am therefore wary ofBailcy·s (19Rl)account of the ·tactical uses of passion', which might suggest 
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him to remove this wall, claiming it had been illegally constructed. He was 
contesting this before the Authority's Appeal's Board. Before the hearing, he 
seemed very upset, telling his lawyer and myself that this would ruin him. 
Nobody would want to eat in his restaurant when pedestrians could walk 
between the tables and dogs defecate near diners. He hinted darkly that 
business competitors had tipped the Authority off. Yet when Dr. Camilleri 
agreed with him, he said: "once they gave you permission to place the tables 
in the road, they could not prohibit you from building the wall." Thus, while the 
lawyer endorsed his client's story, he also transformed it from a vendetta 
narrative into one about the legal principle that the scope of official 
authorisation extends to subsidiary actions entailed by the activity authorised. 
The effect on clients is to socialise them into the way lawyers view their 
cases. They become aware of the difficulty of communicating their stories to 
busy lawyers who do not have much time to listen. This induces clients to 
exercise a certain self-censorship; shortening their stories and also re-
shaping them to catch lawyers' attention. They adopt a more strategic attitude 
to their own stories; insisting on them on in the face of lawyers' inattention 
and summarising them to achieve maximum communicative impact. The 
outcome is short, emotionally charged, statements iconically encapsulating 
their narratives. Thus, after a court awarded her a low maintenance rate, one 
separating woman told her lawyer: "so, that's it? He wins as usual?" Also, 
another client said "I don't see why something which my mother gave me, 
should come to him." These statements function as "morals" evoking the 
stories to which they refer. Clients also learn which stories provoke a 
favourable response from lawyers. Since photos and other material evidence 
provoke a more favourable reaction than accounts of their emotions, they 
learn to produce stories which revolve around this material evidence. 
Moreover, while the ordinary course of lawyer/client interaction is marked by 
clients' attempts to narrate their experiences and lawyers' minimal 
that genuine passions arc not tactically c\·okcd. 
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confirmation of their stories, there are endless variations in practise. These 
depend on the social background of the client, the lawyer's style and the 
nature of the case itself. To start with clients and to give a crude outline of the 
situation, those coming from a lower class, rural and lower middle-class 
background tend to be keenest on creating stories showing them in a 
favourable light. These are the stories which are met with minimal 
confirmation and inattention by many lawyers. At the same time lawyers are 
protective of those clients they see as particularly deserving cases, such as 
young separating females, and pay them more attention. 
With top businessmen, the interaction is completely different; more closely 
resembling a relationship between equals, or even one where the lawyer is 
on the defensive. Here it is lawyers who try to sell their legal advice to clients, 
who do not easily accept it. In one case, for instance, one of Malta's biggest 
businessmen came to Dr. Camilleri's office. Apparently, he had bought some 
plots of land and had then been prevented from building on them because a 
rare species of wild flower grew there. Dr. Camilleri greeted this client with a 
smile and, observing that they were: "going to make our opponents scream," 
he outlined his strategy for winning the case. The client fired off his 
questions, which were fielded by the lawyer. The lawyer then tried to reach 
out to his client and create a shared narrative understanding of the folly of 
their opponents' behaviour, by saying "and all this for a couple of flowers." 
However, the businessman did not respond to this. This case shows that 
where the social power differential is heavily weighted in favour of the client, 
it is lawyers who try to create a shared narrative framework and clients who 
withhold confirmation. However these cases are a minority. 
Different lawyers also adopt varying approaches to clients' narratives. Some 
of the lawyers I observed dedicated more time to listening to their stories and 
were more encouraging. Others were more inattentive and cut clients short. 
These different styles reflect occupational differences between lawyers; with 
small sole practitioners having more time for the stories of rural/working class 
clients and top firm lawyers less. 
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While this analysis illustrates the influence of social power relations on 
lawyer/client interactions, one should note that these are also conditioned by 
stories' objective content. Lawyers themselves confirmed this point by telling 
me it was impossible to generalise because: 'every case is different'. Thus 
lawyers abandon their indifferent stance to clients' stories and actively 
engage with them if their content is such as to prevent clients from taking 
their advice. This can be illustrated by the case of the 'Impotent Husband', 
where the wife's account of her husband's irrational nature stood in the way 
of Dr. Camilleri's attempt to negotiate a settlement. Consequently the lawyer 
altered her story, arguing that her husband was not irrational but was trying to 
assert his offended virility. When the wife objected that her husband's fixation 
with buying a luxurious car proved he was abnormally obsessive, the lawyer 
replied: "that's exactly why he wanted that sort of car. It's a symbol of virility." 
Here, therefore, the lawyer was prepared to transform the narrative frame in 
terms of which his client understood the case, as this ensured that his legal 
advice would be accepted. This is similar to the attitudes of the American 
divorce lawyers observed by Sarat & Felstiner (1988), 14 with a crucial 
difference. While the American lawyers were only prepared to contest the 
'vocabularies of motive' which their clients invoked to explain the present 
actions of their spouses, Dr. Camilleri also tries to transform his client's 
understanding of the motives for the past behaviour of her husband in buying 
a Ferrari Cinque sports-car. His reason for doing so is that the motives 
ascribed by the wife to account for her husband's present actions were 
narratively based on her depiction of his past behaviour during their 
marriage. It is because he was faced with a narrative rather. than with 
temporally isolated 'vocabularies of motive' that Dr. Camilleri also had to 
transform his client's understanding of her own past. A narrative perspective 
makes it possible to perceive these linkages between past and present, which 
a focus on 'vocabularies of motive' leaves out 
1 
' Sec chapter one for a summary· of their views. 
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Having summarised the general discursive features of lawyer/client 
interviews, this analysis will now concentrate on what they tell us about the 
social relationships between lawyers and clients. While clients' stories vary 
widely, a common element is that they portray clients as honourable persons. 
However it is risky to refer to honour in the context of Mediterranean 
anthropology. The analytical significance of the term has been questioned 
(Gilmore 1987). Mediterranean ethnographies traditionally took it: "as 
axiomatic that honour and shame necessarily have to do with sexual roles" 
(Sant Cassia 1991: 8). 15 Yet many of these stories cannot be accommodated 
within this conception of honour. Thus the 'Impartial Widow' seemed more 
concerned with her parental role as a fair mother than with her sexual role as 
such. Also, while the 'Honourable Businessman' evoked the sexually charged 
image of the active man, who directs his own life-walk, this emphasis on 
autonomy is more than a simple assertion of virility. Consequently, one must 
refer to more recent ethnographies for alternative accounts of honour.16 
In an important article, Herzfeld (1987) has explored the social uses of 
honour by replacing the concept with that of hospitality. He argues that the 
rhetoric/practise of hospitality to tourists enables Greeks to symbolically deny 
their dependence on them. Presenting themselves as unilateral givers 
reverses objective patronage relationships to morally oblige tourists towards 
Greeks. This in turn legitimates Greek exploitation of foreigners, so that: 
"The hospitality I have described reproduces in an active, spatial, 
and symbolic frame the ideological structure of patron-client 
relations (see especially Campbell 1964): it is the moral englobing 
of political asymmetry that allows the client to maintain self-respect 
while gaining material advantage"(Herzfeld: 1987: 86). 
1.' The traditional approach is exemplified by Campbcll"s (196~) ethnography, where an analysis of 
honour is difficult to separate from a discussion of gender roles. 
1 
r; The seeds of an altcrnatiYc account arc already present in Campbell" s ( 1964) classic account of the 
Sarakatsani. He there speaks of honour as: ··a condition of integrity"" (ihid.: 269). Yet his only 
explanation for why people assert honour is that this restores the integrity of individuals and families 
by denying the need for co-operation and stressing the: ··mutual exclusiveness and opposition of 
unrelated families·· (ihid: 212). 
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This analysis suggests that hospitality/honour is a way of creating patronage 
relationships. Analogously, Sant Cassia (1991) observes that honour 
operates at the interface between the self and the other. It is central to the 
processes by which individuals in the Mediterranean produce themselves; 
creating their own identities, or 'personas', for social exchange. Honour is 
embodied through the skill individual actors display in crafting a character 
and living up to it. 17 Social interaction reflects attempts to accumulate 
personal honour and also to deny the honour of others by highlighting 
discrepancies between their actor selves and the characters they adopt. Thus 
the social uses of honour lie in its dramatic potential. It enables an individual 
to 'script his self' in the context of a wider social drama he can never fully 
control. Specifically, honour allows the weak to appropriate the vocabulary of 
the powerful; using it against them to question their standing. 
Both Herzfeld and Sant Cassia see an important social use of honour as lying 
in its ability to mask the characteristic power differentials of patronage 
relations. Honour creates and preserves relationships of dependence through 
emphasising the social autonomy of clients. This is strongly reminiscent of 
the behaviour of the 'Honourable Businessman', whose assertion of 
honourable autonomy masked his dependence on the lawyer. While other 
clients do not emphasise their autonomy to the same extent, their stories also 
serve as means of 'self scripting'. By constructing their identities as morally 
upright persons, these clients seek to control the way their lawyers inscribe 
them within the textual legal domain. This is why lawyers react by trying to 
negate clients' honour just as Sant Cassia observes; evoking discrepancies 
between the client as actor and the client as character in his own story. 18 
The picture which emerges is one where most clients use narratives in order 
to script themselves as honourable persons and thus create, by denying, 
1
- Herzfeld ( IIJX5) obsen·es that in Cretan mountain Yillages. men arc not praised for being 'good 
men·. but for ·being good at being men·. 
"As occurred when his l:myer told the ·Friendly Landlord" that he could not 'screw· his tenants. 
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patron/client relationships with their lawyers based on the latters' recognition 
of their morally upright nature. This observation is confirmed by other 
features of client behaviour, which also aim at creating patronage. Thus, 
clients try to draw their lawyers into discussions of non-legal personal issues, 
to create multiplex ties with them. They also give them gifts, ranging from a 
bottle of whisky to the free use of a beach lido, or a trip abroad in the client's 
car. Clients even follow lawyers to their home, forming queues in the street 
outside. Apparently one well-established lawyer wakes up in the morning to 
find clients offering to drive him to work at his office. 
Lawyers do respond to these overtures, often becoming friendly with clients. 
However they are also wary of becoming too obliged/dependent on them. The 
reason for this is revealed by a joke one client made to his lawyer, saying: 
"why don't you let us clients make a collection and buy you a mobile phone?" 
While seemingly an innocent offer of a gift, the lawyer's acceptance of this 
present would make it easier for his clients to contact him, making demands 
at all times. This manifests the latent purpose behind other gifts clients give 
and explains why many established lawyers do not have mobile phones. As 
one lawyer told me: "clients want to have us in their pockets."19 
Consequently, evoking a patronage relationship based on their honour is a 
way by which clients try to script the whole drama of their relations with 
lawyers; ensuring the latter will in turn act honourably by forging ahead with 
their cases and acknowledging obligations towards them. They want lawyers 
to intercede for them on the basis of the justice of their claims and the honour 
of their selves. This is why clients tell stories painting themselves as morally 
upright, although most lawyers told me they are not concerned with the moral 
qualities of their clients. 20 
1 
'' To haYe someone ·in your pocket· means haying ultimate control and dominance over that person . 
.:o Lawyers said they could not ·impose their morality· on clients. who ·should not have two judges.· 
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4. Clients' Perceptions 
Relating clients' narrative self-scripting to their attempt to evoke patronage 
relationships begs the question: 'why do so many clients attempt to create 
patronage relationships with their lawyers?' To tackle this issue one must 
probe the underlying assumptions clients bring to their encounters with 
lawyers. Popular views of lawyers are deeply ambivalent. They are looked up 
to as people of intelligence, cunning and leadership, who are able to resolve 
difficult problems. Thus, a particularly crafty thought is described as one 
which might have occurred to a lawyer. Lawyers' learning is respected and 
they are elected to posts of authority; being heavily involved in politics, mass-
media, clubs, sports and philanthropic associations. 
While a respectful attitude towards lawyers is prevalent throughout Maltese 
society, the reasons for this respect vary according to the social position of 
the speaker. Businessmen generally praise the strategic ability and crafty 
deviousness displayed by certain lawyers. They respect their mastery of 
arcane legal knowledge and the power which this gives them. They admire 
lawyers who are forceful and aggressive, contrasting them to 'sleepy' lawyers 
who are not sufficiently alert to defend their clients. By contrast, clients who 
are placed in a more dependent social position tend to praise the personal 
ethical attributes of the lawyers who act as their patrons. This is how one 
separated woman in her early thirties described her lawyer to me: 
"My lawyer was like a 'father figure' to me. He was as old as my 
father. My father had known him at school. They weren't old 
acquaintances, but sort of, when my father had come with me the 
first time, like they knew each other, we discussed it, you know. 
And I always felt like he was guiding me, as if he knew what I was 
to do more than I knew what to do, which in fact he did." 
Lawyers who are particularly generous with their time and attention are 
classified as 'avukati tar-ruh', or 'lawyers with a soul'. They are looked up to 
for their Christ-like capacity to 'bear their clients' crosses'. They inspire the 
same sort of respectful awe that priests do and clients confide every aspect 
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of their lives in their hands. This quasi-religious authority is clear in the 
following interview with a middle-aged, unemployed, man: 
"There are other lawyers, whom I call 'avukati tar-ruh'. These are 
lawyers who, when you go to them, the first thing they do is to try 
to reconcile the parties, which should be the ethical duty of all 
lawyers. The 'avukati tar-ruh', in my experience, are lawyers who 
have somehow got a certain Roman Catholic belief. This is very 
conspicuous in them. It is predominant. So, they also apply it in 
civil law. These lawyers are so concerned with the soul that 
sometimes they do what shouldn't really be ethical for a lawyer and 
get involved personally. And they do. They do a lot of good." 
However, while most Maltese claim to 'respect' lawyers, this word has 
ambivalent connotations, since lawyers as a class have a negative reputation 
with the bulk of the population. This is not solely the result of their behaviour. 
Lawyers are symbolically associated with the law and the courts, so attitudes 
to them reflect generally negative popular perceptions of legal institutions. As 
one recent newspaper article points out: 
"The plain unvarnished fact is that the only sentiment that all 
Maltese people share is a deep distrust of law enforcement and 
the administration of justice!" (Laivera 1995: 24)21 
Legal proceedings are fraught with delays and lawyers are, rightly or wrongly, 
blamed for them. This connection is also made because lawyers themselves 
are seen as disorganised and inefficient. Clients complain about being forced 
to wait for their lawyers and about their inactivity on their behalf. 22 It is quite 
common to hear people complain that lawyers are never punctual and create 
delays because they: 'have a different sense of time'. Lawyers have 
internalised this criticism and jokingly refer to 'lawyer's time'. 
Rural and working class clients are especially prone to view lawyers through 
the optic of class relations. Lawyers are viewed as representing a dominating 
21 This correspondent also pointed out that: "TV interviewers were recently unable to find one single 
person expressing confidence in Maltese justice" (Laiviera. V: 1995: 24) 
22 As evening falls. one can obserYe groups of clients who have to wait in the streets until their 
lawyers come to open their offices. Orten. 1 waited for more than an hour with clients in this way. 
Once. I heard a client jokingly quote the Maltese proverb: "min jistenna, jithenna" (he who waits will 
be made happy). to which another ironically replied: "jew jitherra" (or will be worn away). 
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upper class, which uses its superior education and power to deceive clients 
and induce them to part with their money for dubious benefits. The character 
of the scheming lawyer is almost an archetypal one in Maltese left-wing 
newspapers and literature (Mamo 1984 ). Consequently lawyers are accused 
of intentionally causing delays to increase their fees. They are also attacked 
for being deliberately vague, misleading clients into prosecuting claims they 
can never win. These attitudes are encapsulated in the oft-quoted expression 
that lawyers 'jghaddu il-klijent biz-zmien', or make fools of clients by 'playing 
with time': constantly promising a future vindication which is never delivered. 
Lawyers are seen as mercenary predators who bleed their clients dry. 23 
Another motive for these negative perceptions is that some aspects of legal 
work contradict traditional ideals of manliness. Thus Maltese proverbs claim 
that a real man exercises a prudent economy of discourse, his word being the 
defining element of his manliness. Its virile strength guarantees the social 
bonds formed on its basis, so that: 'as the bull is bound by his horns, the man 
is bound by his word'. By contrast lawyers specialise in producing 
superfluous talk, which they generally do not act upon. Such talk is 
sceptically described by the ltalianate term for words: 'parol!', which is 
reserved for unproductive, talk and opposed to the Semitic term 'kliem', used 
for veridical discourse. 24 Lawyers are disliked because they 'play with' and 
'twist' words. The feminine nature of such deceitfulness is conveyed by a 
saying that one should leave extra talk to women or lawyers. Lawyers are 
also compared to prostitutes because they are prepared to represent any 
paying client, however unsavoury. This adds up to a popular view of lawyers 
as scheming exploitative rascals, which fuels political debates. 25 
c' One ,·illage lawyer told me that when clients praise a lawyer. they say: 'he did not squeeze me dry.· 
This renects an expectation that lawyers will squeeze as much money as they can from their clients. 
c 1 This renects working class attitudes to Italians: often seen as · hrikkuni". or unreliable deceivers. 
c' rvtLP supporters criticise the P.N. for being the ad\'ocates· party, whose leaders "twist words· and 
·manipulate facts·. 
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One must also keep in mind that in Malta, as in other Mediterranean 
societies, there is a deep-rooted rural/working class hostility towards the 
state and its institutions. Clients are quick to claim that the courts do not side 
with 'straight', or morally upright, individuals and that it is the 'small fish', or 
the socially vulnerable, who are caught by the law. Lawyers are 
representatives of this system and cannot help being associated with it. Thus, 
one rural client to whom I was introduced was described by Dr. Borg as: "one 
of the naughtiest persons in Malta;" an oblique reference to his illegal 
activities. This client felt the need to justify his behaviour before me as an 
aspiring lawyer, saying: "because, with all due respect, the law sometimes 
does not give you any satisfaction. You have to take it in your own hands." 
If the rural/working classes dislike lawyers' elite status and links with the 
state, the middle classes are more critical of lawyers' links with criminals who 
are at the bottom of the social ladder. As one middle-class journalist put it: 
"The greater a criminal lawyer's reputation, the more evil are the 
people who face him across his desk" (Caruana Galizia 1995: 9). 
Contacts between prominent lawyer/politicians and criminals are deplored as 
corruption which undermines state institutions. 26 Clearly such criticism also 
reflects a middle-class social position, which is more supportive of the state. 
By contrast, businessmen criticise lawyers' inefficiency. 27 A common 
complaint they make is that lawyers are impractical and continually quarrel 
with one another, spoiling any transaction into which they are introduced. 
In general, therefore, popular views of lawyers are highly polarised. On the 
one hand, there are the lawyers 'with a soul'. On the other, one can quote a 
recent discussion on t.v., where a young lawyer was asked how he reacted to 
the popular belief that lawyers don't have a soul. This duality is neatly 
::r. A uni,·ersity lecturer recently wrote an article entitled: ·A lawyer who is an m.p. should defend 
institutions and not those who try to destroy them· (Casso Ia 1996: 20). 
::- One businessman asked me whether I was learning ·lawyers fucking·, by which he meant to refer to 
the underhand deception they arc thought to excel in. ··what a disgracer· he continued: "all those 
court delays!"· Dr. Camilleri replied that: ··some clients don "t realise delays work in their favour.·· 
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captured by the Maltese saying that if God does not take the (dead) lawyer, 
the devil will. Indeed, the very existence of the category of lawyers who have 
a soul indicates that other lawyers are thought not to have one. The 
exaggerated respect and admiration in which some lawyers are held is a 
direct result of the fact that most lawyers are considered to be rascals. 
One should also note that this is not a clear opposition between good lawyers 
and bad ones. In Malta, as in Greece (Du Boulay 1974), the ability to perform 
well in the world is thought to require craftiness, which can imply immoral 
behaviour. The word 'hazin', meaning 'badness' is often used as a substitute 
for 'hazen', or 'craftiness', conflating the two concepts. In a culture where the 
assertion that a lawyer is (ethically) good may mean that he is (practically) 
ineffective, lawyers may not mind having a devious reputation. In this context, 
rural/working class clients are often particularly uncertain about the moral 
standing of their lawyers. To phrase it in their own terms, they are unsure 
whether their lawyer 'has a soul' or not. They tend to keep both possibilities 
present in their minds during their interviews. For this reason, they approach 
lawyers with a mixture of suspicion and deference. 28 
This uncertainty is also revealed by the strategies these clients adopt to 
ensure that they are properly represented in either eventuality. I watched one 
rural client jokingly tell his lawyer about his response to another lawyer who 
charged him for a case he had lost. He boasted that he had sent him a 
cheque which bounced, claiming: "if he (the other lawyer) has three balls, I've 
got four." Another client complained before his lawyer about the declining 
ethical standards of the legal profession, while excepting his own lawyer from 
censure. Through such rhetorical devices, clients exploit the bad reputation 
of lawyers as a class to pressure their own lawyers to act differently and to 
alert them that they are no fools. 
2~ One lawyer obser•ed to me that lower class clients either praised him excessively when he did not 
deserYe it or shouted at him when he was trying to help them. 
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The situation is additionally complicated by the ambivalent social role of 
lawyers. Poised as they are between the legal system and their clients, it is 
never totally clear whose interests they ultimately represent. In terms of the 
professional ideal, the lawyer's duty towards her clients ranks after her duty 
towards the court. Clients are aware that lawyers might see their primary duty 
as that of upholding the law in preference to securing their interests. Their 
jokes reflect this fear that lawyers might adopt a detached professional view, 
as they constantly stress their human weaknesses and eccentricities. In fact, 
clients joke about the shabby furniture of a lawyer's office, a time when his 
car broke down, his personal life and so on. Such jokes construct ties with 
lawyers on the basis of shared human frailty. To the opposition between 
lawyers 'who have a soul' and those who do not, one can therefore add that 
between 'humane' and 'legalistic' lawyers. In both cases we are not so much 
talking about different species of lawyers as of opposed categories into which 
clients classify their lawyers' behaviour. 29 
These conflicting attitudes make it easier to understand the motives behind 
clients' efforts to create patronage relationships with lawyers. Widespread 
perceptions of lawyers as tricky and dilatory, coupled with equally pervasive 
notions of the 'respect' they are entitled to, simultaneously motivate clients to 
create personal relationships and ensure that the only avenue for doing this 
lies through the discourse of respecUhonour. 30 Through their stories, clients 
hope to gain credibility in the eyes of lawyers, by translating their concerns 
into language they must respond to. Thus, while Maltese rural/working class 
clients often oppose law and honour in the way the Sarakatsani shepherds 
observed by Campbell ( 1964) did, they are aware that according to the 
conservative discourse favoured by the 'avukati tar-ruh', the two form part of 
the same continuum. They exploit this fact in order to obtain the protection of 
c'J A 'humane· lawyer may sometimes act in a legalistic way and the contrary is also true. 
'" This can be exemplified by the case of the ·Honourable Businessman·, where the religious 
symbolism in Dr. Borg· s office identifies him as a la\vyer ·with a sour. Clearly, such a lawyer may 
not be ready to assist clients to justify immoral acts. It is vital to create a personal relationship with 
him. since. like all lawyers. he is liable to delay your case unless it is brought it to his attention. 
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lawyers. As such protection is founded on the honour of both parties, the 
lawyer will naturally be respectful towards his client and is far less likely to try 
to deceive her or put off taking action in her case. 
Not only do patronage relationships allow clients to make moral claims on 
potentially devious lawyers, but they also make it possible to subvert the 
professional detachment of legalistic lawyers. Once you have transformed 
your lawyer into a friend, it becomes easier to exert pressure on him. He finds 
it more difficult to shelter behind a professional 'persona', becoming 
personally responsible to you for his actions. In one case I observed, a 
lawyer represented some employees of a former client of his in their law-suit 
against their employer. They reported to the lawyer that their employer had 
reacted by saying that he: "had never expected such unethical behaviour, 
given that he had often previously engaged him as his lawyer." While the 
lawyer shrugged off these comments, they are significant since they show 
how clients try to evoke and manipulate patronage obligations. 
Consequently clients' motivations for involving lawyers in patronage relations 
seem primarily derived from negative popular perceptions of lawyers and 
their ambiguous social role. Patronage allows clients to control lawyers and 
define their role in their own interest. This explains why rural and working 
class clients, who are the most socially distant from lawyers, are also the 
ones who try hardest to narrate stories placing their selves in a morally 
favourable light. Ironically enough, therefore, clients may not want to corrupt 
lawyers by creating personal relationships with them, but only to ensure the 
prompt execution of their professional services. Furthermore, lawyers who 
react to these attempts by stressing their professional distance from clients, 
motivate them to try even harder to create personal relationships. Thus, 
patronage and professional detachment appear to mutually reinforce one 
another. 
140 
Chapter 6: Professionals or Patrons? 
1 . Introduction 
A good evaluation of legal representation must flip the coin and explore 
lawyers' perceptions of their role: how and why they react to clients' overtures 
in the way they do. To do so, this chapter will initially focus on the 
professional ideal which is the official self-description produced by lawyers. 
Particular attention will be paid to the way this ideal is reflected in the spatial 
organisation of legal offices and conveyed through various practices by which 
lawyers present themselves as incorporating the law when interacting with 
clients. The reasons for such an approach to the social role of lawyers are, 
firstly, that this clarifies the non-verbal context in which most lawyer-client 
interaction occurs, complementing previous accounts of clients' story-telling. 
Secondly, such an approach exploits the unique anthropological capacity to 
analyse symbolism. The organisation of legal offices, in particular, provides a 
useful vehicle for reflection on the various components of lawyers' identity 
and how they are combined in practice. 
Having outlined the professional ideal, the next section will look at how the 
compromises, which the practical exigencies of legal practice compel lawyers 
to adopt, lead them to re-interpret this ideal. This analysis will revolve around 
extracts from my interviews with lawyers together with my own observations. 
Two distinct representational styles will be identified, which reflect different 
reactions to clients' narratives characterising different types of lawyers. The 
costs and benefits of each style will then be discussed. It will be shown why 
most lawyers strategically balance between them, in the process walking the 
tightrope between patronage and professional detachment. Finally I will 
tackle the influence of these styles on the way lawyers re-present their 
clients' stories in writing; when drafting the judicial acts on which later court-
room litigation will be based. 
1-t I 
2. The Professional ideal 
Codes of professional ethics and laws regulating advocates' fees help 
constitute the public face of the legal profession. It is here that the 
professional ideal finds its purest and most abstract expression. This takes 
the shape of an emphasis on detaching lawyers from clients' pressures by 
ensuring that the interests involved remain distinct. Thus lawyers' fees are 
regulated by an official system of tariffs. 1 In terms of this system, the fee is 
fixed automatically according to such factors as the value of the object of the 
suit, the procedural acts filed and the number of decisions contained in the 
judgement. It makes no difference to the fee whether a favourable decision 
for the client is obtained or not. While there are certain exceptions to this 
system, 2 the general principle is maintained and this serves to detach lawyers 
from their clients since they do not have a direct financial interest in winning 
the case and often do not determine the amount of their own fees. 3 
Similar principles are enshrined in the recently published 'Code of Ethics and 
Conduct for Advocates'. Particularly significant for the purposes of this thesis 
is how this code prescribes the task of legal representation in civil litigation: 
"An advocate who appears in court or in chambers in civil 
proceedings is under a duty to say on behalf of the client what the 
client should properly say for himself or herself if the client were 
allowed to plead for himself or herself and possessed the requisite 
skill, knowledge and legal training" (Rule 11, Part IV, Cap 1 ). 
By requiring advocates to restrict their representation to what clients should 
'properly' say, this code prevents their complete identification with clients; 
requiring them to exclude what clients would like to say but properly should 
1 Contained in Schedule A of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure (Laws of Malta: Cap 12). 
~ No tariff regulates the giYing of legal advice. Also. since 1996, lawyers and clients may opt out of 
the tariff system if they agree on a different fcc. However. the fee charged remains subject to revision 
by a special Committee if the client considers it unreasonable and demands review within a month . 
. l It is forbidden to agree to share in the profits of litigation by both the Maltese Civil Code and the 
Code of Ethics and Conduct for Advocates. 
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not. 4 This institutionalises the professional separation of lawyers from clients, 
obliging them to decide how far to go in their representation. 
This stress on professional detachment affects the way lawyers view clients 
and their stories. This was made clear when I interviewed the President of the 
Maltese Lawyers' Association, the: 'Camera degli Avvocati'. He made a 
distinction between the 'case', which the lawyer is duty bound to present to 
the court as effectively as possible, and 'facts', which are 'in the hands of the 
client' to prove. He observed that the stories clients tell under oath and in the 
courtroom context are often very different from the ones they originally told 
their lawyers. Consequently facts should emerge in the court-room setting of 
a 'viva voce' hearing; which he called a 'search for truth' undertaken before 
the judge. He therefore objected to the use of written affidavits as an 
alternative; 5 claiming that they tempted lawyers to write their clients' stories 
for them and risk perjuring themselves. He asked: "why should a lawyer be 
placed in an intolerable position where he knows that changing a word in a 
clients' affidavit would lead him to win the case?" He also observed that he 
had never witnessed a signature in the absence of the person concerned. 
Thus the professional ideal sees legal representation as a process where the 
lawyer's version of the issues involved is separated from that of the client. 
Lawyers are concerned solely with the 'case'; consisting of the legal 
arguments and claims to be made. 6 The proof of the 'facts', on the basis of 
which these legal arguments are raised, is the clients' job. This distinction 
draws a conceptual boundary between the domain of the client, which is one 
of potentially changeable oral stories of dubious credibility, and the domain of 
1 This principle is somewhat diluted in criminal matters. where the Maltese text states that a lawyer 
should say all that the client would ha,·e said in his defence. without including the word ·properly". 
However the situation is unclear. since the English text still contains the term. 
' An affidavit is a written statement of the client" s version of the facts. They are supposed to be precise 
reproductions of their stories and clients must confirm them on oath. As shown in chapter nine. 
judges increasingly request the presentation of affidavits instead of hearing testimony "viva vnce '. 
'' Lawyers arc prepared to accept more involvement with the facts in criminal cases. 
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the lawyer, which is one of legally valid writing. By drawing such a boundary, 
lawyers escape responsibility for proving their clients' stories, confining their 
role to legal argumentation. Lawyers assert their detachment through 
expressions like: 'trying to win the case for the client', implying they have no 
personal interest in the outcome. They describe a good client as one who 
leaves matters in his lawyer's hands; allowing him to 'guide his walk', or direct 
the progress of litigation. 
This ideal of professional independence is widely shared by lawyers. Thus, 
other lawyers to whom I spoke claim to be unconcerned with whether clients 
tell them the truth; as they must represent them on the basis of what they are 
told, not of what really happened. Detachment from clients' stories implies 
detachment from clients themselves. Judges, whose role requires them to 
take this detachment to its logical extreme, claim that: 
"The prudent judge must keep himself detached from friendships 
and close relationships with persons who are not members of his 
family."7 
This ideal is ceremonially invoked when lawyers graduate. In this respect the 
speech given by Professor Xuereb in 1898 resembles those given 
nowadays. 8 In this speech, the orator emphasises advocates' freedom. He 
even compares them to: "man in his original dignity" (UIIo-Xuereb, 1898: 9), 
since they are neither patrons nor dependents. Advocacy is described as 'Ia 
professione Iibera', or 'the free profession'; a phrase still used by lawyers I 
interviewed. Thorough legal study is the pre-condition for this freedom: 
"A numerous clientele will come without any difficulty, but only to 
those who are well prepared, not to those who are most solicitous, 
to those who show that they are deserving" (ibid.: 11 ). 
Lawyers should not easily trust their clients, nor allow themselves to be 
guided by them (ibid.: 18). Particularly despicable are lawyers who: 
- This quotation is taken from an interYiew with Mr. Justice Victor Caruana Colombo carried on the 
Maltese newspaper. ·JI-Mumen( in 1997. 
x Sec the start of chapter four. 
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"induced by need, or by sole love of gain, run after affairs and 
bewail the loss of their daily bread when the success of a law-suit 
does not correspond to their desires. This has always been a 
cause of corruption" (ibid.: 13). 
These quotations are enlightening because they give a clue as to the ways in 
which lawyers seek to live up to their ideals when interacting with clients. 
This can be seen by focusing on legal offices and court corridors, which are 
the two domains where lawyer/client interaction mostly occurs. 
The organisation of space within legal offices can only be understood if one 
keeps in mind the desire of lawyers to instil a recognition of their professional 
autonomy in clients. This point can be illustrated by the plan of Dr. Camilleri's 
office. The diagram on the next page shows how his professional detachment 
is spatially encoded through the physical separation between the outer office, 
where clients and their files reside until allowed to present themselves for his 
inspection, and the inner office; where he sits surrounded by law-books. This 
institutionalises the distinction between the 'law' and the 'facts', by means of 
a spatial separation, which must be traversed by clients in order to bring the 
'facts' they bear to the lawyer. Lawyers wait in their inner offices and clients 
must knock and request entry. Also, when Dr. Camilleri needs to look at a 
client's file, he asks his secretary to bring it to him through the intercom. 
Rarely does he go to the outer office to bring it in himself before clients. The 
arbitrary nature of this division is also revealed when one realises that an 
established lawyer like Dr. Camilleri needs to refer to clients' files at least as 
often, if not more, than he does law books. Yet he fills his inner office with 
law-books and consigns the files to the outer office. 9 
If the outer office is the domain of clients and their files, everything in the 
inner office testifies to its role as the domain of the law. There are, first of all, 
'J An emphasis on clients haying to come to lawyers. conceived as repositories of legal knowledge. 
also marks the first steps made by a young la\\yer opening an office. It is the practice for him to sit 
and wait in the empty office until the first clients appear (Pullicino 1989). While this can take 
months. the professional ideals do not allow him to do much else to solicit clients. 
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various symbolic barriers which must be traversed on entry. These range 
from the shut door, which also prevents eaves-dropping, to the paper-loaded 
desk, which continues to separate clients from lawyers. The symbolic 
importance of the desk was revealed to me by the insistence of certain 
lawyers that I should sit on their side of the desk while they introduced me to 
clients as a young lawyer. 1° Clients have to hand their papers to lawyers 
across this desk which is often quite wide and forces them to reach across it. 
Moreover, the inner office is replete with objects which make powerful 
statements of legality, testifying to the extent of the lawyer's legal knowledge 
and authority. Indeed, the various components of the inner office can be 
shown to reflect different aspects of the professional identity they convey to 
clients. Pre-eminent among these are the statute books of the Laws of Malta. 
These are generally displayed in a cupboard resting against the wall behind 
the lawyer and above his head. Next to them, are usually framed copies of 
the diplomas obtained and the professional warrant. Also behind the lawyer, 
or sometimes on his desk itself, one generally finds a crucifix. As can be 
seen from the plan of Dr. Camilleri's, inner offices often contain a number of 
other book shelves, replete with case-books and old and dusty text-books. 
The symbolic purpose of these objects is clear from their nature, positioning 
and use. The framed certificates are, of course, the professional symbols 'par 
excellence', which literally inscribe the lawyer's self within the textual domain 
of the law and officially endow him with the authority to mediate between this 
written domain and the oral one of clients. The plethora of dusty books reflect 
the vastness, antiquity and authority of the laws consulted by the lawyer. 
Their strategic value was manifested in the case of the 'Honourable 
Businessman', when Dr. Borg pointed to them so as to display his learning to 
1
" Indeed. when subjecting law students to an oral examination. lawyers always make sure that a desk 
stands in between and often try to fill it with papers in order to further distance themselves from the 
student. This confirms the point made in chapter four that law-students arc treated like clients. 
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his client. 11 Significantly too, while Dr. Camilleri gets his secretary to bring 
clients' files over, he often walks over to his book shelves to consult the law-
books. Often, he does this to solely to symbolically buttress advice already 
given to clients by showing that it is based on the law. 
This symbolic use of law-books indicates that when lawyers present 
themselves to clients, they invert the theory/practice dichotomy which 
practising lawyers inculcate into law-students. The fourth chapter observed 
how, in the theoretical field of the University, lawyer lecturers elevate the 
importance of practical knowlege over the theoretical knowledge their 
students possess. When facing clients, however, they emphasise the 
superiority of the theoretical knowledge contained in the law books above the 
practical knowledge of the clients. Similarly the crucifix functions to 
symbolically align the legal realm to the religious one. This endows the 
lawyer with the quasi-priestly authority of the 'avukat tar-ruh', making it easier 
for clients to confide secrets to him and more difficult for them to lie. The 
presence of the crucifix next to the law-books evokes the same continuum 
between legal and moral rules which clients evoke in their stories and which 
lawyers selectively confirm, ignore and deny. 
The positioning of these objects is also revealing. By placing the statute 
books immediately behind and above them, lawyers portray legal knowledge 
as flowing down from a hierarchically superior position towards the lawyer, 
who then transmits this knowledge across the desk to his client. This point is 
confirmed by the poses lawyers favour when they take photographs for public 
consumption. They almost always make sure that they are either seated at 
their desk, with the statute books behind them or else have a book in hand, 
which they are gravely consulting. 12 Thus, the public 'persona' of the 
advocate is derived from his professional role as an interpreter of the law. 
11 As shown by a professional ·in-joke· about a law professor who came to assist another lawyer 
staggering under the weight of seYeral legal tomes. When told that the case did not require detailed 
study. the professor said he had not brought the books for consultation. but to impress clients! 
1 ~ The photos on the following page show la\v~·ers in each of these poses. 
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(Source: "The Malta Independent" of the 3rd September 1995) 
(Source: "//-Gens" of the 8th December 1995) 
A Learned Profession. 
This privileged position as the mediators transmitting hierarchically superior 
legal knowledge in turn endows lawyers with the ability to produce 
authoritative descriptions of social reality. Given the explicit recognition of the 
sovereign status of legal knowledge supplied by the doctrine of the rule of 
law, lawyers have little doubt about their ability to create superior 
descriptions of the inferior realm of social facts. 13 Maltese lawyers often 
double as all-purpose writers cum social scientists. 14 Moreover, the 
relationship between lawyerly identity and legal texts is so close that the two 
are often presented as emerging from one another. Indeed, lawyers often 
present themselves, as part of their presentation of the law. 15 
If lawyers' identity is often conflated with legal texts, this implies they might 
construct their own physical presence in a manner continuous with the way 
they organise their offices. Here the analysis follows recent anthropological 
theory, which explores how the body is trained to unconsciously enact a 
'political mythology' (Bourdieu 1997: 69). As Bourdieu observes: 
"One could endlessly enumerate the values given body, made 
body, by the hidden persuasion of an implicit pedagogy which can 
instil a whole cosmology, through injunctions as insignificant as 
'sit up straight' or 'don't hold your knife in your left hand,' and 
inscribe the most fundamental principles of the arbitrary content of 
a culture in seemingly innocuous details of bearing or physical and 
verbal manners, so putting them beyond the reach of 
consciousness and explicit statement" (ibid.) 
It is possible to identify a series of ways by which lawyers seek to incorporate 
and live up to a professional 'persona' modelled on the law itself. Particularly 
noticeable are the clothes lawyers wear in offices and other public settings. 
u Bonello ( 1996) observes: ··advocates make a point of knowing everything and learning nothing." 
1
'
1 The link between the literarv acti\·ities of advocates and their professional role is made clear by the 
existence of a .. bridging gen~e-- between strictly legal writing and literary compositions, such as 
autobiographies mixing personal professional life and Maltese social history (Pullicino: 1989). 
1
' One lawyer percei\·ed no incongmity in placing a full length colour photograph of himself and his 
family. accompanied by a c.Y.. at the end of eight volumes of case decisions he had compiled and 
glossed! Also. a law-firm published a booklet informing clients about the state of the law in regard to 
certain issues and inserted a loose-leaf sheet with information about the finn in this booklet. 
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They almost always wear suits. The traditional colour scheme, which is still 
favoured by many lawyers, is a black or dark gey suit, white shirt and grey tie. 
This colour scheme, which is also maintained in Summer despite its 
impracticality in a hot climate, serves to visibly distinguish lawyers from 
laymen. One layman observed that: "you can spot a lawyer from seven miles 
away."16 During my fieldwork, i grew so used to looking out for the dark suits 
of lawyers that often I unconsciously ignored lay acquaintances who were 
dressed differently and who therefore fell outside the legal field of vision! 
Thus the lawyer's dark suit evokes the serious and traditionally authoritative 
nature of law. Similar motives also explain the serious facial expressions 
lawyers usually favour. All these devices are meant to endow the lawyer with 
the authority and dignity of the law, ensuring that he conforms to a particular 
image of the legal system as conservative, learned and serious. 
Lawyers usually ignore the strategic potential of their dress and office. 
Sometimes they even joke about them, as when they laughingly refer to their 
'dusty' or 'paper-filled' office. However the relaxed ease with which they treat 
what are for many clients solemn symbols of authority, itself tends to de-
familiarise them. Moreover, the strategic potential of the legal office and 
professional 'persona' form part of the advocate's stylistic repertoire, to be 
utilised when necessary. Indeed, one lawyer told me that he was buying 
particularly dark-rimmed glasses so as to be able to give those 'sudden sharp 
glances' which serve to discipline clients. Thus these devices enable lawyers 
to rapidly shift from 'humane' to 'legalistic' client-handling styles. 
Professional detachment is also clearly incorporated by lawyers through their 
posture and gait. Lawyers spend a lot of time walking; either in the context of 
the court-corridors, or between the court-room, other public institutions and 
their offices. 17 During these walks, their professional 'persona' is subject to 
'"Similarly. a law-student joked that he was tired with having: ·an this blackness shoved in my face'. 
,-All of which arc usually located in the city of Valletta. 
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the scrutiny of a larger and more critical audience than occurs in their offices. 
In these contexts lawyers adopt a special style of movement which serves to 
dramatise their autonomy. On weekday mornings, lawyers and notaries can 
be seen making their way down the streets of Valletta towards the courts or 
their offices. They generally occupy the centre of the street and look straight 
ahead, walking rapidly forward and avoiding the possibility of catching 
anyone's eyes. This style of movement often means that the greetings of 
friends or clients are ignored. Laymen are accustomed to such behaviour 
from lawyers, and explain it as a result of their 'busy work' or their 'bad 
manners', depending on the informant. Thus the professional detachment of 
lawyers is incorporated through adopting a style of movement which makes it 
difficult to engage them with the ordinary greetings employed in social life. 18 
This style of movement is so characteristic that it is used to distinguish 
lawyers from laymen when entering the court. People entering the courts are 
usually frisked by a court usher, while lawyers are not subjected to this 
examination. As I personally discovered during my fieldwork, this examination 
is avoided by marching straight through the entrance, ignoring both the court 
ushers as well as any queues of 'ordinary people' which might exist. The 
resentment this can cause is revealed by one letter recently published in a 
local newspapers, which complains about the way lawyers: "simply walked in 
through a side-door, their heads high in the air as if they belonged to a 
different species."19 
Ix However. its contrh·ed nature is revealed by the reaction of a client to one young lawyer I know who 
waYed at this client on seeing him in the street. Apparently, a look of incredulous amazement passed 
across this man· s face and he backed away in a flustered manner. 
19 A reference is lacking. since I tore out this letter and did not record the date. However, the 
newspaper is the ·Times of Malta· and the writer: ·Alex Caruana· from St. Julian ·s. The text runs: 
"RecentlY I had to \'isit the court. On entering I had to walk through a detector and 
undergo. physical frisking by court employees. Had this procedure been applied to 
evel)·one. I would not object but all lawyers. except one, simply walked in through a 
side-door. some carl)·ing heavy bundles of papers or bulging brief-cases, their heads 
high in the air as if they belonged to a different species. Dozens of police officers 
followed suit and nobody dared stop them. My advice to any would-be terrorist: Find a 
hard-up lawyer to carl)· whatever you want to carl)' inside for you -- your only problem 
would be to find a hard-up one!" 
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To understand why lawyers incorporate professional autonomy through their 
'straight walk', one has to keep in mind the conceptual opposition between 
corrupting social entanglement and honourable moral autonomy explored in 
chapter five in the case of the 'Honourable Businessman'. lawyers face this 
threat of entanglement in the shape of clients' efforts to involve them in 
patronage relationships. This is not just a matter of words, as some clients 
actually clutch at their lawyers; physically impeding their movement so as to 
ensure that they are listened to. 20 Moreover, the lawyer's walk is comparable 
to that of other Mediterranean 'men of honour' observed by anthropologists. 21 
In such ways, lawyers project their honourable refusal of social entanglement. 
Their honour is based on a dramatic display of single-minded allegiance to 
the law, even if it leads them to ignore their own clients. Thus, when a lawyer 
encounters a client, he generally strides ahead, while the latter strives to 
catch up with him. This also emphasises the client's role as a follower who 
has to tread in his lawyer's footsteps, conforming perfectly to the way in 
which legal representation is usually imagined. Indeed, clients complain that 
they have to 'run after' lawyers to get their attention, while lawyers claim that 
the lawyer should 'imexxi 1-k/jenf, or 'guide his client's walk.'22 
While lawyers try to convey a sense of their professional autonomy, they are 
also aware of the need to avoid alienating clients. Their attempts to 
simultaneously achieve both aims are revealed by the way lawyers move in 
~~~ The photo on the next page shows the current Leader of the Nationalist Party, a lawyer/politician, 
being ·clutched at· by an elderly woman who is one of his supporters. The posture of both parties is 
typical of that of many lawyer/client encounters I observed. Note that the woman·s affectionate 
gesture still interrupts her lawycr"s forward walk. 
~ 1 Compare the gait of Kabylc men of honour: 
"The man of honour walks at a steady. detennined pace. His walk, that of a man who 
knows where he is going and knows he will get there on time, whatever the obstacles, 
expresses strength and resolution. as opposed to the hesitant gait (thikli thamahmahth) 
announcing indecision. half-hearted promises (awal amahmah), the fear of 
commitments and inability to fulfil them·· (Bourdieu 1997: 70). 
~~ The only case I know in which the client appeared to direct his lawyer·s walk occurred during the 
recent trial of an alleged major drug dealer. Television footage of his entry into court showed this man 
walking behind his lawyer with his hand placed imperiously on her shoulder. However it is clear. in 
the context of this analysis. why this gesture was used to indicate the clients· superior power. 
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(Source: The Malta Independent, 17/11/1996) 
Clutching the Lawyer/politician 
15~ 
the corridors of the court building. 23 Lawyers emerge from court-rooms, head 
straight towards particular clients or other lawyers with whom they have some 
business. After a very short time talking, they abruptly depart, heading 
straight towards another encounter. Alternatively, they might go towards a 
particular court-room, to see which stage proceedings have reached, or look 
at the notice-board of one of the courts or leave the court building altogether. 
What seems significant about this style of movement is that interactions are 
so drastically reduced that it is very easy even for close friends to take 
offence at what they feel is highhanded treatment. This contrasts with the 
relaxed behaviour of lawyers on entering the 'Advocates Chambers', which 
are the lawyers' quarters to which the public has no access. Once they enter 
these rooms, lawyers sink contentedly into sofas and start gossiping about 
the latest football results or Italian politics. Yet, if the same lawyers meet in 
the court corridors a moment before, they exchange a few short words and 
then depart. 
This interactional style seems to be an intentional compromise between 
lawyers' need to service relationships with clients and the desire to display 
their professional independence before them. Lawyers make a point of talking 
to clients, but they are also quick to cut off the conversation in order to 'walk 
straight' towards their work; emphasising their professional detachment. This 
shows how lawyers are obliged to compromise between the opposed 
demands of patronage and professional detachment; a point which will be 
further explored in the next part of this chapter. 
c.1 This is because of the liminal position occupied by the court corridors within the overall 
organisational stmcturc of the courts. Court corridors are public spaces which are clearly distinct from 
the controlled en\' ironment of the court-room. while thev do not have the anonymous informality of a 
public street. or the secrecy of legal offices. Sec chapter-seven for a more detailed explanation of why 
lawyers feel ·on display· when walking along the court-corridors. 
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3. Two Styles of Representation 
While the lawyers interviewed all proclaimed the ideal of professional 
autonomy, they also had to cope with their client's efforts to create patronage 
relationships with them through story-telling. To comprehend their reactions, 
the way lawyers talked about their work will now be discussed in the context 
of my own observations of lawyer-client interaction. 
Lawyers related variations in story-telling to the nature of the case and 
clients' social backgrounds. They said family law cases generate the longest 
and frankest stories. One experienced lawyer told me that in such cases she 
was expected to be a confessor since clients wanted advice about intimate 
personal matters. She derived this from the loneliness of these clients who 
had no one else to confide in, especially because certain matters could not 
be shared with family or friends. She also distinguished 'business' or 'more 
educated'24 clients from others; arguing that the latter are readier to confide: 
"You've got to remember that here in Malta being a lawyer still 
carries quite a lot of weight. There is a difference between what I 
call the general public and, for example, businessmen. Socially, if 
they are the general public, they feel that if you're not superior, at 
least you're more knowledgeable. A business person wouldn't feel 
that way; especially a person who has more than a grocer, if you 
know what I mean, who has a certain level of business. So when a 
client comes for an opinion, you're his lawyer. I've noticed that 
even the fact that I'm a woman comes secondary with the general 
public. With business people, it's different. With them, it's more 
like it's the other way round and with professional classes." 
Thus this lawyer confirmed my observations, reported in chapter five, that 
rural/working class clients are keenest to tell stories placing themselves in a 
morally positive light. However because they interpret these stories as 
attempts to confide reflecting a vulnerable social position, lawyers do not 
perceive that they might form part of the strategies by which their clients try to 
control them. 
: 
1 I place business and educated people in separate categories. Yet lawyers conflated the two. 
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Lawyers explicitly spoke about the threats stories posed to their detachment. 
The lawyer quoted earlier observed that this is necessary: 
"Because if you're not detached, first of all you become too 
emotional and you are not crystal clear when you are pleading in 
court. Secondly, clients sometimes lie to you and you've got to be 
careful not to fall into the trap of feeling offended, or stuff like that. 
It's all a question that if you're detached, you work better. You see 
lies. You see your way ahead of you clear. You can deal with the 
other person. For instance, in family law, let's say she says that 
her husband beat her. This is something which me, personally, I 
suppose most people ... It's not something which you enjoy hearing. 
Now, often, in law, if you want things to turn out well for your client, 
you have to know how to compromise. For example, if you're owed 
a hundred pounds and you manage to get eighty out of court, take 
the eighty and be happy with it. So, with my clients, I try to remain 
detached. Because let's say its my client and I know he beat her 
up. That would make me really angry ... Whilst if you're detached, 
you look at things from a different angle and say: 'no, it's better if 
you get eighty instead of a hundred and miss out on all that aggro." 
One should here note that this lawyer legitimates her detachment on the 
grounds of the unreliable character of clients' stories and their best interests. 
Other lawyers to whom I spoke also stressed the difficulty and importance of 
detaching oneself from the client's view of the case. A lawyer with a rural 
practice told me that clients often don't understand the purpose of their own 
law-suits; going to court against the advice of their lawyers and then blaming 
the latter when they lose them. This illustrates the difference between clients' 
perceptions and those of their lawyers, since most clients do not imagine that 
lawyers would defend their cases unless they believe a successful outcome 
to be probable. By contrast lawyers insisted that the law-suit belongs to the 
client, arguing that one should let particularly unreasonable clients do as they 
please, without paying attention to them. 25 
While lawyers accepted the necessity of making some concessions towards 
confirming clients' narratives, they usually presented this as a matter of 
~ 5 The way la\wers refer to cases illustrate their distance from client's stories. In fact, lawyers never 
e\'oke the~e sto~ies. referring instead to: (i) the legal issues involved (i.e. a ·separation· case); or (ii) 
the financial rewards they would get from them (i.e. a .. LMlOOO case); or (iii) their political 
implications (i.e. a politically ·hot' case): or (iv) the name of the client. 
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paying lip-service to the client. Thus one lawyer observed that: "you have to 
know how to put things to clients so as to avoid offending them." When asked 
how clients reacted to her attempts to detach herself, another one claimed 
she lived up to their expectations by staging an aggressive court 
performance; which is how she learned to 'play the game': 
"You notice that your clients enjoy having you act a pantomime. So 
you act a pantomime, although you know that you're not making 
sense legally." 
The most significant disagreement among lawyers concerned the extent to 
which they should listen to clients' stories. While some claimed that it was 
necessary to cut clients short, others argued that one should dedicate extra 
time to listen to them. One interviewee who favoured the former approach, 
observed that a client he had charged for this extra time had filed a complaint 
against him for over-charging. By contrast, the earlier quoted lawyer said: 
"I have problems with that, personally. I tend to spend too much 
time on these individual clients. But I find that although it looks like 
a waste of time, long-term it usually pays. Because they look on 
you with a certain amount of . . . respect. Because you give them 
respect. I think basically there are two different styles. Because, 
for example, Dr X (here she mentioned another lawyer who worked 
in the same law-firm), that's the way he does it. He doesn't take 
time. He does this, then that and the other. I tend to do a lot of 
family stuff. Those, you can't. You have to give them their time. In 
fact, we give appointments of a quarter of an hour or half an hour. 
Those, immediately we give them half an hour. Because otherwise 
forget it. They have a real lot to tell you anyway. And you can't 
chuck them out, you know. By contrast, traffic cases ... and even 
with those you have to be careful." 
This confirms my own observations. I have noted two main styles by which 
lawyers seek to handle their clients' stories. Adherents of the first style stress 
their position as independent professionals. They do not waste time in 
listening to all the niceties of their clients' stories, but tend to cut them short 
with a few abrupt questions. Such lawyers avoid small-talk and casual 
conversation with their clients and to emphasise speed and efficiency in 
handling cases. They are more likely to assert their own authority as persons 
who know the law and expect clients to acknowledge this by respecting their 
158 
silences and allowing them to do the questioning. Lawyers who adopt the 
second style are more gregarious; dedicating time to listening to clients' 
stories and being prepared to confirm them when necessary. They do not 
emphasise the difference between themselves and their clients and are more 
sympathetic to them. 26 These two styles broadly correspond to the distinction 
between 'humane' and 'legalistic' advocacy. They express different ways of 
understanding the task of representation. While 'legalistic' advocacy 
emphasises the professional autonomy of the lawyer, 'humane' advocates act 
more like their clients' patrons. Thus the tension between patronage and 
professionalism seems to explain lawyers' characteristic attitudes. 
Here I must observe that despite my efforts to do so, it often proved difficult to 
definitively classify lawyers in terms of the client-handling style they adopt. It 
seems most lawyers select characteristics of both styles and mix them 
together in varying proportions; so that the differences between them are 
more a matter of degree than of kind. Both 'professional' and 'patron' lawyers 
deny that it makes any legal difference whether the lawyer devotes much time 
to listening to the client or not. The claimed advantage of listening to clients' 
stories is that this satisfies them. Moreover, adherents of both styles assume 
that their occupational role endows them 'a priori' with the honour of the legal 
system itself. They both react negatively when clients try to display their own 
knowledge of the law before them. 27 
Even 'professional' lawyers often waive payment for their legal services, 
ensuring that clients feel personally obliged towards them. Moreover they 
also use narratives to create a shared moral consensus with their clients, 
when this is necessary to ensure they follow their advice. Conversely, 'patron' 
lawyers at times display incredulity to their clients' stories. I have observed 
c" Dr.Borg adopted this style in the case of the ·Honourable Businessman· reported in chapter five. 
c- As a mlc. clients· efforts to ·waye the law· at lawyers arc quickly countered. At best. lawyers will 
quali(v their agreement with the clients· views by stating that they are ·obvious· or 'natural", implying 
that they arc not saying an~1hing particularly brilliant. Often they ignore clients· attempts to assert 
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the most 'humane' lawyers suddenly assume a sharp, questioning, tone of 
voice in order to discipline their clients. As one young lawyer put it: 
"The older lawyers don't want to get to know clients and listen to 
their stories. They want to get rid of them and try to put them off. 
I'm different. I enjoy talking and I've discovered that clients feel 
relieved when they realise that their lawyer takes an interest in 
their lives and their hobbies. The problem I have is that my clients 
put more pressure on me than they do on the others. But I'm 
learning how to shout at clients who are too intrusive." 
Thus 'patron' lawyers maintain an ability to assume a professional 'persona' 
implying distance from and superiority over their clients. In order to do so, 
they employ all the techniques of self-presentation previously analysed. This 
confirms that most lawyers strategically balance between the opposed 
demands of patronage and professionalism. 28 
This raises the question of the costs and benefits which guide the selection of 
either of these styles of handling clients. Clearly the benefits of the 
'professional' style are efficiency and speed. 'Professional' lawyers run less 
risk of getting entangled in their clients' stories and are freer from pressures 
which take up their time and threaten their freedom to organise their work as 
they deem fit. Such lawyers do not have to justify themselves before their 
clients and can easily give them unwelcome advice. Given the advantages of 
this style, it may seem strange that lawyers do not always adopt it. 
However important considerations militate against the adoption of this style in 
its full purity. Firstly, as explained in the previous chapter, clients want 
nothing more than to enjoy a personal relationship with their lawyers. Thus 
legal knm\"ledge. or point to defects in their reasoning which invalidate their arguments. A common 
strategy is replying with jokes or proyerbs to clients· efforts to speak in a legally correct manner. 
ex I heard both lawyers and clients pass ironic comments about the discourse of honour/patronage. 
One old man told his daughter. who was Dr. Camilleri" s client: ·•Jist en to the lawyer, because he will 
take proper care of your case in order for him to make more money."" When I asked another lawyer 
what it means to be an · avuknt tar-nth·. he said: "it means that you ask your clients for your fees 
straight away.·· In both cases the irony plays on the discrepancy between the outward affectation of 
concern for clients required by the ·patron· style and the actual distance from clients engendered by 
professional detachment. reflecting la\\yers· efforts to cope with both. 
160 
lawyers who are too professional risk alienating their clientele. The 
drawbacks of such an approach are illustrated by one case I observed, in 
which a notary's efforts to avoid endorsing his client's story led him to couch 
his advice so abstractly that his client did not understand it. The difference 
between clients' desires and the professional ideal is revealed by attitudes to 
affidavits. As has been seen, lawyers complain about being over-involved in 
the drafting of affidavits. By contrast, clients grumble that lawyers do not pay 
enough attention to the affidavits they write. One client observed that this 
should be drafted between lawyer and client. Another said that after she had 
spent a whole night writing her affidavit, her lawyer had barely glanced at it. 
Thus lawyers must provide some confirmation of their narratives if they wish 
to satisfy their clients and to persuade them to follow their advice. 
Another motive which forces lawyers to compromise their stylistic purity is 
that in Malta, as in Greece (Du Boulay 1974), there is a very tightly controlled 
economy of secrecy. Knowledge about personal matters is only told to a few 
individuals with whom one enjoys a close relationship. For this reason, 
lawyers who emphasise their professional distance from their clients risk 
being obliged to operate in ignorance of the real facts of the situation. 
Although lawyers claim not to be concerned with the truth of their stories, in 
practice the biggest confirmation of their honour and power is their clients' 
readiness to confide their secrets in his care. A lawyer who is misled by his 
clients risks being made to look ridiculous in court. It becomes impossible for 
him to fulfil his professional role of controlling the evolution of legal 
proceedings. This is why lawyers who want to be 'respected' by their clients 
have to give them 'respect' by listening to their stories. 29 
There are also pull factors which encourage lawyers to create patronage 
relationships. Certain rewards of patronage are inherent in the relationship 
itself. For instance, in his autobiography, one Maltese lawyer remarked that: 
c'l Sec the intcn·icw with the female lawyer quoted earlier on in this section. 
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"The clients who come the way of a newly fledged lawyer are not 
the sort that bring him lucrative work, but they start to give him 
some practical experience and also, gradually, some very much 
needed self-confidence and encouragement" (Pullicino 1989: 43). 
Thus patronage can supply the self-confidence on which a successful court 
performance is based. Lawyers may also desire to create patronage 
relationships in order to convert them into social power in other, non-legal, 
spheres of life. The standard case is that of party politics, where successful 
professionals use their network of clients to win the necessary votes for 
election to Parliament.30 One should also observe that the lawyer/patron's 
reputation may be greater the lower the position occupied by his clients in the 
social spectrum. 31 Consequently, it is not surprising that even the most 
dedicatedly professional lawyers adopt features of the 'patron' style. 
However patronage also carries its own cost for the lawyer. Apart from the 
increased time that has to be spent to listen to their stories, lawyers who act 
as their clients' patrons run the risk of becoming overly subject to their 
pressures to act unprofessionally. Rather than being 'avukati imqabbdin', or 
'lawyers who have caught on to a large clientele,' they find that they 
themselves 'jinqabdu', or 'get caught' by their clients. Increasingly such 
lawyers become associated with their clients in the popular view. After all, 
patronage forces the patron to pay lip-service to the discourse of mutual 
honour on which his relationship with his client is based. This exposes him to 
the accusation that he is as corrupVevil as his client. Indeed, lawyers often 
find it impossible to express an opinion about some alleged wrongdoing, 
because a friend of theirs is involved. 
·'n Sant Cassia somewhere described this as the double process of the politics of 'professionalisation · 
and the professionalisation of ·politics·. 
·" Douglas has argued that areas where the social structure is poorly articulated are also those from 
\vhich informal powers which create disorder are thought to derive (Douglas 1988: 101). She 
contrasts these powers to the explicit and articulate powers wielded by those occupying clearly defined 
positions of dominance in the formal social structure. Thus a lawyer/patron who attracts criminal 
clients located outside formal social hierarchies is also tapping the invisible and inarticulate power 
which they possess and uniting them to the explicit and fonnal powers he already has. 
162 
These considerations explain why most lawyers cannot afford to adopt a 
client-handling style based wholly on patronage or professionalism, but must 
attempt to balance between the two. Thus both lawyers and clients have to 
try to square a circle in order to achieve their respective purposes. Clients 
who want to act autonomously feel that they have to create a personal 
relationship of dependence on lawyers to do so, while lawyers who want to 
act as independent professionals have to adopt many of the traits of patrons. 
There also appears to be a relationship between the client-handling strategy 
adopted by lawyers and their occupational status. While the lawyers whom I 
observed adopting the 'patron' style were all sole practitioners, those who 
belonged to large law-firms tended to adopt a more 'professional' approach to 
clients' narratives. Here it is useful to refer to the analysis of the occupational 
distribution of Maltese legal professionals. 32 This showed a growing division 
between those lawyers who are employed in firms, specialising in various 
branches of the law and sole practitioners who mostly specialise in social 
networking. The latter focus on attracting a heterogeneous clientele by 
penetrating various peripheral regions. The greater attentiveness sole 
practitioners display towards clients' stories seems to be a consequence of 
the importance they give to satisfying the diverse expectations of different 
clients, whom they seek to attract on the basis of their personal qualities. By 
contrast, firm lawyers cater for a more standardised clientele, which reflects 
their more specialised legal practice. They are therefore less inclined to act 
as their clients' patrons. 
·
1
" Sec chapter four or this thesis. 
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4. Writing the Case 
While the effect of these two client handling styles may seem restricted to the 
behavioural level of lawyer/client interaction, it is possible to show that they 
have a direct bearing on the sort of legal representation lawyers provide. This 
can be seen by exploring the way lawyers draft judicial acts. The principal 
task lawyers carry out when opening a law-suit is that of writing a 'citazzjoni', 
or 'writ of summons.' As explained in the fourth chapter, this contains a 
statement of the legal motives for the suit and is accompanied by a 
'declaration of the facts' on which this claim is based. According to 
professional practice, the 'citazzjoni' is written by lawyers in a standardised 
form which centres around the legal issues involved and employs legal 
descriptive categories; containing only the barest bones of the client's story. 
Thus drafting the 'citazzjoni' usually means re-structuring the clients' narrative 
around the legal rules he is invoking, so that its particular 'subjunctive' 
features are muted and the rules invoked made clear. Various drafting 
techniques are utilised to present the client's case as typical and therefore as 
falling within the central meaning of the descriptive terminology of the legal 
rules which it is intended to animate. It is reduced to a few details, such as 
the crucial names and dates. Any reference to the thoughts and feelings of 
the parties is omitted and only those actions of theirs having a direct 
relevance to the legal argument mentioned. By contrast, the legal rules 
involved are extensively referred to and explained in detail. The outcome is 
the sort of 'paradigmatic story' which Ricoeur described and which was 
examined in the fourth chapter of this thesis, 33 where the legal rules operate 
as the paradigms which are evoked. 
q Sec the second chapter for Ricoeur"s analysis of ·paradigmatic stories·. The section on ·Teaching 
the Law· in the fourth chapter contains an example of the sort of paradigmatic story law-students are 
taught to produce. 
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The 'declaration of the facts' which accompanies the 'citazzjoni' is supposed 
to be a sworn statement by the client of the factual grounds on which the 
legal claims made in the 'citazzjoni' are based. It is therefore couched in the 
form of a declaration by the client affirming the truth of a series of numbered 
paragraphs containing 'the facts'. The original aim behind the introduction of 
this declaration was that of compelling litigants at the start of litigation to state 
in writing and in full the stories they intend to prove later on, during the oral 
court-room phase. The legal requirement of making this declaration of facts 
followed a report on the Maltese courts prepared by a British Royal 
Commission in 1913.34 This sought to eliminate delays by ensuring that 
judges know what cases are all about at the start of litigation, reducing 
reliance on oral testimony for this purpose. Yet professional practice has 
largely subverted this by making the 'declaration' a carbon copy of the 
paradigmatic story contained in the 'citazzjoni'. It is therefore copied from the 
'citazzjoni' written by the lawyer, with minor changes to make the story seem 
to emerge from the client's lips. So as to explore this issue, I examined the 
first fifty writs, or 'citazzjonijiet', filed in February 1997. There were only three 
cases in which the declaration of facts was substantially different from the 
'citazzjoni' and contained new facts unmentioned in it. 
There are various reasons why lawyers try to avoid committing their clients to 
a detailed written statement of the factual issues involved at the beginning of 
a law-suit. On one hand, this is because, like affidavits, the 'declaration of 
facts' is seen as threatening their professional detachment. As a written 
document enunciating the client's story, this declaration blurs the neat 
separation professional ideals establish between written documents filed by 
lawyers and oral stories told by clients. 35 It commits lawyers to clients' stories 
in a way most would like to avoid. Consequently objections to the 'declaration 
of facts' mirror those to affidavits considered at the start of this chapter. 
].1 As was made clear by our professor of ciYil law. Professor Ganado. when I was a law student. 
.ls Sec my intcr\"iew with the President of the ·camera degli Avvocatr analysed at the start of in the 
pre,·ious section of this chapter on ·The Professional Ideal·. 
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Lawyers told me they prefer to let the facts emerge through oral court 
testimony since stories often change during this phase; either because the 
client changes his version, or because new details become known which 
throw new light on the case. They therefore wish to avoid committing their 
clients to sworn written statements which can later be given the lie; exposing 
them to charges of perjury. Above all, most lawyers insist that facts should be 
left 'in clients' hands' so that lawyers are not perceived to be conniving with 
attempts to mislead the judge. Moreover, there are also strategic motives for 
lawyers' dislike of the 'declaration of facts', which relate to the way this 
restricts their space for court-room manoeuvring and will be considered in the 
ninth chapter of this thesis. 
As explained in chapter four, the defendant's lawyer replies to the 'citazzjoni' 
by means of a 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet', or 'statement of defence'. This is 
drafted in precisely the same way as the 'citazzjoni', with the difference that it 
is intended to rebut the plaintiffs claims. The 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet' therefore 
refers to each of the claims made by the plaintiff in his 'citazzjoni' and states 
why they should not be accepted by the court. Clients' stories are 
incorporated in the 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet' in the same paradigmatic form as 
they are in the 'citazzjoni'. The defendant's lawyer must also attach a 
'declaration of the facts' to the 'nota tal-eccezzjonijief and this too is usually a 
carbon copy of the paradigmatic. story contained in the 'nota tal-
eccezzjonijief. Moreover, the defendant may also present a counter-claim 
against the plaintiff, by attaching another 'citazzjoni' and 'declaration of facts' 
to his 'statement of defence.' 
When I carried out my fieldwork there were a couple of occasions when I was 
asked to draft a 'citazzjoni'. One lawyer advised me to be as concise as 
possible, remarking that some tended to draft documents which are too long 
and verbose. In this context a particular lawyer is often mentioned. He is 
considered as a bit of a maverick by many of his colleagues, due to his 
radical social beliefs and what is considered as the excessive length of the 
judicial acts he drafts. Lawyers would humorously refer to his '40 page long' 
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affidavits. Apparently certain judges are annoyed by this practice, which 
increases their workload tremendously. One lawyer pointed out to me that: 
"he makes them Uudges) read," observing: 
"Do you know how he works? First he goes on the radio till late in 
the evening. Then he tours his offices one by one coping with all 
his clients. He's got a bed in every office, so when there aren't any 
more, he just sleeps in the office. His clients adore him. They 
consider him as their saviour. I've heard of one man who waits 
outside in the cold for hours (until he comes to open the office} 
holding a thermos so that he can have warm coffee." 
This lawyer is a sole practitioner. His media activities, the number of offices 
he has and his clients' attitudes clearly indicate that he handles clients in 
terms of what I have defined as the 'patron' style. As the above quoted 
remarks show, this is a lawyer who specialises in attracting clients by totally 
immersing himself in their worlds. Moreover my lawyer informants explicitly 
related the way he drafts judicial acts to the way he handles clients. This 
relationship can be investigated by looking at the judicial acts drafted in one 
case by this lawyer. 36 In this case, he was defending a man whose wife had 
instituted a law-suit for personal separation from him. 
The 'citazzjoni' in this case was drafted by the wife's lawyer in terms of the 
usual formulaic style. In fact, the only details of the wife's story incorporated 
in it are the date of her marriage and the names and ages of her children. 
The rest consists of the legal grounds on which her demand for personal 
separation was based, which are standard since they are listed by the law; 
reference to two court decrees the wife had obtained and a list of her claims 
relating to custody of children, maintenance and other property matters. The 
declaration of facts simply replicates the factual part of this 'citazzjoni' and 
adds no new details. The 'citazzjoni' and declaration together are only three 
pages long. 
In comparison, the 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet' drafted by the husband's lawyer is 
seven pages long and replete with details about his story. Here 'subjunctive' 
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features predominate and strictly legal argument is secondary. The flavour of 
this document can be conveyed by looking at its second paragraph. This is a 
~bu~~ol afthe wife's assertion in her 'citazzjoni' that the marriage ended due to: 
"physical and moral violence and other facts imputable to the 
defendant, her husband, which constitute cruelty threats and 
grievous injury according to the law and also because the marraige 
has irretrievably broken down." 
As already noted, this terminology has been copied verbatim from one of the 
grounds of separation listed by the law. In reply, the second paragraph of the 
husband's 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet' states: 
"That regarding the second assertion, the defendant strongly 
rejects the notion that he was responsible for the shattering and 
irredeemable breaking of his marriage, since it was the wife who, 
apart from her adultery, through her savage behaviour against the 
defendant her husband was a continual menace against him to the 
extent that it resulted that he could not tolerate this sort of conjugal 
life any more, and apart from all this he still made an effort to save 
the marriage, but unfortunately this was all in vain because the 
plaintiff through her actions showed her determination to shatter 
this marriage at all costs and also to destroy her own family and 
this both literally and metaphorically since the plaintiff carried out a 
series of violent acts both against her husband the defendant and 
even against her own children, as will amply result through the 
pleadings in this law-suit." 
What is particularly striking about the convoluted prose of this extract is the 
way it reinterprets the legal ground of 'irretrievable breakdown of marriage'. 
Actually this ground was introduced into Maltese law so as to move 
separation proceedings away from notions of fault. It made separation 
possible if a marriage had irretrievably broken down and four years had 
passed; eliminating the need to identify a 'guilty' party, responsible for the 
marriage breakdown. Yet the husband's lawyer has gone in a totally opposite 
direction. He exploited the semantic resonance of the term 'breakdown', 
which in Maltese suggests a shattering into tiny pieces so as to paint a 
picture of a marriage which is irredeemably destroyed due to the wife's 
irresponsible actions. Other parts of the 'nota tal-eccezzjonijiet' also show the 
.lr. I came across the record of 1 his case while doing my fieldwork. 
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lawyer using every opportunity to introduce grotesquely loaded moralistic 
narratives which clearly reflect the husband's own understanding of events 
far more than the legal categories. For instance, the neutral tone of a 
statement in the wife's 'citazzjoni' that the court had authorised her to live in 
the matrimonial home is challenged by incorporating it into a story about her 
continual cruelty forcing her long-enduring husband to leave the home. 
While one could list many other 'subjunctive' aspects of this 'nota tal-
eccezzjonijiet', one should also note that the appended 'declaration of facts' 
this lawyer drafted does contain totally new facts unmentioned in the 
'statement of defence.' An additional five pages recount incidents from the 
marriage, entering into graphic detail about the alleged adulterous behaviour 
of the wife. The husband's feelings on discovering this are detailed, as also 
how the adulterer escaped being caught by him, the feelings of the children 
and so on. While the wife's lawyer listed twenty potential witnesses, the 
husband's lists over sixty! Moreover this lawyer then added a counter-claim 
to the statement of defence, in which his client made his action for personal 
separation against the wife. The 'citazzjoni' in this counter-claim took five 
pages and the 'declaration of facts' was another nine pages long, containing 
such new details as the story of his courtship with his wife or the time he 
burst into tears when he heard the adulterer's testimony in court. This adds 
up to a grand total of twenty six pages of emotionally drenched narrative in 
response to the three pages produced by the wife's lawyer! 
What is one to make of this case? It should firstly be clear that it is 
exceptional in many ways. This is because: 
a) Separation cases are perceived as more likely to generate long stories. 37 
b) The case itself was a particularly dramatic one between two working-class 
spouses. Powerful emotions were aroused which, as the record shows, even 
led to a physical fight between the spouses in the court corridors. 
,- Sec the prcYious section of this chapter for confirmation of the way la\\yers regard these cases . 
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c) This lawyer's representational style is considered unusual precisely 
because he tends to draft excessively long judicial acts. One lawyer informant 
gave me a cynical reason for this, pointing out that the tariff for drafting a 
'citazzjoni' reflects the total number of pages it contains, hinting that this is the 
real motive for these long documents. Yet this does not seem to me the 
principal reason. After all, the lawyer might be able to devote more time to 
attracting clients if he did not draft these long documents. More convincingly 
his drafting style appears necessarily entailed by the way he manages 
interactions with clients. 
Thus while the anomalous character of this case may seem to make it 
irrelevant, it actually reveals the intimate connection between the client-
handling style adopted by lawyers and the manner in which they legally 
represent their claims. This lawyer has adopted the 'patron' style in an 
extreme manner. This means that he gauges his success according to the 
extent to which he fulfils clients' expectations by creating a personal 
relationship that bridges the professional distance between them. Clients 
want nothing more than to receive confirmation of their narratives from their 
lawyers and to see them operating within their view of their cases. This 
lawyer fulfils this desire in a particularly complete and gratifying manner, by 
making his clients' narratives, not legal categories, the central cognitive 
framework in terms of which he legally scripts their case. It is hardly 
surprising that he is rewarded with devotion on the part of clients whereas 
many judges and lawyers see him as a maverick. Because he tilts towards 
one side of the tight-rope between patronage and professionalism on which 
lawyers balance, he makes the whole balancing act apparent. 
It follows that it is not only in their interactions with clients, but also when 
legally representing them, that lawyers have to balance between patronage 
and professionalism. In this context, professionalism is expressed through 
resisting the unmediated incorporation of clients' stories into written legal 
texts. Conversely patronage means letting these stories encroach into the 
written legal domain, culminating in situations where the stories structure the 
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invocation/interpretation of the legal rules rather than the other way round. 
Thus there is no homogenous professional consensus on the manner in 
which legal representation is to be carried out. Still less is it dictated by the 
law. On the contrary, all lawyers have to decide how much of their clients' 
narratives to include when legally scripting cases and arguing them before 
the court. While most lawyers will not give them the prominence they were 
given in this case, they will all have to make choices as to whether this 
particular incident is 'legally relevant' or whether this phrase is 'legally 
acceptable'. 38 In the process, they creatively extend the limits of legitimacy. 
Consequently, too, the driest and most paradigmatic texts lawyers produce 
are generated against the background of the pressure placed on them by 
clients' stories. Even if lawyers act 'professionally', refusing to give much 
space to these subjunctive stories in the judicial acts they draft, they still have 
to cope with this pressure. They may try to find another outlet for it which 
vindicates their clients' desires for narrative self expression. To further 
explore these points, it is now necessary to move towards the court-room and 
examine the manner in which testimony is produced . 
. lx The choices made reflect the client-handling strategies adopted by lawyers. which arise at the 
intersection between their own sociallv stmctured attitudes and those of their clients. Thus it seems 
that culture and social relationships po~verfitlly influence the way legal representation is carried out. 
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Chapter 7: Telling it to the Judge 
1. Introduction 
This chapter continues to explore legal representation by looking at the way 
litigants' stories are re-told in the context of the court-room itself. A brief 
description of the court environment will set the stage for a more in-depth 
focus on the way testimony is produced and contested in oral litigation. The 
discussion will revolve around a case-study, which serves to clarify the 
parameters within which court-room narratives are elaborated. These 
correspond to what were previously termed the paradigmatic and subjunctive 
poles of narration and reflect the way court-room testimony mediates 
between the subjective experience of witnesses and the language of 
paradigmatic legal rules. The strategies by which opposing lawyers seek to 
shift testimony towards either of these poles will be described and explained 
by reference to their respective interests in the case. The effects on 
witnesses and their resistance will also be charted. 
This analysis will show how complicated and time consuming court-room 
story-telling is. The shifting and malleable quality of orally told narratives 
requires lawyers to act as skilful story-tellers, acquiring an ability to develop 
and reinterpret stories to take account of new evidence. On this basis an 
evaluation will be conducted of Jackson's (1991) hypothesis that litigation 
provokes the telling of a plurality of narratives. My fieldwork suggests that this 
theory sees only one side of the picture, ignoring the aims which motivate 
court-room narration and the way the judicial process operates to reduce 
these different stories to a single official narrative. This has important 
implications for the exercise of judicial discretion, which will be fully explored 
in the next chapter. 
172 
2. The Court Environment 
The Maltese Law-Courts are housed in a large building in Valletta, the capital 
city. The imposing neo-classical facade abuts on to the busy and crowded 
Republic Street. This street runs straight through the centre of the city, linking 
the Court building to the Presidents' Palace, which houses the Maltese 
Parliament. Completed by the Nationalist Administration in 1970, the 
building's architecture dramatically contrasts with the surrounding baroque 
streetscape. 1 In the morning, when court sessions are usually held, there is a 
constant flow of people moving in and out of the building. A sense that 
momentous business is being carried on inside is communicated to outsiders. 
In fact, the square outside the court is the favourite 'hang-out' of some older 
men, who lean against the walls and gossip about current goings on. At times 
when there is a major criminal trial, crowds of people often invade the 
building, eager to observe the case. Mostly, however, the influx of people is 
restricted to litigants, witnesses, lawyers and policemen. 
The court space is deeply imbued with symbolic meaning. Thus the threshold 
of the court is not only a physical space, but also the liminal point of entry into 
a special legal domain, often experienced by ordinary laymen as aggravating, 
de-familiarising and humiliating. Idiomatic expressions refer to this 'ghatba 
tal-qorti' as very ugly. 2 It is also said to be 'as sticky as pitch', given the length 
of time it takes to settle court-cases and the consequent difficulty of 
extricating oneself. Once inside the court, many clients look gloomy and start 
grumbling about the delays, arrogance and corruption of lawyers and judges. 
Lawyers also complain of the waste of time, chaos and boredom induced by 
court -proceedings. 
1 The daily news bulletin broadcast on Malta· s state television channel generally contains a section on 
Court News. This is always read out against the background of a photograph of the court's facade (see 
photograph further on). Often tourists wander into the court building, convinced that it must be some 
ancient and significant monument. 
2 Sec the photograph on the following page. 
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The Threshold of the Courts 
(Source: "ln-Nazzjon" of the 61h March 1996) 
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As already observed, 3 a sense of hierarchy is imposed at the outset, through 
the frisking inflicted on laymen, from which lawyers and police are exempt. 
With this hurdle surpassed, laymen find themselves in a gloomy echoing hall, 
filled with people. Lawyers stride about purposefully with their dark-suits and 
brief-cases, often accompanied by their clients. Everyone seems to be talking 
loudly and this soundscape is punctuated by the shouts of the court 
messengers who, at rhythmic intervals proclaim three times the names of 
lawyers, litigants or witnesses summoned to appear in court-rooms. In this 
setting it comes as no surprise that, 'ghamel qorti', or 'making a court' refers, 
in Maltese, to the creation of clamour. Unaccompanied laymen often 
experience a sense of confusion and disorientation. Directions are largely 
lacking. Although an information desk was installed while I was doing my 
fieldwork, certain details, such as the current location of particular lawyers, 
cannot be given. As a result, one often sees clients wandering around like 
lost souls, eager to question anyone where Doctor so and so is to be found. 
The entrance hall leads into a long corridor replete with door-ways, which 
open into the Magistrates' court-rooms, known as the Inferior Courts. There 
are also two stairways leading upwards to the Civil and Appellate Courts, 
which by an understandable social logic are termed the Superior Courts. 
These court-rooms are mostly located in a corridor on the second floor of the 
building. There is a clear class difference between the clientele of different 
courts. The Magistrates' courts attract a larger proportion of rural/working 
class litigants, who are often unsure how to behave in the confines of the 
court. During my fieldwork, I grew used to seeing rural men struggle to put on 
unfamiliar jackets and ties in conformity with the dress codes imposed by the 
Magistrates, or taking these off with a sigh of relief as they emerged from the 
court-rooms. By contrast, the Superior Courts attract a clientele largely 
composed of businessmen and the higher social classes, who are also more 
acquainted with the court setting. Thus the division of Superior and Inferior 
Courts encodes and reinforces hierarchical class differences . 
. l Sec the section on the ·Professional Ideal' in chapter six of this thesis. 
175 
A separate part of the Court is located in another building located just behind 
the main building and linked to it by a closed bridge. This building is known 
as 'the Annex' and houses most of the administrative offices of the Court 
Registry. Here there is also a special court-room where most of the civil 
cases relating to family matters were heard during the period of my fieldwork. 
The clientele of this so-called 'family court' mostly consists of couples from all 
social classes who are breaking up. They generally wait outside the court-
room in a mutually hostile and suspicious silence. 
In the main court building, activity centres around the two corridors on which 
the Inferior and Superior Courts are respectively located, the stairs which link 
them and the various offices which pervade the court. The atmosphere of the 
two corridors varies in line with the differing class backgrounds of the 
litigants. There is more shouting and swearing in the crowded Inferior Court 
corridors and physical fights sometimes erupt there. There is also a 
concentration of police officers around the Inferior Courts, reflecting the fact 
that criminal cases are largely handled by the Magistrates. The Superior 
Court corridors are generally less crowded than those of the Inferior Courts 
and the noise level more bearable. Here nouveau riche building contractors 
rub shoulders with established land-owners and the commercial elite. The 
Chamber of Advocates' rooms are also located in this corridor and these 
constitute a point of reference for advocates and clients alike. All advocates 
must make their way to the Chamber of Advocates at least twice a day, in 
order to put on or remove their 'toga'. 4 
Both corridors share a liminal position in between the highly controlled space 
of the court-room and the less regulated spaces of everyday social life. 5 The 
1 Clients who arc seeking their lawyers often question the chamber's clerk about his whereabouts, 
through a little window which opens into the Chamber. 
5 In the court-room. the judge and the lawyers are in charge of the proceedings and clients are largely 
invisible. Indeed. lawyers tend only to take notice of their clients once they emerge into the corridors. 
Here they can consult one another freely in the light of what has just been said or what they believe is 
going to occur in court. 
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corridors are the place from which litigants and lawyers are summoned into 
the court-rooms and into which they emerge on leaving them. There are 
benches in these corridors where clients wait to be summoned. The wooden 
doors of the court-rooms also have little glass windows through which one 
can observe the goings on in different courts. These windows are used by 
lawyers and clients who are trying to trace one another or to gauge the stage 
reached by court-work.6 These corridors are important zones where lawyers 
display their busy lifestyle and professional detachment under the close 
observation of prospective clients. They are normally chock-full of people, 
including prominent businessman and lawyers, busily engaged in assessing 
each others' worth and work-load. Thus they constitute a central zone of 
lawyer/client interaction. 
The central focus of this activity is the court-room itself. With some minor 
exceptions, Maltese court-rooms have the same general lay-out.7 On entry, 
one finds a large wood-panelled hall, broadly divided into three stages. The 
first stage, at the back, is where lay-people are allowed to sit on two or three 
benches facing the judge. There are also benches at the side which serve the 
same purpose. In the centre of the room, between the benches and the judge, 
is a raised platform surrounded by a wooden screen and containing a table 
and some chairs. This is the lawyer's area of the court, which is usually out of 
bounds for anyone not wearing the 'toga'. Here lawyers jostle behind one 
another, impatiently waiting to argue their cases, or sit to examine the record 
of a case before debating it. At either end of this platform, facing the judge, 
there are two microphones which serve the purposes of the opposed lawyers 
pleading in each particular case. Outside the platform area, on the left and 
also facing the judge is the witness-box. This contains a crucifix, which 
witnesses must kiss before testifying. 8 In front of the lawyer's zone is the 
6 The doors arc closed and their windows covered to ensure secrecy when sensitive cases are heard. 
Sec the photograph on the following page. 
~ Instead. non-Christians may make a solemn affirmation to tell the truth. 
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Above is a photograph of the fa<;ade of the Maltese law-courts in Valletta 
(Source: "//-Gens" of the 16th August 1996). Below is a photograph of the 
interior of a Maltese court-room (Source: "/n-Nazzjon" of the 6th March 1996). 
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raised desk of the court clerk. Next to him are the files containing the records 
of the cases to be heard during the day. At the very back of the court and 
raised so as to visually dominate the entire space, is the judge's bench. On 
the wall behind him are the emblem of the Republic of Malta and a crucifix. 
The court's day starts at 9 a.m. and is usually over by 1.00 p.m. Court-work is 
of its nature varied. Yet it can be summarised as follows: 
a) Judges read out their judgements. They normally do this hurriedly and in a 
low voice, received by the attentive silence of lawyers and litigants. 
b) Judges take decisions and issue decrees in regard to matters on which a 
provisional ruling must be given during the course of the law-suit. 
c) Lawyers plead cases orally, stating the reasons on which their legal claims 
are based and rebutting points made by their opponents. Lawyers may also 
be asked to draft written notes summarising their arguments, to present 
affidavits on behalf of their clients and to state their claims in a formal manner 
for inclusion in the record of the case. 
d) Lawyers bring parties and witnesses forward to testify and produce other 
relevant evidence. These witnesses are directed to the witness box, from 
which they have to answer the questions put by the judge and the lawyers. 
While every judge has a numbered list of the cases which he should hear that 
day, this does not really determine the order or timing in which cases will be 
heard. 9 This is because of the many imponderables which can crop up in a 
court hearing. Nobody can say beforehand exactly how long the hearing of 
any particular case will take. Cases tend to be heard on a 'first come, first 
served' basis, with queues of lawyers forming before the judge and 
competing to get his attention. Once this is secured, they try to obtain a 
hearing for each of the cases in which they are involved, regardless of their 
position in the list. There is a constant sense of bustle and clamour in 
Maltese court-rooms and often all the lawyers are talking at once and trying 
to interrupt one another, while judges periodically warn them to keep quiet. 
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Moreover cases are rarely, if ever, heard and decided in one sitting. Instead, 
they are usually dragged on over a number of sittings. Adjournments are 
generally given for two or three months, for such purposes as calling a new 
witness or giving a lawyer time to draft additional written pleadings. As a 
result, lawyers claim that law-suit hearings proceed 'bis-sulluzzu', or 'by 
hiccups'. They complain of the chaotic nature of court-work, which can 
involve a 'lot of waste of time' and 'can't be predicted in advance.' 
Symptomatic are the comments of one lawyer who explained to me that even 
when granting the final adjournment before pronouncing judgement, judges 
state that this is being given 'in difett ostakolu', or 'as long as there are no 
obstacles'. This lawyer observed that such wording practically invites lawyers 
to create obstacles which will delay the case even more. 
Court-work is therefore piece-meal and sporadic in character. Typically a 
lawyer and his client would enter the court and separate, as the lawyer heads 
for the table in the centre, while the client sits deferentially at the back. They 
are soon followed by their opponents in litigation, who would do the same. 
After a period waiting their turn and chatting with fellow lawyers, it is the turn 
for these opposed lawyers to speak. Standing on either side of the table and 
clutching the microphones in their hands, they would compete to inform the 
judge of their respective views on the issues involved and the work which 
needs to be done. They would then present their arguments and/or examine 
their witnesses. Having completed their work in connection with the case and 
obtained a ruling or an adjournment from the judge, the lawyers thank him for 
his help and leave the court-room, followed by their clients. Their place would 
then be taken by a second set of lawyers. 
Court proceedings are characterised by the formal and highly regulated 
nature of the interaction between the participants. There are a number of 
mechanisms through which a sense of the hierarchical position of each of the 
participants in the court-room drama is reinforced. Thus the very lay-out of 
9 Some judges ha,·e recently begun to set fixed hours in which particular cases must be heard. This 
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the court-room serves to spatially demarcate judges, lawyers and laymen, 
creating an ascending series of spaces, with judges at the most elevated 
position and laymen at the bottom. This institutes an economy of sound and 
vision, in which the judge is the only person who can both see everything that 
goes on in the court-room in a single glance and clearly hear the arguments 
and testimony. 10 This arrangement reflects a view of the judge as the person 
who controls the whole performance for the edification of a public which is 
mainly concerned with the case as a spectacle. 
Moreover hierarchical legalism is more than just a background feature of 
court-work manifested in judicial injunctions to laymen to maintain silence in 
court, sit properly, or put a tie on. In a very real sense, the constant evocation 
of what is legally proper is the fundamental basis for all court-work, informing 
lawyers' questions and arguments and controlling what they are allowed to 
say and how. 11 Before the judge, lawyers' efforts to display an aggressive 
professional persona reach a climax. They are extremely assertive, often 
breaking out in dramatic displays of anger against the other party and 
constantly invoking the legal rules. Indeed, judges and lawyers seek relief 
from the strain of maintaining this artificial legal correctness of speech by 
cracking jokes, thus introducing moments of what Turner (1996) called 
'communitas' into rigid court-rituals. Surrounding and underlying the 
presentation of legal argument is a constant flow of banter, which often 
comments ironically on the case being discussed and the behaviour of the 
lawyers. Thus, one judge reacted to a lawyer's argument by observing that it 
system appears to be eliminating some of the uncertainty as regards timing. 
10 By contrast. lawyers arc in a position where they can hear what is being said, but are expected to 
keep their gaze fixed on the judge. literally turning their backs on the lay onlookers. The latter can see 
everything. but often hm·c difficulty in following what is being said in front, before the judge. 
11 This is also revealed by lawyers· gestures in litigation. Often these portray the imposition of a 
straight line onto an in\'isiblc reality, mimicking the hierarchical imposition of the law on the facts. 
Thus lawyers hold their right hand in a straight vertical position and move it horizontally forward, 
conYcying a sense of straight. uninterrupted movement. They also oppose the right thumb to the index 
linger to fonn a circle. which is then moved vertically downwards. This gives the impression that a 
straight line is being described by the point of intersection of thumb and index finger. 
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is very rare to find businessmen who are prepared to give up their rights 
gratis. He pointed out that people like Mother Teresa of Calcutta did exist, but 
not, as a rule, in business. Similarly, one lawyer jokingly interjected while his 
opponent was in the middle of a convoluted legal argument that the latter 
would do better to go and cut his hair, since it was far too long. 
These comments, which might seem so peripheral to the real tasks of 
litigation, are actually a good pointer to the underlying tensions which are 
built into the relationships between the participants. Thus much banter is 
exchanged between lawyers who are opposing each other in a particular 
case, serving to mockingly undermine each others' claims. Metaphoric 
language is mined for the purpose of these witty exchanges, or 'battibekki' as 
they are known. In one case, for instance, a judge observed to a lawyer that 
his arguments were being ignored by his opponent, telling him: "you are 
throwing your seed in the emptiness." This lawyer seized the opportunity to 
twist his words to insinuate that his opponent was not very bright, replying: 
"yes, because the soil on the other side is not very fruitful, your Honour." To 
this, his opponent replied: "that's because you're sowing it with thorns like 
those of Jesus Christ!" In another case, a lawyer commented that the court 
had to be careful because the nick-name of his opponent's client was: '1-
ahrax', or 'the savage one.' 
Thus lawyers' banter utilises metaphorical language as a vehicle through 
which to communicate matters which are unmentionable in strictly legal 
argument and express their hostile relationships with their opponents. At the 
same time, this conforms to a pervasive Maltese conviction that whatever is 
said openly is only the tip of the iceberg of sophisticated underground 
machinations. Indeed, lawyers, judges and litigants often claimed that 'there's 
something else underneath', or that 'you have to know what's going on 
beneath the surface'. For this reason too lawyers pass off pointed criticism as 
a joke, or come up with ambiguous comments which have more than one 
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meaning.12 These tactics endow lawyers with the discursive freedom to attack 
their opponents, not only with the weaponry of legal argument, but also with 
that of gossip and innuendo. Indeed one lawyer who made fun of me justified 
this by saying: "I'm preparing you for the court, because there you must not 
pay any attention to the things they say." Consequently lawyers experience 
the court-room agonistically, as what Appadurai (1986) has called a 
'tournament of value'. It is a place where their own honour and that of their 
clients are constantly being challenged and where success depends on the 
ability to assert oneself (and one's definition of the issues involved in the 
case) and being quick and ready to reply to provocation. The good reply is 
not solely a legally learned one, but also one which shows a wide cultural 
competence: an ability to mine proverbs, religious parables and operatic 
motifs so as to present oneself as being in full command of the situation, able 
to deploy key cultural values in one's support. 
Judges' behaviour, on the other hand, seems to be guided by two objectives. 
Firstly they are concerned to ensure a sense of justice, order and discipline in 
the court-room. They are therefore quick to censure laymen or lawyers who 
speak out of turn or behave inappropriately. The court-room is, in fact, 
described by lawyers as belonging to the judge who presides over it. Maltese 
judges exercise a very close, hands-on surveillance over all that occurs in 
'their' courts. A second objective, which is not always shared by lawyers, 13 is 
their desire to reduce the backlog of cases, to ensure they are settled as 
soon as possible. As shown in chapter four, there is great public concern 
about court delays. At the end of every forensic year, the Court Registry 
compiles lists of the cases which have been decided by each judge. 
Moreover, the doctrine of judicial independence, which Maltese judges are 
1 ~ Thus. one lawyer came up to me in court and claimed that Dr. Camilleri was not a good informant 
for me. as he would conceal "juicy· information. This was said smilingly in the presence of Dr. 
Camilleri. who smiled back. 
u One la\\}·er told me that judges also tend to delay cases when they have reached the stage where 
they ha\"e to write their judgements. 
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quick to defend, might imply that they, not the government, are responsible 
for the overall efficiency of the courts. 
In this situation no judge wants to be seen as contributing to court delays. On 
the other hand lawyers often try to stretch out cases, for various reasons 
which can only be roughly indicated here. There is a clear tendency to try to 
put off the final judgement when this seems likely to have an adverse effect 
on clients' interests. In addition they also try to represent clients as fully as 
possible, by calling a large number of witnesses to prove their versions of 
events and opposing the other party every inch of the way. Another possible 
reason, which clients mentioned but I could not verify, was that some lawyers 
may have a financial interest in prolonging litigation. This increases the work 
they perform, multiplying their fees. While it was difficult to ascertain the 
respective contribution of each of these factors to court delays, it was a 
recurrent part of my fieldwork experience to hear judges shout at lawyers, 
accusing them of delaying cases unreasonably. Generally these arguments 
raged around lawyers' attempts to obtain adjournments to call new witnesses, 
to present documents, or to reach agreements with the other party. Lawyers 
also justified their actions by claiming they were trying to shorten 
proceedings, so as 'to avoid summoning witnesses uselessly'. 
Clients and other laymen are largely invisible in the court-room. They are 
often initially intimidated by the whole set-up. When they try to assert 
themselves, they are disciplined by lawyers and judges and forced to accept 
the passive role of a silent audience. Here is how one middle aged man I 
interviewed described the experience: 
"There's a lot of stress in the court experience. You hear a lot of 
lies and you're not allowed to refute them. Or if you do refute them 
and bring proof against them, it makes no difference as the judge 
pays no attention." 
Similarly, a woman in her mid-thirties observed that: 
"Like, when you're in there (the court) for the first time, it's 
terrifying. You know what's bad, as well: the fact that you have to 
wait outside. So many people around, all kinds of people and 
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you're waiting and waiting and waiting and waiting. And you have 
to go there, say, at nine. I think everybody must go there at nine or 
half nine. And people have to go there alone sometimes. You have 
to make your way there. lawyers running all around the place and 
you don't know whether your lawyer will be inside the court-room 
when they call you. When they do call, sometimes he's not around. 
So you're in the court-room actually waiting for him to arrive. Very 
worrying. Plus the fear that you feel inside you when you're going 
before the judge for the first time." 
lay-people are only allowed to speak at any length in the court-room when 
they are summoned to testify as witnesses. When I first started my fieldwork, 
I was impressed by the amount of time devoted to the examination and cross-
examination of witnesses during the court's work. I had expected to hear 
lawyers deliver ornate speeches and to hear judges declaiming their 
judgements. Instead the bulk of the courts' time was taken by the questioning 
of witnesses, which also tended to emotionally dominate the proceedings. 
Documents and other material evidence produced in the course of law-suits 
were often handed over by witnesses while they were being questioned. The 
generation of evidence thus took place in the context of the narrative frame-
work established by the oral questioning of witnesses. Consequently my 
focus on testimony does not only reflect my theoretical concern with the way 
clients' stories are re-told to the court, but also mirrors the nature of court-
work itself. For these reasons, the rest of this chapter will be dedicated to 
investigating the way testimony is produced before the court. 
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3. The Relations of Production of Testimony 
Witnessing is a highly regulated activity. Apart from general evidentiary 
provisions and rules contained in other statutes, the Maltese Code of Civil 
Procedure (laws of Malta: Cap.12) has 63 sections specifying how oral 
testimony is to be produced and recorded. For the purposes of this 
ethnographic study, however, the details of these provisions are less 
important than their general influence on the routine processing of evidence. 
For similar reasons, the distinct evidentiary rules applicable to criminal cases 
will here be ignored. The processes focused on are shared by most law-suits. 
Moreover, while criminal litigation is often the object of media attention, this 
rarely happens with the civil law-suits researched, enhancing their 
ethnographic interest. Consequently this chapter will concentrate on the 
general features governing the production of testimony in civil litigation, 
leaving the distinguishing features of criminal litigation to future research. 
The regulatory framework of testimony sets the scene for this activity in a 
number of ways. Among the most important rules is the initial one directing 
that evidence given should be: "relevant to the matter in issue between the 
parties" (Cap.12, sec. 558). This combines with other rules enabling the court 
to disallow evidence it considers irrelevant and to require the party producing 
evidence to state its object, so as to privilege the judge's view of what is 
'relevant' and what is the 'matter in issue'. Thus lay perceptions of the 
meaning of the case are formally subordinated to those of the judge, in turn 
largely based on what he has been told by the opposing lawyers. 
Other rules structure the giving of evidence, making a distinction between the 
'examination in chief and the 'cross-examination'. The 'examination in chief 
is the initial questioning of a witness by his lawyer or by the lawyer of the 
party who has produced14 this witness in court. It is followed by the cross-
•·• Witnesses arc ·produced' by listing their names in a note which must be filed together with the 
·citazzjoni ·or ·nota tal-eccezzjonijiet'. Normally lawyers ask their clients to ensure that a particular 
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examination of the witness by the lawyer of the other party. To a certain 
extent the rules also influence the relations between lawyers and witnesses, 
creating a collaborative relationship between lawyers and the witnesses 
produced by their clients and inserting hostility into relations with witnesses 
produced by opponents in litigation. Thus, during the examination-in-chief, no 
leading questions may be put to the witness and it is not allowed to: "impeach 
his credit. .. by evidence of a bad character'' (Cap.12, sec. 584). 15 By contrast, 
these questions are permitted during cross-examination. The roles of witness 
and judge are similarly regulated. Witnesses are obliged to answer all 
questions put to them, 16 while judges are allowed to ask any questions they: 
"deem necessary or expedient" (Cap.12, sec. 582). Moreover, not all 
testimony is allowable. As a general rule, for instance, hearsay evidence is 
not acceptable. Finally other rules dictate that the substance, not the actual 
words of a witness's testimony shall be taken down. 17 
These rules are usually implemented as follows. The plaintiffs advocate is 
given the first opportunity to state his client's version of events and produce 
testimony for that purpose. He will therefore tell the judge of the names of the 
first witness he wishes to summon. The latter informs the court marshal and 
the marshal emerges into the corridors of the court and shouts the witness's 
name three times. Normally the first witness to be brought is the plaintiff 
herself, who enters the court-room and is directed to the witness box, where 
she stands, facing the judge. Once there, the judge will ask her whether she: 
'swears to say the truth, the whole truth. and nothing but the truth'. On 
witness attends their sittings. However. if the witness does not turn up in court, the lawyer can compel 
him to do so by issuing a special warrant and even, if the judge approves, have him arrested and 
brought to court by the police. 
15 Although it is permissible to: ··contradict him (the witness) by other evidence" and to: "show that 
he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony" (Cap.l2, sec. 584). 
16 Sa"e when the judge rules othenvise. or when the witness· s answers may incriminate him. 
1
- This rule is immediately qualified with the words: "'every answer which may have a material 
bearing on the merits of the case shall be taken down word for word" (Cap.l2, sec 594 (1)). However 
this still lcaYcs it up to the judge to decide whether an answer materially bears on the merits. 
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receiving a positive reply, the judge tells her to kiss the crucifix and then 
requests her name, date of birth and occupation. Having obtained these 
details, he then allows the plaintiffs lawyer to begin the examination-in-chief. 
When the examination in chief is completed, she is cross-examined by the 
defendant's lawyer. Finally, the witness may be questioned once more by the 
plaintiffs lawyer in what is known as a 'ri-ezaml or 're-examination'. Usually 
three or four witnesses testify in any particular sitting. The general procedure 
followed is one where the lawyer for the plaintiff is the first to summon his 
witnesses in the order he chooses. When all the plaintiffs witnesses have 
been questioned and cross-examined, it is then the turn of the defendant's. 
These are also examined initially by their lawyer and then cross-examined by 
the plaintiff's lawyer. The questions put and the answers supplied are 
recorded on tape and subsequently typed by the clerk of the court. 
From this description, the production of evidence might seem to be a smooth 
and trouble-free process: a sort of unequal dialogue where all the cards are 
held by judges and lawyers, so that the views of lay witnesses on the 
meaning of their own testimony have no real influence. Yet when one looks at 
the actual practice of the Maltese courts, what could be called the 'relations 
of production' of testimony appear more tense and troubled. To start with, 
testimony is not usually taken down the moment it is uttered. Most judges I 
observed would keep the recorder18 turned off while a witness is replying to 
questions. They only turn it on again after the witness has finished, when 
these judges repeat the testimony given into the tape-recorder, generally 
using a more formal, ltalianised and legalistic Maltese than that of the 
witness. Moreover, there are endless objections by lawyers and judges 
regarding the summoning of particular witnesses, the framing of questions by 
the other lawyer and the best words to insert into the record of the case to 
1 
x The judge controls the recording of evidence by means of a sort of hand-held joystick. 
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express what the witness intends to convey. 19 These arguments aggravate 
the conflicts between lawyers and witnesses produced by questioning itself, 
to make the production of testimony an intensely contested process. 
To explain these tensions, one must understand the divergent interests and 
experiences of each of the protagonists, starting with lawyers. The lawyers 
for the plaintiff and the defendant are clearly in an antagonistic relationship. 
They express this opposition by formally objecting to the summoning of 
particular witnesses or the placing of particular questions, often on the 
grounds that they are irrelevant or not the best proof that could be brought. 
There is often substance to these allegations, because one of the tools by 
which lawyers can delay a case is by contesting every detail, multiplying the 
number of witnesses which have to be brought. This increases the time which 
must be devoted to the hearing of witnesses and also makes the lawyer 
appear more assertive and aggressive in the eyes of his client, since he 
openly disagrees with all that is asserted by the other party. 
Increasing the number of witnesses also creates space for endless 
manoeuvres to the effect that a case should be adjourned so that a particular 
witness could be called, or that a witness was not properly notified and so on. 
Indeed, one of the things which surprised me when I acted as a legal 
referee20 was just how problematic the hearing of evidence could be. I heard 
lawyers openly remark that a particular witness was too important to be 
brought to court to testify over a minor case. Despite my best efforts, around 
ten months and six court sittings were wasted in one case because a 
particular witness did not turn up in court, although the lawyer who wished to 
bring him claimed that he had notified him properly. These delays often give 
rise to the suspicion on the part of opponents in litigation that the opposing 
lawyer is causing the delays to prolong the case because he believes he will 
19 Frequently. judges stop the recording. rewind the tape and delete some piece of testimony which has 
been objected to by the lawyer for the other party or which seems to be unclear. Often, too, judges ask 
questions themselves or re-phrase questions originally put by the lawyers. 
-'" Sec chapter three for a description of this experience. 
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ultimately lose it. Indeed, lawyers often ask their opponents: 'why should we 
bring witnesses to prove something we agree on?' 
Apart from these objections about the relevance of particular witnesses or 
questions, lawyers interrupt opponents and pass sly comments attacking 
them while the latter are questioning witnesses. 21 They pay great attention to 
the actual content of the testimony delivered by the other side and rush to re-
phrase expressions which might damage their case. Often heated 
discussions develop between the lawyers and the judge as to whether to use 
one word instead of another. Consequently judges delete or re-phrase 
testimony and question witnesses themselves to clarify the matter. Indeed, for 
historical reasons, Maltese judges tend to take a more active part in the 
questioning of witnesses than in common-law systems. 22 
As already observed, judges are guided by the twin aims of ensuring that the 
case proceeds fairly and without too many delays. For this reason they try to 
discipline all the parties to the case, ensuring that lawyers and witnesses do 
not speak out of turn. They do not look kindly on those lawyers who seem to 
them to be wasting the court's time by disagreeing with their opponents on 
every facet of the case,23 calling large numbers of witnesses and spending 
too much time asking irrelevant questions. Consequently they often threaten 
to cut short a particular line of questioning, by asking the lawyer what 
relevance the answers to these questions could have and 'where he intends 
to arrive' with them. Lawyers often wrangle with judges in order to be allowed 
to call a particular witness or to ask a particular question and this clearly 
~ 1 Thus one lawyer said: ··oottore, you are inserting the answers you want into the questions you put." 
~~ This seems to be a legacy of the inquisitorial judicial system Malta had before the British refonns 
(Harding llJXO). I have noted another cultural legacy of this system, which is the tendency of judges to 
ask lawyers what the case is about before the court sitting starts and while they are waiting for the 
lawyers of the other party to appear in the court-room. 
~J One judge complained in my presence about the unreasonable behaviour of one lawyer who told 
him: "I contest eYef)1hing which my opponent says in this case." When the judge asked him whether 
this included his statement that the house which fonncd the object of the suit had a door painted green 
and had four walls. this lawyer replied: "yes. I disagree with evcf)1hing ... 
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conditions the sort of testimony which can be brought. The following outburst 
noted in my field-diary conveys the flavour of their interaction. Here a judge is 
shouting at a lawyer who tried to obtain an adjournment to call a new witness: 
"How can you do this in a case which has been going on for six 
years? It cannot be that you make fools of us in this way! What 
can you have left to say? Can you tell me what you have left? I'm 
going to keep going without any brakes. If necessary we'll eat here 
(in court) and we'll keep going without interruptions until all the 
proof is brought!" 
The questioning of witnesses is itself conducted in a way which reflects the 
different interests of the protagonists. To start with the relationship between a 
lawyer and his client's witness, one must note that it is usually much more 
collaborative in nature than that between a cross-examining lawyer and the 
other party's witnesses. When a lawyer conducts an examination-in-chief, he 
tries to ask his witness a series of questions which help him build up a 
coherent narrative through his testimony. The next section will show how this 
questioning is usually intended to elicit a paradigmatic story of the sort which 
has been discussed. Characteristically, therefore, the lawyer's questions 
attempt to create a culturally believable and chronologically sequential story, 
through asking the witness what happened 'subsequently', or saying: 'if this is 
what happened, then what was your reaction to it?' 
Generally lawyers are courteous to their witnesses and try to interpret their 
words in good faith to iron over any discrepancies. However they are also 
quick to discipline witnesses who do not reply to their questions or ramble on 
at length. This is because they are afraid that they will muddy the waters, 
confusing the issues involved in the case or making damaging admissions. 
Lawyers and judges selectively repeat the answers given by witnesses, 
cloaking them in a formal vocabulary which meshes better with the language 
of the legal rules. Thus, even the collaborative relationship between a lawyer 
and his own witness is based on the barely concealed linguistic dominance 
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exerted by the lawyer, who claims to be able to identify the real meaning of 
what the witness wants to say behind the actual words he uses. 24 
If the relationship between a lawyer and his client's witness has its latent 
tensions, then that with the other party's witness is often overtly hostile. This 
is not only because lawyers are free to attack the credibility of witnesses 
during cross-examination, but also because of the way this is done. In fact 
lawyers resort to a range of rhetorical tactics to debunk witnesses' credibility. 
Often they adopt a mocking superior tone, trying to discover discrepancies in 
the testimony. They also intimidate witnesses by interrupting them, shouting 
at them and piling questions on top of one another. A common tactic is to ask 
the witness ever more precise details about the remembered event, to 
uncover lacunas in his memory which can then be used to suggest that he is 
lying. 25 The assumption made is that a truthful witness will remember the past 
accurately. However it is also assumed that a lying witness can be identified 
by the suspicious accuracy of his memory of minor details crucially important 
to his case. 26 Clearly these assumptions can easily contradict one another 
and they illustrate the flexible nature of the theories of memory which lawyers 
appeal to in cross-examination. Typical of cross-examination are questions of 
the form: 'what would you tell me if I were to tell you so and so?' Such 
questioning creates a sceptical atmosphere, allowing the lawyer to confront a 
witness with statements which contradict testimony he had earlier given. 
::I One lawyer I interyiewed put it this way: "there's a lot of psychology, for want of a better word, in 
court. You start to realise that this is the situation where you have to appear aggressive; this is the 
situation where you have to be passive: this is the situation where you have to scream at your client in 
order to tell him to shut up because he· s mucking up his case ... 
2
' In one criminal trial 1 observed. a female police-woman testified that she had received an 
anonymous phone-call in which a stuttering male voice infonned her of the commission of a crime. 
Under cross-examination. the defence attorney started to grill her as to the exact sound of the voice 
and the quality of the stutter. In response. the witness eventually attempted to personally reproduce 
the voice she had heard in the court-room. Clearly she felt that any attempt on her part to describe the 
\'Oicc would make it possible for the lawyer to misinterpret or 'twist· her words. She tried to prevent 
this happening by reproducing the voice herself and leaving it up to the lawyer to describe it. 
eli Especially when major events which occurred at the same time arc forgotten. 
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As has been explained, judges often question witnesses themselves and in 
the process may ask questions which resemble both those which are posed 
by lawyers during the examination-in-chief and during the cross-examination. 
Thus one judge who used to deal with cases of personal separation told me 
that there were a number of trouble questions which he would always ask to 
test the credibility of witnesses. For instance, he would ask separating 
women whether they allowed their husbands access to their children and 
follow this up by asking when they last saw them. What is particularly 
noticeable about judges' questioning is the care they take to prevent 
witnesses from digressing and recounting long narratives which explain their 
subjective perspective on events. This is partly because of their desire to 
reduce court delays and also because, as one magistrate told me, listening to 
these stories, can expose judges to charges of prejudice in favour of one of 
the parties. Certainly judges often commented that they: 'do not enter into 
these stories', because: 'they never end'. 27 
The effect of questioning on witnesses is usually to make them feel exposed 
and vulnerable. Clients I spoke to described the fear they felt when testifying 
before the judge. Many characteristic features of testifying conspire to 
produce this feeling. Witnesses often do not know where they are supposed 
to stand and have to be directed to the witness box by lawyers. They have to 
wear a jacket and tie to enter the court-room and, if these are carelessly put 
on, or if they slouch, they are shouted at by judges and directed to 'arrange 
your tie' or to 'stand properly'. When in the witness box, they are placed on a 
higher position than other laymen and the gazes of everybody in the court-
room are fixed on them. 28 They have to take an oath and kiss the crucifix. 
When replying to the lawyer's questions, they are instructed to look straight 
ahead towards the judge, rather than side-ways towards the lawyer with 
whom they are actually conversing. 
~- I also heard a legal referee complain to a judge that it was impossible for her to listen to everything 
a particular litigant had to say. because: ··we ·n continue into the next millennium!"' 
~H This sense of being raised up to public scrutiny is conveyed by the Maltese expression used, which 
is: "te!lghuh jixhed ·. or ·they raised him up to testify·. 
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However it is the actual questions which create the greatest tension. 
Witnesses are often placed in a frustrating situation where intimate details 
about their personal life are aired in public, while they are unable to direct the 
course of what is said or to give their own perspective on events. In fact, it 
has been observed how not only the opponent's lawyer, but also the judge 
and the lawyer who is conducting the examination-in-chief re-phrase what the 
witness says and prevent him from expounding his subjective opinion. 
Witnesses are constantly being cut short and interrupted. 29 Moreover, while 
cross-examining lawyers may only seem to be contradicting the words of the 
witness, their aim in doing so is often that of attacking the witness's self, by 
undermining his credibility. This is made clear both by the types of questions 
which are asked and by the ways in which they are asked. 30 
Questioning provokes a reaction on the part of witnesses, which reflects its 
influence on them. Witnesses become angry and emotional, insisting that 
they must have their say. Lawyers complained to me that their witnesses 
would not allow them to do the questioning and would insist on pouring forth 
entire stories to the judge. This damaged their cases because clients did not 
understand what was relevant and lost the judges' sympathy. In another case, 
a legal referee complained that a client had even brought a tape-recorder 
with her to make sure her testimony was properly taken down. It is however 
important to note that witnesses sometimes manage to communicate and 
impose their own understanding of events and this will be revealed by a 
detailed examination of the way in which testimony was produced and 
contested in a particular case. 
2
'
1 As I heard one judge tell a witness: ··if you please. do not argue. You are here, solely to answer the 
questions which arc put to you:· 
.1o When Maltese describe the giying of testimony there is a great emphasis on what ·emerges· from 
witnessing. In the process. people slip from talking about the emergence of the truth to talking about 
the emergence of sciYcs. Thus. it is common to hear people say ·hareg ta' rage/', or 'he emerged as 
(an honourable) man·. 
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4. The Case of the 'Rented Garage' 
The relations of production of testimony will now be exemplified by looking at 
the evidence given in a particular case, so as to further develop the analysis. 
My access to this case was mediated through the official transcript prepared 
by the court clerk. It is important to keep the conditions of production of such 
transcripts in mind. It is clear from what has just been said that they cannot 
be considered as perfectly reflecting all that was said in court during the 
sittings to which they refer. Apart from the fact that all non-discursive features 
are automatically eliminated, these transcripts already bear the mark of the 
efforts of lawyers and judges to shape the testimony produced in line with 
their own objectives. However since they contain a detailed record of the 
questions asked and the answers given in particular cases, these transcripts 
can be mined for their ethnographic interest. 
The case which will be described is still an ongoing one at the time of writing 
this thesis. It is significant mainly because it is ordinary and therefore typifies 
the way testimony is negotiated in most Maltese civil law-suits. One of my 
lawyer informants acted for the defence in this case along with another 
advocate. He brought it to my attention because he wanted my opinion on the 
legal issues involved. For this reason, he also told me the story of the case, 
as he saw it. With his permission, I tape-recorded his description of the case, 
which was given in English and can serve to introduce this discussion by 
showing what the story of the case was in the eyes of one defence attorney. 
The transcription of this recording is given below and on the following page: 
Me: "Do you mind (my recording)? If you mind I'll switch it off." 
Lawyer: "No, no, no. In this case ... the defendant John Zammit. 
Zammit was the owner of the garage. At least, he thought he was 
the owner of the garage. Now the facts were these: He had a 
'konvenju' (a promise of sale agreemene1} with a certain Gejtu 
Aquilina. Gejtu, on the 'konvenju', we know for sure, was paid the 
·'
1 This is an agreement where the owner of immovable property promises to sell it to another who 
promises to buy it. 
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whole amount, being the same price, value of the garage. For 
some reason, either they did not finalise the contract of sale or 
they did not register it. In the mind of John Zammit, he was the 
owner. John Zammit then gave the garage on lease to my client, 
who is Salvu Camilleri (the other defendant). Eventually, Salvu 
Camilleri was approached by a certain Joseph Tabone, who is the 
plaintiff and Joseph Tabone told him: "listen, get out of here ... this 
is my place." Apparently John Zammit was never registered as 
owner. Gejtu then hypothecated (a form of mortgage) the place in 
favour of the B.O.V. 32 B.O.V. called down the debts. There was a 
'subbasta' (a judicial sale by auction33). It was sold to Joseph 
Tabone. Joseph Tabone bought the place through the 'subbasta'. 
So Joseph Tabone was the real owner. But for a long period of 
time, John Zammit was the possessor 'animo domini'. 34 Because 
this guy can barely read or write. I believe John Zammit. He is a 
very simple man. This guy Gejtu was jailed. Fraud. The story was 
quite obvious. The notary35 was also of shaky qualities. So is my 
client Salvu Camilleri protected against the real owner?" 
Although my lawyer/informant described this story as 'quite obvious', it may 
not appear to be so clear-cut to a non-lawyer. The whole structure of this 
narrative suggests this lawyer is describing events from the standpoint of how 
they relate to a framework of legal rules and concepts which are shared with 
other Maltese lawyers but not with a wider audience. To an audience 
unfamiliar with Maltese legal terminology, the story could be re-phrased so: 
Gejtu Aquilina owned a garage, which he promised to sell to John 
Zammit, by means of a written agreement. John paid the full price 
of the garage to Gejtu. Yet the two parties did not conclude a final 
contract of sale with all the legal formalities, so that the ownership 
of the garage did not legally pass to John, who was unaware of 
this and thought that he had become the full owner. Acting on this 
belief, John leased the garage to Salvu Camilleri. Meanwhile, 
Gejtu, who was a dubious character, mortgaged the garage as 
3 ~ The Bank of Valletta: one of the two leading Maltese banks . 
. B A ·suhhasta · is an auction of mortgaged property which is authorised by the Maltese courts and 
often held within their precincts. Judges will order that a ·suhhasta ·be held when a debtor is unable 
to re-pay his loans and has mortgaged some of his property in order to secure these loans. The 
proceeds from the auction will go to the creditor. 
_l-t Under Maltese law. possessors who arc in good faith. believing that they are the owners of property 
which is not their own enjoy special protection even against the real owner. 
_ls The notal}' had drafted the · konvenju ·. but apparently failed to follow it up with a contract of sale. 
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security for the repayment of a bank loan he had taken. When he 
did not repay this loan in time, the bank decided to initiate court 
proceedings and obtained a judgement ordering an auction of the 
mortgaged garage so that the bank would be repaid out of the 
proceeds. The garage was auctioned and sold to Joseph Tabone. 
Joseph Tabone approached Salvu Camilleri (who had leased the 
garage from John Zammit) and told him that he had to leave the 
garage on the grounds that his lease agreement was invalid, since 
the lessor had no valid legal title over the garage. 
The need I feel to translate this story makes clear my own involvement in 
narrating (and therefore re-interpreting) the case. What I am here telling is 
my story concerning the story my informant told me about what he saw as the 
real issues involved in the case. Each of these levels of story-telling implies a 
different perspective on the issues involved and subtly influences the ensuing 
narrative, adding new layers of significance to it. My academic training in law 
and anthropology and the context of narration of an anthropology thesis has 
clear repercussions on what I write, not least of which being the way I must 
re-tell the story for the consumption of a non-legal, non-Maltese, audience. In 
comparison, the story provided by my lawyer/informant was produced after 
most of the witnesses had testified in court and he was telling it to me as a 
lawyer colleague in order to obtain my opinion on the legal issues involved. 
His narrative is therefore the sort of finished product this defence lawyer tried 
to elicit through his own questions in court. It is a series of events which has 
been remembered for the purpose of clarifying a legal issue. 
In order to understand the specific characteristics of the story told by my 
lawyer informant, it is useful to recall the spectrum of narrative possibilities 
outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. This spectrum lay between the 
opposed poles of paradigmatic rules and subjective experience. In this 
context it was argued that the significance of narrative lies in the way it 
mediates between these two poles. This means that telling stories can serve 
both as a medium through which rules structure individual experience and as 
the means through which particular experiences can challenge existing 
paradigmatic rules and ultimately generate new ones. Different forms of 
story-telling epitomise these converse processes, so that such 'paradigmatic 
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narratives' as moralistic tales affirm established rules, while 'subjunctive 
narratives' like modern novels challenge them. 
In the light of this distinction, it is clear that the story my lawyer-informant told 
me is a paradigmatic one. The internal fabric of this narrative itself reveals 
this. For one thing, it is a unitary, coherent, story authoritatively told from a 
single viewpoint. There is no sign of ambiguity or contradiction and no 
awareness of the co-existence of different narratives providing alternative 
interpretations of events. Nor is there any of the hesitation, calculation, 
disruptions and opacity of practical life. Moreover this narrative is structured 
in terms of a series of legally defined concepts and relationships. Persons 
are characterised mainly in terms of their legally significant actions and their 
thoughts and feelings are only mentioned in those points in the narrative 
where this is essential so as to understand the legal issues involved. It is the 
paradigmatic rules of the legal system which are stressed in such a story, as 
against the particular experiences of the protagonists. 
In practice, however, most people do not understand their actions in terms of 
such legally oriented narratives. Nor are such stories automatically produced 
by clients when they come to testify in court. Rather, there is a long process 
of delivery of testimony, in which parties and their witnesses are repeatedly 
questioned, various narratives are evoked and different lawyers seek to 
shape this material in the interests of their clients. This can be seen from the 
following extract from the official transcript of John Zammit's court testimony, 
which I have translated. It shows my lawyer informant trying to discover the 
basis of John Zammit's claim to own the garage and in the process actively 
creating a paradigmatic story out of his utterances :36 
v, In the extract reproduced on the next page. ·L · refers to my lawyer/informant, who was defending 
Saln1 Camilleri. ·JZ" is John Zammit. who was called as a witness by Salvu Cammilleri and 'Crt' is 
the judge hearing this case. who also put questions to this witness. One should note that all the names 
I have used arc pseudonyms. 
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Creating a Paradigmatic Story: 
Joseph Tabone vs. John Zammit & Salvu Camilleri 
Defendant John Zammit, produced by defendant Salvu Camilleri, on oath 
declares: 
L: Did you lease a garage to defendant Salvu Camilleri? 
JZ: Yes 
L: Where is this garage? 
JZ: Hai-Farrug, Independence Street 
L: This garage, how did it come to you? 
JZ: I bought it from Gejtu Aquilina; I bought it from him, I paid him and 
asked the notary for the contract and each time he would tell me: 
'wait, wait'. Some days passed and he did not give me the contract. 
Crt: When you say that the notary did not give you the contract, do you 
mean he did not give you a copy or that a contract was not made? 
JZ: No. The contract was made. As far as I'm concerned, it was made. 
But what he did I don't know. 
Crt: You went to the Notary and made the contract. You went before him 
and signed. Then you asked him for a copy of the contract and he did 
not give you one? 
JZ: Yes. 
L: How much did you pay for the garage? 
JZ: Eight Thousand (Malta Liri) 
L: Did you give him the full amount? In cash? 
JZ: In cash. In cash. 
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L: Who was the notary? 
JZ: Peter Borg 
Crt: Where is his office? 
JZ: Hal-F arrug 
L·· Did Aquilina give you the keys to this garage, initially, before you 
leased it? 
JZ: Before I leased it, it was leased to me. 
Crt: So you bought the garage and it was already rented to you? 
JZ: The garage was rented to me and after a little time, I rented another 
and this one was not being used and this man cropped up for it. 
Crt: The question is: so, when you bought the garage from Aquilina, you 
were already using it. You transferred it to Camilleri and Camilleri 
began to rent it from you 
JZ: Yes it was in my hands and that. 
Crt: When you bought the garage, the keys were in your possession. 
JZ: They were. 
L: When you leased the garage to the defendant Salvu Camilleri, was 
there anybody there before him, before Camilleri took the garage? 
JZ: No, no. 
L: So the first person who entered the garage ..... 
JZ: It was him, he entered ..... 
L: When you leased the garage to Salvu Camilleri, you made a writing, 
right? 
JZ: Yes. 
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Crt: Where did you make this writing? Did you make it at some notary, at 
some lawyer? 
JZ: No, no. On a book, we made it -the rent-book. 
Crt: He will show you a document and you must see if it is that one or one 
like it. 
JZ: I don't know how to read. 
[I have omitted part of Zammit's testimony here for reasons of space. At the 
end of this examination in chief, the lawyer asked Zammit:] 
L: How did trouble arise? What happened? 
JZ: I leased the garage to him; well it was leased with Gejtu. Suddenly, 
one day, I was called to the Bank, I don't know which one, and I was 
told to give the keys to Joseph Tabone. I was left staring. 
Crt: Because you thought the garage was yours; right? 
JZ: Of course. 
The extract above is taken from the examination-in-chief of John Zammit by 
Salvu Camilleri's lawyer. This lawyer has 'produced' Zammit, as he is the 
landlord of Salvu Camilleri, who is faced with a demand for his eviction from 
the garage on the grounds that Zammit's title was not valid. It is therefore in 
the interest of Camilleri's lawyer to show that Zammit's title was at least 
apparently valid. He consequently asks the witness to provide more details 
about the basis of his title, how much he paid for the garage, the name and 
address of the notary involved in the alleged sale and so on. His questioning 
is co-operative not hostile and meant to show that the witness had good 
reasons for believing that he owned the garage. This lawyer does not try to 
highlight contradictions, but to produce a coherent story out of the answers of 
the witness, which meshes with the legal rules it invokes. 
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If one considers Zammit's testimony, however, it seems possible to identify 
an alternative narrative understanding of events which eludes the shaping 
efforts of both lawyer and judge. 37 This alternative version can first be 
glimpsed in his answer to the judge's first question. This was itself aimed at 
clarifying his legally unclear claim that he bought the house but the notary did 
not give him the contract. Consequently the judge asked him if this meant that 
the notary did not give him a copy of the contract or that the contract as such 
was not made. He replied that: "as far as I am concerned it (a contract) was 
made but what he (the notary) did I don't know." 
From a legal perspective a contract either exists or it does not. There is no 
place for a contract which exists only in the eyes of one of the parties. Such a 
contract would have to be considered as legally inexistent. By evoking this 
possibility, Zammit is undermining his previous claim to have bought the 
garage, since one cannot legally buy a garage except through a valid 
contract of sale. Thus his statements are, legally speaking, contradictory. Yet 
from a lay perspective he seems to be narrating how his own good faith was 
abused of by the notary, who presided over what was in effect the sale of the 
property without ensuring that the contract complied with legal formalities. 
After all, Zammit is illiterate and he clearly belongs to a lower social class 
than the highly educated lawyers who are questioning him. How could he 
have known that what he signed was a contract if he could put his mark on it 
but not read it? He had to rely on the notary's word. 38 This would explain why 
he previously referred to the notary's attempts to fob him off whenever he 
asked for the contract. This witness was therefore being as honest as 
possible in court in order to convey his belief that effectively and ethically 
speaking a contract existed even if there were some legal procedures which 
had not been observed. 
r This is my own interpretation of this testimony. which doubtless reflects my legal background . 
. 
1
x I am indebted to Mary Thompson for making me aware of this point. 
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Unfortunately, this sort of story does not easily mesh with legal logic which 
does not recognise the existence of divergent popular notions of the 
significance of contract. 39 Consequently, the judge's next question seeks to 
reformulate Zammit's testimony to fit into the legal categories, in the process 
giving it a different slant: 
Crt: "You went to the Notary and made the contract. You went before him 
and signed. Then you asked him for a copy of the contract and he 
did not give you one?" 
The difference between this question and the previous answer is that it 
completely eliminates the ambiguous legal status of the 'contract' evoked by 
Zammit. Instead of a contract which exists in real terms but lacks some legal 
formality, the judge's question implies that a contract only exists if it is legally 
valid and re-interprets the notary's behaviour as the forgetful or deliberate 
withholding of a copy of the contract from the witness. Faced with this 
authoritative reformulation of the issue, Zammit is effectively pinned down 
and forced to choose between the claim that a contract of sale legally existed 
and the claim that it did not. Not surprisingly, he chooses the former option, 
since this seems to strengthen his claim to own the garage. Yet this was not 
the way he originally described the situation. 
Salvu Camilleri's lawyer continues to question Zammit. At one point, he asks 
the witness whether Gejtu, who supposedly sold him the garage, gave him 
the keys of the garage before he leased it to Camilleri. Zammit's reply serves 
to muddy the waters once more, since he states that before he leased the 
garage to Camilleri, the garage was leased to himself. Legally speaking this 
is another contradictory statement which throws doubt on his previous claims, 
as the status of owner and that of lessee are mutually exclusive. The witness, 
who earlier claimed to have been the owner of the garage is now stating that 
.1'1 Although John Zammit· s lawyer could conceivably have sued Gejtu Aquilina and the notary on the 
grounds that they had fraudulently extorted money from him. this would have to be a separate law-suit 
from the current one which is solclv concerned with establishing the legal basis for the title of the 
defendants and \Yhether Saint Camilleri is protected in his possession of the garage. 
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in the period before he gave it out on lease, he was only the lessee of the 
garage. Again this claim, which is incoherent from a legal perspective, is 
intelligible in terms of the previously identified layman's narrative. In fact, 
Zammit seems to be invoking his earlier uncertainty as to whether a legally 
valid contract of sale had been entered into and suggesting that the situation 
was more similar to a lease. Once more, however, the judge re-formulates the 
question so that it will provoke a reply which does not contradict Zammit's 
earlier testimony or the legal categories. In the process the testimony is again 
given a different slant. The judge asks the witness whether he used to lease 
the garage before he bought it, thus effectively reminding him of his earlier 
claim to have bought the garage and suggesting a new temporal structuring 
of the testimony which reconciles its various parts and makes legal sense. 
However Zammit makes it even more clear that his understanding of events 
resists categorisation by legal logic: 
W: "The garage was rented to me and after a little time, I rented another 
and this one was not being used and this man cropped up for it." 
This answer seems to completely exclude his previous claim to have bought 
the garage. Not surprisingly, the judge repeats his question in another 
attempt to clarify the situation: 
Crt: "The question is: so, when you bought the garage from Aquilina, you 
were already using it. You transferred it to Camilleri and Camilleri 
began to rent it from you 
JZ: Yes it was in my hands and that." 
This time Zammit's answer is more satisfactory, since he seems to accept the 
court's formulation of the issue. However, it is important to observe that he 
still qualifies his acceptance, using the ambivalent expression: "it was in my 
hands." This expression seems to be intentionally chosen so as to evoke his 
previous ambiguous stand as to whether a legally valid contract existed 
without openly challenging the judge's formulation of the issue. 
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The final question put by the judge shows the same attempt to pin the witness 
down to a legally correct version of events which conforms with his earlier 
statement that he had bought the house. Zammit had just described his shock 
on learning that he was expected to evict the garage since Joseph Tabone 
was the real owner. The judge asked whether this sense of shock arose 
because Zammit thought he owned the garage, to which he replied: "yes." 
Thus the judge attempts to resolve the lingering uncertainty about the actual 
existence of a contract of sale which was produced by Zammit himself. 
This extract consequently shows the judge and the lawyer for the defence 
collaborating to transform the narratives produced by this witness into stories 
which more fully engage with the logic of the law. It seems clear that this 
process involves shifting stories towards the paradigmatic pole stressed by 
Ricoe~Ar (1984), away from the 'subjunctivising' discourse Bruner (1986) 
described. It can therefore be considered as the creation of a paradigmatic 
story. In this case, creating such a story is useful for the defence lawyer, 
since the legitimacy of his client's title is under attack and he wishes to stress 
its conformity with the legal rules by showing that the person from whom his 
client derived his title also acted in a legally correct manner. It is also useful 
for the judge, whose position requires that he assume that legal categories 
are applicable to everyday life and therefore intelligible to witnesses. 
However the extract shows that this process is not carried out without the 
resistance of the witness, who seeks to impose his own narrative 
understanding of events and to some extent succeeds in doing so. There is 
therefore a sort of narrative struggle which accompanies the giving of such 
testimony, in which witnesses assert the validity of their subjective 
experiential understanding of events as against the sort of paradigmatic 
narratives the legal system favours. In the case under discussion, while the 
witness was more or less forced to accept the paradigmatic story as 
representing the events he described, he also managed to create a margin of 
doubt as to its adequacy. 
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The subsequent cross-examination of this witness by the lawyer for the 
plaintiff, Joseph Tabone shows how it can also be the aim of lawyers to try to 
demolish the coherence of the a witness's narrative and to detach it from the 
legal rules which provide its paradigmatic underpinnings:40 
Contesting a "Paradigmatic Story": 
L: How often did you go to notary Borg? 
JZ: At the start, I went several times. 
L: How often did you sign the contract? 
JZ: I signed the promise of sale agreement once and I also signed the 
other time when I don't know whether there was a contract: that 
which I thought was a contract. 
L: For how long had the garage been leased to you when you bought it? 
JZ: I can't tell you precisely offhand, but I'd had it for a long time. Maybe 
four years? 
L: What did you do with it (the garage)? 
JZ: Pasta 
L: Did you have some company producing pasta? 
JZ: No, I work with pasta. 
Crt: Did you produce pasta or did you store pasta there? 
JZ: I used to store pasta. 
-
1
" In this extract. ·L· refers to the Iawver who represented Joseph Tabone. 'JZ" is John Zammit. who 
was called as a witness by Saln1 Ca1~milleri and ·crt· is the judge hearing this case. who also put 
questions to this witness_ 
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L: For how long was the garage in your possession before you bought 
it? 
JZ: Some four years maybe? Three years perhaps? I can't tell you 
precisely how long. 
Crt: But even before you made the promise of sale agreement, it was 
already in your hands? 
JZ: The garage was in my hands. 
L: For how long (a time) before you bought the garage had you stopped 
storing pasta in it? 
JZ: How long? Six months maybe? 
L: Some six months before you bought the garage you stopped using it 
for your business. 
JZ: No, before I passed it on to this man (the lessee). 
L: So when did you buy the garage? 
JZ: I bought it previously. 
L: Were you still using it for storage? 
JZ: Certainly. Of course! 
Crt: So you did not give the garage to this man (on lease) as soon as you 
bought it. Did you pass it on to him when you bought it? 
JZ: No, because it was leased to me. Then I told him: 'sell it to me' and 
he sold it to me. 
Crt: The question is whether you passed it on to Camilleri immediately on 
buying it (the garage). You did not pass it on immediately. 
JZ: No, no. 
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Crt: You were still using it. ..... 
JZ: Using it. 
L: For how long did you continue to use it? A few months? 
JZ: His reply was not registered on the tape. 
This extract shows a lawyer resorting to hostile cross-examination of a 
witness in an attempt to destroy his credibility. Although the court transcript 
does not capture this, lawyers generally adopt an aggressive tone of voice 
and try to intimidate witnesses when they conduct these cross-examinations. 
They pile questions on top of one another, often appearing to disdain the 
answers and conveying the impression that it is only a matter of time before 
the lies of the witness become obvious to all, as they have been to the lawyer 
from the start. In this case Tabone's lawyer has good reasons for wanting to 
undermine Zammit's credibility, since otherwise his own client's entitlement to 
the garage would appear questionable. Consequently his questions differ 
from those put by the defendant's lawyer, since rather than creating a 
paradigmatic story, they aim both to destroy the internal unity of Zammit's 
narrative and to detach it from the paradigmatic legal framework. Instead, the 
plaintiffs lawyer implies that Zammit's story only reflects an idiosyncratic 
understanding of the situation which can have no legal consequences. 
Such an attitude is apparent from the first two questions put by the plaintiff's 
lawyer. The first seems to confirm this witness's story, by asking him how 
many times he went to see the notary. This fits well with Zammit's initial claim 
that despite his efforts the notary had always eluded him and had not given 
him the contract of sale. Having lulled the witness into a false sense of 
security and predisposed him to answer positively, the lawyer then asks his 
second question: "how often did you sign the contract?," which is apparently 
a simple continuation of his previous one. In reality, however, it is a clever 
attempt to catch the witness in a legal and personal contradiction. In fact, a 
contract can legally be signed only once. However Zammit's preceding 
testimony suggested that he might not understand legal logic very well and 
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that he more vividly and bitterly recalled his repeated visits to the notary, than 
whether a contract had, legally speaking, been signed. There was a good 
possibility that he would also misunderstand this question and give the legally 
absurd reply that he had signed the contract 'many times'. Obviously this 
statement would continue to cast doubt on his claim to have bought the 
garage. It would do so precisely by turning the story into a personal tale of 
misfortune which does not have any valid legal grounding. The lawyer is 
therefore attempting to shift the witness's narrative away from the 
paradigmatic and towards the subjunctive pole of the spectrum of narrative 
possibilities. To do so he is exploiting the earlier identified gap between the 
paradigmatic story produced by the lawyer and his subjective experience. But 
this time the witness comes up with a reply which cannot be faulted legally, 
claiming to have signed the promise of sale agreement and the document 
which he believed to have been the contract of sale. 
The lawyer then changes tack and starts to ask a number of questions which 
are meant to extract more details from Zammit about his possession of the 
garage. While these questions are superficially similar to those of Camilleri's 
lawyer, there is a fundamental difference in orientation. In fact Camilleri's 
lawyer tries to extract details fitting into a paradigmatic story which makes 
Zammit's title to the garage seem more solidly founded. Tabone's lawyer, by 
contrast, tries to extract more and more details from the witness in the hope 
that the latter will contradict himself at some point and destroy the coherence 
of his story and his own credibility. This hostile orientation is manifested in 
various ways. For instance, Tabone's lawyer asks many questions about the 
temporal sequence of events at different stages of this testimony. He asks 
how long the garage had been leased to Zammit before he bought it, how 
long before he bought the garage did he stop storing pasta in it, when he 
bought the garage and for how long he continued to use it to store pasta after 
buying the garage. Clearly the intention behind the lawyer's request for all 
these details is his hope that some of these time periods will contradict one 
another and undermine Zammit's credibility. For the same reason, the lawyer 
repeats his question regarding the length of time for which Zammit had 
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leased the garage before buying it. The witness had given a very uncertain 
reply to this question the first time it was asked, saying that it could have 
been three or four years. By repeating the question the lawyer highlights and 
emphasises Zammit's uncertainty. When the witness again replies that it 
could have been three or four years, he seems incompetent at best and 
evasive at worst. Finally, the hostile orientation of the lawyer is clearly 
revealed by the way he frames the following question: 
L: "For how long (a time) before you bought the garage had you 
stopped storing pasta in it?" 
At first sight, this question seems bizarre since there is no reason why the 
lawyer should assume that Zammit stopped using the garage before buying it. 
Yet this question is intended as a trap, which the witness uncovers by 
promptly falling into. In fact, when the witness replies: "six months maybe," 
Tabone's lawyer seizes the opportunity to re-state this reply in a way which 
makes the witness's behaviour appear absurd: 
L: "Some six months before you bought the garage you stopped using it 
for your business?" 
This re-statement of the reply which the lawyer provoked by his question 
makes the reader wonder what incentive the witness had to buy the garage in 
the first place if he was no longer using it for his work in the period before the 
sale. In this way, even more suspicion is thrown on Zammit's claim to have 
bought the garage and the credibility of his story as a whole becomes 
strained. This seems to have been precisely the motivation behind this 
question. This purpose was achieved by framing the question in such a way 
that Zammit understood it to refer to the time period before he leased the 
garage to Camilleri, rather than the period before he bought the garage. 
This sample of testimony is a good illustration of the way in which the cross-
examination of witnesses is often carried out. Particularly noticeable is the 
ability shown by this cross-examining lawyer to frame his questions in ways 
which evoke alternative narrative understandings of events, breaking up the 
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coherent unity of the paradigmatic narrative created by Camilleri's lawyer 
Various strategies are used to achieve this, which range from exploiting 
actual areas of divergence between subjective experience and paradigmatic 
stories to the active creation of such discrepancies by asking questions which 
provoke them. In this way the story is detached from its anchorage in the 
paradigmatic legal framework by stressing its subjective and legally 
contradictory features. 41 
These processes can also be seen at work in the examination of the other 
witnesses questioned in the same court sitting in this case. These were all 
brought by Salvu Camilleri's lawyer.42 Their summoning and examination-in-
chief reflected his objective to create a solid framework of interlocking 
paradigmatic narratives bolstering his client's title to the garage. Thus the 
next witness produced was a certain Frank Azzopardi, who said he had lent a 
sum of money to Zammit to allow him to buy the garage. He was followed by 
Gejtu Aquilina, the putative seller of the garage, who testified that he had in 
fact sold the garage to Zammit. Finally the lawyer brought Camilleri himself to 
testify. The latter supplied important details about the duration of his lease of 
the garage from Zammit, the amount of his rent and so on. In examining all 
these witnesses, Camilleri's lawyer kept trying to create interlocking 
paradigmatic stories, notably by showing them documents and asking them to 
confirm their validity. Consequently, the stories told were shown to be 
grounded in legally valid documents. Moral feelings were also evoked in 
support of these stories. Thus his lawyer asked Salvu Camilleri the duration 
for which he had rented the garage before becoming aware that he was liable 
to be evicted by the real owner. When the latter replied: "four years," the 
lawyer exclaimed in a shocked tone: "you had it for four whole years before 
this business cropped up!" 
11 One should however note that this strategy did not wholly succeed to debunk Zammit"s testimony. 
1
:: Since the case is still going on at the time of writing. it is not possible to state the outcome of the 
case or e\·en to list all the witnesses who testified. 
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Conversely, Tabone's lawyer continued to use both fair means and foul to 
fragment the unity of these inter-locking narratives. For this reason he 
confronted Gejtu Aquilina with the fact that he had mortgaged the garage 
which he previously claimed to have 'sold' to Zammit. Gejtu said he knew 
nothing about this and suggested that his notary had mortgaged the garage 
without telling him. When cross-examining Frank Azzopardi, who claimed he 
gave Zammit a loan to buy the garage, Tabone's lawyer alternately 
suggested that Zammit had said the amount lent was different, that Zammit 
could not have signed the loan agreement because he was illiterate and that 
Zammit and Azzopardi were colluding to mislead the court. Many of these 
allegations were based on previous testimony which had been slightly 
altered, or 'twisted', by the cross-examining lawyer. For instance he recalled 
Zammit's statement that he did not know how to read in order to confront 
Azzopardi with it. But he neglected to mention Zammit's previous admission 
that he knew how to sign. 43 Such tactics were repeatedly used by this lawyer. 
u These questions illustrate another feature of witnessing, which is the crystallising of certain 
narrative themes. the validity of which is tested by questioning various witnesses about them. These 
themes sen·e to test the credibilitY of the narratives to which thev refer. In this case. the nature of John 
Zammit" s illiteracv was definitcl~· one of these themes. on whicl; questions were put to two of the later 
witnesses. Clearly: if Zammit co~tld be shown to have been lying about this issue, then his whole story 
would become highly suspect. 
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5. Courtroom Story-telling 
The case of the 'Rented Garage' provides food for further reflection on the 
nature of testimony and the role stories play in the process. The previous 
analysis illustrates the differences between the oral delivery of stories in 
court and their presentation via such written accounts as are contained in 
'affidavits' or 'declarations of the facts'. The stories told in court are much 
more opaque and unclear than written narratives. After all, had John Zammit 
really bought the garage or not? Both the judge and the opposing lawyers 
kept trying to define what his story really was. Moreover oral stories change 
or reveal unexpected dimensions under the impact of court questioning. 
Thus, while being questioned, Zammit shifted from his initial claim to have 
bought the garage to saying that he had leased it. This places into relief the 
time-consuming and laborious character of court story-telling. In the process 
opposing lawyers must employ their narrative skills; orchestrating the 
production of evidence to conform to the accounts they respectively present 
in court and also changing the stories they tell on their clients' behalf in 
response to changes in the testimony given. 44 
Lawyers' narrative skills can be investigated by taking a deeper look at the 
different questioning strategies adopted by opposing lawyers in this case. 
The strategy of the defendant's lawyer has been shown to rest on the 
creation of a monolithic paradigmatic story which links together all the stories 
produced by the different witnesses and affirms their continuity with the legal 
framework. Such a story denies the existence of any contradictions between 
these narratives, or between the subjective experience of witnesses and the 
legal framework. For this reason, the lawyer resorts to a type of questioning 
which reflects the sort of 'learned ignorance' which Bourdieu (1997) saw as 
inherent in any theorist's attempt to reach an objective understanding of 
1
.
1 Thus Zammit" s Imwcr shifted from claiming that his client owned the garage to saying that it was 
·in his hands·. 
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social life which does not reflexively analyse the theorist's own relationship to 
his object. 45 He writes in regard to how anthropologists question informants: 
"There is every reason to think that as soon as he reflects on his 
practice, adopting a quasi-theoretical posture, the agent loses any 
chance of expressing the truth of his practice, and especially the 
truth of the practical relation to the practice. Academic 
interrogation inclines him to take up a point of view on his own 
practice that is no longer that of action, without being that of 
science, encouraging him to shape his explanation in terms of a 
theory of practice that meshes with the juridical, ethical or 
grammatical/ega/ism to which the observer is inclined by his own 
situation" (Bourdieu 1997: 91 ). 46 
Thus it seems that the questions asked by Camilleri's lawyer and the judge 
reflect their relationship to the case, which is that of educated people who 
have had a legal training and are more concerned with the legal rules 
involved than with the subjective experience of witnesses. One could say, 
following Oleson (1994}, that lawyers 'introspect' the legal rules into recalled 
testimony in the same way that literacy induces speakers of a language to 
model their own speaking on the grammatical rules which structure the 
written language. Clearly such questioning also reflects class differences 
when these result in different conceptions of what constitutes a good story. 
(Bennett & Feldman 1981 ). In the process witnesses are encouraged to 
remember their experience in terms of paradigmatic stories meshing with the 
legal rules and to forget those aspects of their practical experience which 
cannot be easily accommodated within this framework. Examining lawyers 
actively produce complete paradigmatic stories by assuming that they already 
exist and therefore by denying their creative role in this productive process. 47 
15 He argues that the kinship charts and statistical tables produced by anthropologists reflect their 
detached position as leisurely obser•ers more than the practical experience of their informants. 
·to There is a striking parallel here between lawyers and anthropologists and between the questioning 
of infonnants and that of witnesses. Bourdieu ( 1997) argues that anthropologists actually produce 
mles out of experience whenever they ask informants what they do in particular circumstances and 
then generalise this experience by writing: ·members of X culture do so and so in this situation·. 
r Lawyers· attitude to witnesses reflects their training. Reference is made to the discussion in chapter 
four of the way law-students write essays and are questioned during oral examinations. 
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Such questioning provokes the resistance of the questioned, who try to assert 
their subjective view of events, seeking the words with which to fulfil their 
promise to tell the whole truth. Simultaneously, however, the creation of inter-
locking paradigmatic stories also affirms the coherence of the experience of 
witnesses and socially validates it by creating continuity with the narratives of 
other witnesses and with the legal framework. 
This continuity is precisely what the cross-examining lawyer seeks to attack. 
He does so by resorting to 'subjunctivising' language to fragment the unity of 
these paradigmatic narratives; suggesting they are internally contradictory 
and that different stories could be told. This exerts a symbolic violence on 
witnesses which runs in the opposite direction to that exercised by the 
examining lawyer. This is because of the close relationship between the 
stories through which people remember their past and their sense of self-
identity (Freeman 1995). This relationship illuminates the internal dynamics 
of cross-examination, where the lawyer's aim in debunking a particular piece 
of testimony is to undermine the entire narrative framework with which it is 
inextricably tied up (Bennett & Feldman 1981) in order to attack the self of the 
witness. Witnesses are made to feel their whole social personality is at stake 
and react to this type of questioning by seeking to tell a coherent story which 
reflects the coherence of their memories and ultimately that of their lives. 
Court questioning therefore reflects the assumption that the best way to 
invoke legal norms in one's favour is through the production of a coherent 
paradigmatic story, which withstands the attempts of opposing lawyers to 
destroy and fragment it48 by evoking alternative subjunctive narratives. On 
this basis, it is possible to cast a fresh look at Jackson's (1991, 1994) analysis 
of witnessing, summarised in the second chapter. This takes off from a 
·lM For an anthropological critique of similar tactics in a US court, see Feldman· s (1994) discussion of 
the Rodney King trial in Los Angeles. In this trial the prosecution relied on video footage of the police 
beating King to argue that they had used undue violence on him. The defence inserted a 'voice-over' 
explaining that King had been disobedient and was trying to retaliate and freeze-fmming the video at 
,·arious points so as to illustrate this. Thus the coherent narrative provided by the prosecution's video 
was literally fragmented. through freeze-framing it. 
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critique of the views of Bennett and Feldman (1981 ), who claimed the 
significance of such 'court-room drama' as the performative ability of lawyers 
is given by its role in the over-arching story of the case, constructed during 
the delivery of testimony. Instead Jackson argues: 
"We have in the trial not simply a single story, but a set of stories. 
The act of testifying of each individual witness is a story in itself, 
but other polemics are also going on concurrently, albeit 
manifested in different (and less immediately perceptible) ways. 
There is the story of the jurors, to perform the task of adjudication 
in a manner conformable to narrative images of their 'official role'. 
There is the combat of the parties to the dispute, manifest very 
often by their location in spatially opposed places in the courtroom. 
There is also a variety of forms of professional combat, often using 
procedural tactics, between the advocates and between the judge 
and the advocates .... We have then a plurality of narrative 
discourses at work in the trial" (Jackson 1991: 85). 
The case of the 'Rented Garage' shows that there were indeed multiple 
stories at work in the case. Apart from the stories identified by Jackson, one 
could also add the story produced by the examining lawyer on behalf of his 
witness, the story the witness himself tried to tell and the stories evoked by 
the cross-examining lawyer. Yet these stories did not function as separate 
discourses which exist side by side in detached self-contained compartments. 
On the contrary court-room story-telling was an inherently dialogical activity 
(Bakhtin 1994), where the aim of each participant telling a story was to have 
an impact on the stories told by the others. Thus the aim of the plaintiff's 
lawyer in evoking alternative narrative scenarios was to destroy the unity of 
the inter-locking paradigmatic stories produced by the defendant's lawyer. 
Similarly the judge was clearly uncomfortable when John Zammit's answers 
suggested that he had a different story to tell from the paradigmatic one 
which had been produced on his behalf. He kept trying to iron out these 
discrepancies. The same point could be made in relation to the way lawyers 
and witnesses 'performed' in court. Their gestures, oratory and inter-personal 
relationships both contributed to and were generated by the stories they were 
telling. 49 
1
'' My efforts. as a participant obscrYcr. to understand the dynamics of litigation generally foundered if 
I did not know these stories. On manv occasions I obsen·cd opposed lawyers litigating several 
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Jackson's insistence on the plurality of the stories at work in litigation is oddly 
similar to the stance of a cross-examining lawyer, who evokes alternative 
narrative scenarios in order to prevent the paradigmatic narratives produced 
by the other side from coalescing into a unitary whole. It misses an important 
point about court story-telling; which is how different stories are pitted against 
one another so that a paradigmatic story which is successfully contradicted 
by a cross-examining lawyer cannot serve as a basis from which to invoke 
legal protection. The judicial process operates to produce a single official 
narrative of what 'the facts' are and it is on this basis that the judgement of 
the case is made. Alternative narrative accounts cannot be officially 
recognised and are not allowed to figure in the final statement of the facts 
made by the judge. The reasons for this will be explained in the next chapter, 
by exploring the outcome of one case where a coherent story survived this 
process and was not contradicted by the cross-examining lawyer. 
successi\'e cases before the same judge. As one case ended and the other began there was often a 
dramatic change in the atmosphere of the court and the relationships between the lawyers. The effect 
was similar to watching a series of different films after each other. These shifts derived from the 
differences between the stories told in each case. which detennined whether lawyers would shout 
angrily at one another or smile tolerantly. 
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Chapter 8: The Judicia~~ Consumption of Stories 
1. Introduction 
Having examined the ways in which stories are produced and contested 
during litigation, this chapter will now explore their 'consumption' by judges 
when they determine the legal relevance and credibility of the 'facts' on which 
their judgements are based. My field research will be drawn upon to address 
various issues which are often uncritically lumped together under the general 
label of adjudication. Particular attention will be paid to how judges describe 
the facts in issue so as to legitimate their judgements, as also to the manner 
in which they interpret the legal rules involved. 
Focusing on two cases will demonstrate how Maltese judges complete the 
process of producing a single official narrative of the facts in issue which 
begins when testimony is orally contested. This is achieved partly through the 
invocation and attempted recovery of pre-existing narrative linkages between 
the experiences of the opposed parties, which the latter deny and play down 
when producing their divergent stories. It is also done by debunking stories 
which contradict the accounts of the facts contained in final judgements. In 
this way, judges attempt to create a sense that ju$tice is being done while 
affirming the validity of the pre-existing legal framework. Yet when coherent 
stories survive these processes, they can normatively condense critical 
cultural beliefs so as to challenge existing interpretations of legal rules, 
spurring judges to re-interpret them. This explains why judges try to reduce 
the conflicting stories told in the case to one official version. Thus this 
analysis will expose the differing practical involvement of lawyers and judges 
with litigants' stories; providing the tools for the analysis of ongoing tensions 
within the Maltese legal system which will be conducted in the next chapter. 
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2. The Case of the '!Pain in the Neck' 
I had a close practical involvement with this case, since it was one for which 1 
had been appointed as a legal referee. 1 My job was that of gathering all the 
relevant evidence and on this basis compiling a report giving my opinion on 
the factual and legal issues involved and how they should be decided. Such a 
report is then presented to the judge who commissioned it and, if he agrees 
with its conclusions, it will form the basis for his judgement. Court sittings in 
these cases are held before the referee, who himself collects the evidence 
and transcribes the testimony given. Since this particular case related to a 
personal injury, the court had also appointed a medical doctor to act as a 
court expert and draft a report of the plaintiffs medical condition. In this 
context it is clear that my relationship to the evidence was a quasi-judicial 
one. A reflexive analysis of the way I assessed this evidence may therefore 
throw light on more general trends in the judicial consumption of stories. 
The key legal issues in this case were quite clear-cut. The two parties had 
been involved in a traffic collision and the plaintiff was alleging that the 
defendant was responsible for the accident since she had driven negligently 
and without observing traffic regulations. If this claim was correct, then 
according to Maltese law, the defendant would be liable to recompense the 
plaintiff for any permanent disability he suffered as a result of the collision. 
The plaintiff was claiming that the crash had provoked a permanent whiplash 
injury to his neck and he should therefore be adequately compensated for 
the permanent loss of 15% of normal bodily functioning that he had suffered. 
The defendant, for her part, rejected all the plaintiffs claims, saying that she 
had not driven negligently and that the plaintiff had not suffered any 
permanent disability. 
If the legal issues were clear -cut, the same can certainly not be said for the 
factual aspect of this case, which was characterised by the almost complete 
1 Sec chapter three for a description of how I was appointed a legal referee. 
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divergence between the stories told by the opposing parties. This is revealed 
by the written affidavits they filed. Thus the plaintiff's affidavit starts by 
outlining the spatial positions of the vehicles involved. He stated that: 
"At the time of the accident, my car was in a stationary position 
behind another car, which had stopped so as to let some people 
cross a zebra-crossing. There was no other car behind me when ~ 
stopped. After I had been stationary for about a minute, I glanced 
at the mirror and saw the defendant's car round a curve of the road 
behind me. She was heading in my direction and I could see from 
the mirror that she was pointing at some boats in a nearby bay as 
she was driving and looking towards this bay rather than at the 
road in front of her. Then I saw the defendant turn towards her left 
while the car was still moving forward and look backwards towards 
her daughter, who was in the back-seat of the car. Suddenly I felt 
that my car had been jolted As a result, my body moved forward 
towards the steering wheel, while my head moved backwards. My 
head did not find the headrest and I felt my neck being tugged. 
Due to the impetus from the bump, my car crashed into the 
stationary one in front of me. With this second crash, my neck was 
jolted towards the front of the car, I felt it being stretched and I lost 
consciousness for a while." 
The affidavit continues by describing the aftermath of the incident. The 
plaintiff said that when he regained consciousness, he got out of the car and 
approached the defendant. The latter was depicted as slightly worried that 
some damage might have been done to her car and quite unconcerned about 
any possible damage to the plaintiff's. He recounts how he had to persuade 
her to remain at the site of the incident until the police came2 and how his 
parents then turned up and took him to hospital. Finally his affidavit 
terminates in a long list of his repeated visits to the hospital and various 
clinics, the medication he was subject to at different stages, the opinions of 
various doctors he consulted on the degree of his permanent disability, the 
negative consequences on his ability to work and graphic descriptions of the 
neck pain he suffered and continues to suffer as a result of the accident. 
~ According to Maltese law. the police used to be called in to prepare a road accident report whenever 
there was a car collision. This has recently been abolished. 
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The contrast with the defendant's affidavit is apparent from the start. like the 
plaintiff's, it starts with a description of the spatial co-ordinates concerned: 
"We were in a traffic jam, one car after another. I completely deny 
what the plaintiff said: that I was pointing with my finger in the 
direction of the boats in the bay and that I was looking at the 
boats. My attention was on the road and the stop start conditions. 
My velocity was practically nil and I was driving on the first gear. 
The incident occurred when the plaintiff stopped abruptly because 
there were some people crossing on the zebra-crossing. My car 
bumped lightly into his and the impact was minimal. In fact, it was 
so minimal that we did not even notice it. I deny that the plaintiff 
lost consciousness, because immediately after the incident, he 
came out of his car and I, since we had not realised that we had 
touched him, asked him: 'what happened?' He replied: 'don't you 
know that you bumped into me?' Then I came out of my car and 
realised that the two cars were touching one another. I saw no 
damage." 
The defendant's affidavit terminates by pointing out that she saw nothing 
unusual or abnormal in the plaintiff's behaviour after the incident and that he 
did not seem to be in any pain. 
The stories of the two parties were therefore opposed term by term, to the 
extent that a traffic jam in the defendant's version became an empty road in 
the plaintiff's! When producing their evidence before me, both sides sought to 
strengthen their respective versions, in the way described in the previous 
chapter. The plaintiff brought two witnesses. These were the woman who in 
his version of events had been driving the stationary car in front of him and 
the police officer who had drafted the relevant road accident report. 3 The 
driver of the foremost car testified that as a result of the defendant's collision 
with the plaintiff, the plaintiff's car had crashed into hers and moved it forward 
from its immobile position. The plaintiff also produced various medical 
certificates issued by different doctors who had examined him, all claiming 
that he had suffered a permanent disability in the region of 15% of normal. By 
contrast, the defendant produced one witness, who was a representative of 
3 An official description of the nature and causes of a traffic accident, generally accompanied by a 
plan reconstructing the events in question. 
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her insurance company. 4 The latter testified that on being informed of the 
claim his company had contacted the plaintiff and requested that he visit the 
company doctor to establish the extent of his injuries. The comany doctor had 
indicated that the plaintiff might be maximising his problem, since he saw him 
emerge from his car without any difficulty before he entered his office. 
However, he had also opined that there was probably a permanent disability 
of not more than 5% of normal. On the basis of this opinion, the insurance 
company had offered the equivalent of 4000 pounds sterling compensation to 
the plaintiff in settlement. The latter had refused this offer, resorting to legal 
action instead. 
Despite these discrepancies, which even extended to the supposedly 
objective medical issue of the extent of the plaintiff's injury, the cross-
examinations carried out by the opposing lawyers served to bridge some of 
the gaps between the parties' respective stories. When the plaintiffs lawyer 
cross-examined the defendant, she replied that she did not know where the 
traffic jam she mentioned had started, nor whether the impact of the collision 
moved the plaintiffs car forward. She claimed not to remember anything 
which she had not mentioned in her affidavit as the incident was such a minor 
one that she had not given it any importance. The cross examination showed 
that the plaintiff's story that the jolt had been powerful enough to push his car 
into the one in front of him was not really contradicted by the defendant and 
also created doubt whether, as she said, they had really been in a traffic jam. 
When the driver of the foremost car was cross-examined by the defendant's 
lawyer, she admitted that the bump she felt when the plaintiffs car crashed 
into hers had not been a big one and that she did not know whether her car 
had really been pushed forward as a consequence. This strengthened the 
defendant's story that the collision had been a minor one. Finally when the 
plaintiff was cross-examined by the defendant's lawyer, he reduced what he 
had previously described as a time period of a minute in which his car was 
1 All Maltese car drivers arc legally required to take out a third party insurance policy covering any 
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standing in a stationary position until the defendant's car bumped into his. He 
now said that he had only been waiting for around forty seconds. This 
brought his story closer to the defendant's, since it implied that there had not 
been such a great distance between their cars. He also admitted that he 
occasionally danced when he went out with his friends, which implied that his 
injury was not quite as grave as he had previously made out. 
Although these cross-examinations had brought about a degree of narrative 
convergence between the two stories told by the parties, my initial reaction 
on approaching the task of writing my report was a mild feeling of panic. It 
seemed that either of these stories could be true and also that they were 
mutually exclusive. My training as an anthropologist strongly predisposed me 
to take a relativistic stance on the matter and accept that both parties to the 
case lived in their own subjective universes of meaning The situation seemed 
even more muddled after the court appointed medical expert issued his 
report, as he said that the plaintiff had suffered no permanent disability at all 
as a result of the incident. This opinion went even further than that of the 
doctor appointed by the defendant's insurance company, since the latter had 
assessed the permanent disability at 5%. If even the medical doctors could 
not agree on a medical fact, then how could I legitimately take a decision 
vindicating the story of one of these parties and denouncing that of the other? 
In an attempt to escape from this quandary, I obtained and read copies of 
other reports and judgements. I also delved into the legal rules, trying to 
discover principles to orient the assessment of the facts. The reports and 
judgements served to introduce me to the characteristic attitudes of 
adjudicators when faced with conflicting stories. As a rule they try to create a 
single coherent narrative by ironing out discrepancies between the stories or 
by debunking either or both of the narratives produced by the parties. Once 
such a narrative has been created, it then becomes much easier to apply the 
rules to it so as to opine on the legal position. If contradictory stories are 
damage they might cause to third party"s by their driving. 
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allowed to co-exist then clearly the legitimacy of the judgement would be 
called into question. 
This point can be illustrated by reference to one of the reports I consulted. 
This concerned a law-suit for personal separation, in which the husband was 
claiming that his wife had committed adultery, while his wife had filed a 
counter-claim denying this and alleging that her husband used to beat her up. 
One should note that such emotive issues are often raised in Maltese 
marriage breakdown cases. This is partly a result of the influence of Catholic 
canon law on local legislation, which stresses the ongoing relationship 
between separated spouses and tries to financially penalise immoral 
behaviour. 5 These legal principles are the antithesis of the 'no-fault divorce' 
found in many Euro-American states. They create financial incentives for a 
spouse to prove the immoral behaviour of his or her partner, while also 
requiring high levels of proof. The consequent increase in the volume of court 
story-telling is aggravated by local cultural traits deriving from the highly 
personalised texture of Maltese social life, in which individuals are linked 
together in multiple ways through long-term obligations. In this context, 
conflict often takes the shape of an ongoing competitive feud known as a 
state of 'pika', in which one must show an awareness of and ability to react to 
the smallest actions of opponents (Boissevain 1965). 
In the case to which this report referred, these factors had operated so as to 
multiply the number of witnesses, the length of the stories that were told and 
the applications the respective spouses made to the judge requesting 
changes in the provisional orders he had made. In fact this case took eight 
and a half years to be decided and the record of the case was around two 
hundred pages long! The husband had powerful incentives to prove that his 
wife had committed adultery, because he could not then be obliged to pay for 
her maintenance. He therefore recounted a long and complicated story about 
' There is. for instance. a statutory linkage between a spouse·s ·guilt' or responsibility for the 
breakdown and a diminution in the share of the matrimonial property which that spouse would 
otherwise be awarded when the court divides joint assets. 
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his wife's seduction and subsequent un-wifely behaviour, which he claimed 
included attempts to poison him! He produced five witnesses to support his 
version. These included his father and sister who had both on separate 
occasions seen the wife in the company of her 'paramour' and attempted 
unsuccessfully to ask bystanders to testify about this in court.6 !For her part, 
the wife narrated a moving story of the brutality of her husband, whose 
beatings had even induced her to go to hospital for stitches. She brought her 
son to testify about the brutality he had witnessed and also produced a friend 
who had seen her husband in the presence of his new lover. 
In his report, the legal referee noted that a special characteristic of this case 
was that there had been no cross-examination of the testimony given, which 
he described as: 
"A series of monologues. It seems that every party had his or her 
say; one party stating its point of view without replying to the 
other." 
He next noted that with the exception of one neighbour, 7 none of the 
witnesses summoned was detached from the case, since they were all 
relatives or close friends of the parties. For this reason one had to be careful 
in evaluating their testimony. 
These two consecutive observations illustrate the difficulties faced by the 
legal referee as a result of the opposed stories of the parties and his attempts 
to resolve them by adopting a certain analytical distance from the stories 
which the parties were trying to get him to consume. This enabled him to 
create his own narrative version of the facts, which effectively incorporated 
elements of the stories told by both the spouses, while refusing to endorse 
those elements which conflicted with his version. Thus the report endorsed 
the wife's claim that her husband used to beat her up, yet it did not fully 
6 The father recounted how he had followed the defendant together with his son as she went for a 
secret meeting with her lover. They had then asked a bye-stander to testify that he had seen the 
couple. however the latter refused to get involved in the case. 
; She claimed to hm·e seen the wife· s lover enter her house in the absence of her husband. 
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endorse the husband's story about her infidelity. The legal referee suggested 
that the husband had tacitly encouraged his wife to be unfaithful, since he 
had not testified that he had ever confronted her alleged lover and told him to 
stay away from his wife. He also argued that the wife had committed adultery 
only after she had been forced to leave her home due to his beatings. Thus, 
the legal referee wove his own version of events by maintaining his distance 
from and creatively re-interpreting the testimony given by the two parties. in 
drafting his report, he operated on the assumption that there was only one 
story to be told about this case. 
After reading these reports and judgements, I decided to adopt a similar 
attitude when writing my report about the case of the 'pain in the neck'. At the 
time the creation of a unitary narrative appeared as a necessary legitimation 
'after the fact' of a decision which would have to be made on other grounds. 
So as to reach this decision, I carried out some research on the applicable 
legal rules. These strongly implied that the defendant would have to be 
considered responsible for the incident even if her car was locked in a traffic 
jam just behind the plaintiff's and he had stopped abruptly.8 These rules also 
made it apparent that if the plaintiff's disability was a direct consequence of 
the defendant's negligence, then she or her insurance company would have 
to compensate him in full for any resulting permanent disability. This was, 
after all, what her insurance company had already tried to do, when it offered 
the plaintiff a sum of money in compensation. In this context the defendant's 
responsibility to compensate the damage seemed clear. This left only one 
legal issue to be decided, which was that of whose medical opinion was to 
determine the existence of any permanent disability. However other lawyers 
informed me that the opinion of the court appointed medical expert is usually 
followed in such cases. 
x A local ne\\'spaper had just carried a case report in which the court had invoked a section of the 
Maltese Highway Code prohibiting a vehicle from driving too close to the one in front of it, without 
leaving enough space to pull up in case of an emergency. This meant that the defendant was still 
responsible for the collision even if the two cars were in a traffic jam, as she should not have driven so 
closely behind the plaintiffs car. 
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On coming to write my report, I consequently knew that this had to lead to the 
two principal conclusions that the defendant was responsible for the accident, 
but that since no permanent disability had been caused she did not have to 
compensate the plaintiff for this. It also seemed that the creation of a unitary 
narrative out of the conflicting stories of the two parties must serve to 
legitimate my recommendations. In order to achieve these aims, i set about 
writing my report in the following ways: 
1) The opening paragraph of such reports must contain a brief description of 
the traffic accident which gave rise to the case. At this stage, I avoided any 
reference to the stories of the two parties and simply recounted the date and 
time of the accident and that this had taken the form of a collision when the 
defendant's car had bumped into the back of the plaintiff's stationary car. My 
aim was to extract an uncontested kernel of 'facts' with which to legitimately 
open my narrative. 
2) It is standard practice for such reports to include a section reproducing the 
relevant testimony given, followed by one which contains the legal referee's 
conclusions on the responsibility of the defendant and a final section with his 
assessment and liquidation of damages. When reproducing the testimony, I 
was careful to quote all the answers to cross-examinations, which had served 
to create a certain narrative convergence. 
3) I embedded my opinion on the defendant's legal responsibility within a 
wider narrative framework stressing her moral responsibility. This meant 
pointing out that the collision had not been as insignificant as she had tried to 
say. It had been powerful enough to move the plaintiff's car from a stationary 
position until it bumped into the one in front of it and the defendant had not 
denied this. I then argued that the lacunas in the defendant's memory which 
had emerged under cross examination9 actually confirmed the plaintiff's claim 
that she had not been paying enough attention to her driving at the time. 
'J Such as her claim not to recall whether the collision had pushed the plaintiff's car forward. 
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These rhetorical techniques were intended to ensure a favourable reception 
for my conclusion that even if the defendant's story was correct, this did not 
legally eliminate her responsibility for any permanent disability caused by the 
accident. They brought the defendant's story closer to that of the plaintiff, by 
making the collision more significant and her driving less attentive. 
4) An assessment of the plaintiffs story followed. This argued that if the 
defendant had tried to minimise the accident, the plaintiff had exaggerated by 
trying to magnify it. In order to create this argument, I drew upon my 
experiential knowledge as a Maltese of the area in which the accident 
occurred. This was quite detailed since as a kid my parents used to take me 
to Sunday Mass in a church facing the stretch of road in question.10 
Consequently I knew that if the plaintiff had parked in the position he 
described, then there were less than hundred metres of road space which he 
could have viewed through his rear-view mirror. After this the road curves 
sharply to the right and is no longer visible. Yet the plaintiff had given a 
detailed description of the actions of the defendant before she crashed into 
him. He claimed to have seen her point out of her car window and 
subsequently turn to the back of the car to look at her daughter. I therefore 
argued that the plaintiff's claim to have observed the defendant perform these 
consecutive actions in the short stretch of road in question was only credible 
if one adopted one of these two hypothesis: 
a) Either the defendant was driving relatively slowly and therefore 
the collision (and the jolt suffered by the defendant) was not a 
large one. 
b) Or the plaintiff was lying when he claimed that for around forty 
seconds after he stopped he saw no car behind him and the 
defendant was correct when she claimed that the two cars had 
been locked in a traffic jam. 
This created a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was moving at 
a fast speed and consequently whether the plaintiff had suffered such a 
10 Such ·local knowledge· is a common feature of Maltese litigation given the small size of the 
archipelago. 
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severe jolt as appeared from his affidavit. Although this part of the report 
concluded that the defendant was in any case responsible for the accident, 
my treatment of his evidence had clearly brought the plaintiff's story clo$er to 
that of the defendant. In this way I hoped to show how my decision about the 
defendant's responsibility was based on a thorough study of the evidence 
and also to create some doubt regarding the extent of the plaintiff's disability. 
This would prepare the reader for the final section of my report in which 
reference would be made to the opinion of the court appointed medical expert 
that he had suffered no permanent disability as a result of the accident. 
5) In the final section my narrative skills were used to try to reconcile the 
differing medical opinions about the extent of the plaintiff's disability, so as to 
justify a reliance on that given by the court appointed medical expert. The 
report pointed out that these varying opinions had been given over a long 
period of time and that the disability the plaintiff suffered might not have been 
permanent but temporary in nature. It drew attention to the fact that he had 
followed a long course of therapy between the giving of one opinion, 
assessing his disability at 15%, and the giving of another which assessed it 
at 5%. Conceivably his condition might have improved as a result of 
treatment. I therefore argued that the opinion of the court appointed medical 
expert should prevail, not only because he was an independent person who 
enjoyed the court's confidence but also since he was the last doctor who had 
examined the plaintiff. Thus he was in the best position to establish whether 
any permanent disability had been caused. 
Although I had felt uncomfortable about creating this unitary official narrative, 
my own writing seemed increasingly convincing as I drafted and re-read my 
report. This may be a case of self-mystification. However my feeling was 
more similar to the sensation of successfully completing a jigsaw puzzle. 
After all, my story incorporated details from the stories of both parties and 
was therefore bound to seem more complete than either. On a deeper level, 
focusing on those aspects of testimony provoked by cross-examination felt 
like recovering a pre-existing untold narrative which had been obscured by 
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the testimony of the parties. This point can be exemplified by looking at one 
statement made by the defendant under cross-examination. She said that she 
did not remember whether the impact of the collision had been powerful 
enough to move the plaintiff's car forward from a stationary position until it 
collided with the car in front of it. This fact had been completely excluded 
from the defendant's affidavit. Yet under cross-examination she admitted that 
this could well have happened. 
An apt description of my activity is supplied by Ricowr. So as to explain the 
notion of an 'untold story', he explicitly gives the example of a judge who: 
"undertakes to understand a course of actions, a character, by 
unravelling the tangle of plots the subject is caught up in. The 
accent here is on 'being entangled', a verb whose passive voice 
emphasises that the story happens to someone before anyone 
tells it. The entanglement seems more like the 'prehistory' of the 
told story, whose beginning has to be chosen by the narrator. This 
'prehistory' of the story is what binds it to a larger whole and gives 
it a 'background'. This background is made up of the 'living 
imbrication' of every told story with every other such story. Told 
stories therefore have to 'emerge' from this background. With this 
emergence also emerges the implied subject" (1984: 75). 
This view of individuals as entangled in untold shared stories reveals a new 
dimension of the defendant's court-room narration in this case. While making 
her affidavit, it seems clear that she was mainly concerned to deny the 
narrative threads through which her story was entangled with that of the 
plaintiff. This was why she excluded any reference to the way the collision 
had propelled his car forward. The story she told her lawyer had emerged 
from this shared narrative backdrop as part of the process by which she 
'scripted her self as an autonomous moral entity before him. Like the other 
cases of self-scripting discussed in chapter five, 11 this involved focusing on 
those aspects of events which put her in a more sympathetic light and 
neglecting those which did not 
11 Reference is particularly made to the case of the 'Impotent Husband". 
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This suggests that by attempting to create a unitary shared narrative out of 
the conflicting stories of the parties, I was trying to restore a common pre-
existing narrative framework which had been selectively denied by both when 
they told their respective stories to their lawyers. My attempt was unlikely to 
result in a perfect reproduction of the pre-existing story. However, by 
incorporating statements elicited through cross-examination, my story may 
have been closer to the untold story the parties had experienced than either 
of their initial narratives was. If correct, this might tell us something important 
about adjudication by explaining how a sense of the legitimacy of a 
judgement is created. Once one abandons the notion that the stories the 
parties tell through their testimony truly represent the whole of their 
experience, then it is quite probable that cross-examination and adjudication 
serve to recover narrative elements which had previously been obscured or 
denied. 
The case of the 'Pain in the Neck' also indicates the power of the stories told 
by the parties. Again if one looks at the defendant's story, it is clear that I felt 
the need to author a narrative questioning her version that the collision was 
an insignificant one and that she had been paying careful attention to her 
driving. This is because although these claims would not have affected her 
legal responsibility, they certainly created moral sympathy for her within a 
Maltese cultural context. Malta is a small island which imports over 10,000 
new cars a year. Traffic jams are a common, and for many people daily, 
experience. In this situation, minor collisions are also frequent. Whatever the 
law may say, people often attribute the blame to the driver of the front vehicle 
who stopped too suddenly. Thus I felt relieved to have managed to cast some 
doubt on the defendant's story as it would otherwise have seemed unjust to 
recommend that she be declared responsible for the accident. The next case 
to be analysed will provide more food for thought on the cultural basis of this 
morally persuasive power of narratives. 
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3. The Case of the 'Faithful Prostitute' 
The next case to be described is in many respects an unusual one. One 
reason for its exceptional character is the shocking and emotionally 
compelling character of the stories told in its regard, while testimony was 
being heard in court. In fact, my attention was drawn to this case by one of 
my lawyer informants who thought it sounded 'anthropological'. Given 
prevalent perceptions of anthropology among the lawyers to whom I spoke, 
this meant that it was 'colourful' or 'interesting' and therefore symbolically 
distanced from ordinary 'boring' litigation. However, the following analysis 
aims to demonstrate that this case can tell us something important which 
applies to more run of the mill litigation. 
So as to understand this case it is necessary to provide more of the social 
and legal context. As observed in chapter three, Maltese law does not allow 
divorce. 12 This situation, which may be about to change, 13 reflects the 
important role traditionally played by the Catholic Church within Maltese 
society. 14 Consequently there are two principal avenues by which Maltese 
spouses whose marriage has broken down can obtain legal recognition of 
this and some remedy for their situation. The first option is the legal institution 
of personal separation. This allows spouses to separate from one another by 
means of a contractual agreement ratified by the court, or though opening a 
law-suit. Separated spouses may be obliged to pay maintenance to one 
another and the court will divide the matrimonial property and determine 
issues of access and custody of children. While separation is very similar to 
divorce, the glaring difference is that separated spouses are still considered 
1 ~ Although it docs recognise divorces granted by foreign courts, where one of the parties to the 
marriage is either a citizen of or domiciled in a foreign country. 
13 The Prime Minister has recently appointed a commission to advise on the best way to introduce 
divorce into the Maltese legal system. 
11 On this sec chapter four of this thesis. 
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as being married, in line with the Catholic doctrine of the indissolubility of 
marriage. Consequently they cannot re-marry. 
By contrast, if the other avenue is chosen and the marriage is judicially 
annulled, the spouses are allowed to re-marry. This is because annulment is 
based on the canonical notion that due to some defect a real marriage never 
existed between the spouses and the judge's role is simply that of 
acknowledging this fact. For this reason, annulment must always be judicially 
ascertained through litigation and cannot be established through a 
contractual agreement. Following ecclesiastical canon law, Maltese law 
allows a limited number of grounds for annulment and this will be granted 
only if the existence of one of these grounds is proved in court. Many of these 
grounds refer to defects in the consent originally given by either of the 
spouses to the marriage. For instance, if it is proven that one of the spouses 
consented to the marriage without properly understanding the nature of 
married life or its essential rights and duties (as defined by Catholic canon 
law}, the consent of that spouse would be vitiated and her marriage annulled. 
Couples whose marriage has broken down tend to prefer to file for an 
annulment instead of personal separation, as the effects of an annulment are 
practically identical to those of a divorce. However it is much more difficult to 
prove than a separation, which is always granted after the lapse of a certain 
period of time. Judges are also less likely to require either of the spouses 
whose marriage has been annulled to pay maintenance to the other. They 
may, however, order that maintenance be paid for a period of five years in 
cases where the spouse claiming maintenance is in good faith and the other 
spouse is 'responsible for the nullity of the marriage'. 
In the case of the 'faithful prostitute', the husband filed an action for 
annulment of his marriage before the civil court. In his 'citazzjoni', he argued 
that neither he nor his wife had properly consented to marry one another, 
claiming that there had been simulation of consent and 'lack of due discretion 
of judgement on the nature of the matrimonial life or its essential rights and 
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duties'. In her written reply, his wife denied that there had been any defect in 
the consent she gave to the marriage and said that if the marriage was null 
then her husband was responsible for the nullity and should be ordered by 
the court to pay maintenance to her since she was in good faith. 
The legal claims of the two parties motivated the narrative strategies to which 
their lawyers resorted when orchestrating the production of their testimony in 
court. The husband was the first to testify. His story was brutally clear. He 
claimed that he had married his wife purely in order to encourage her to work 
as a prostitute, so that she could bring him money. He explained that he was 
a well known pimp and showed his police record to prove it; observing that 
while he used to have other women working for him, the one whom he 
married brought him the most income. Therefore his decision to marry was 
made solely to ensure that he did not lose the income she brought him and 
for no other reason. During eleven years of marriage his wife had brought him 
a lot of money. However she had now taken to drinking and was becoming 
violent and refusing to work for him any more. He had now found the sort of 
woman he had always wanted and therefore wanted to annul his marriage in 
order to settle down with her. The husband's lawyer lost no effort in 
portraying him and his marriage in a degrading light. He even brought his 
client's mother to testify that he had quarrelled with his parents and left home 
at an early age and also asked him to explain how he and his wife used to 
participate in orgies with other couples. 
The strategy of the husband's lawyer consequently involved a graphic 
description of the husband's criminal character, his brutally manipulative 
relationship to the woman he married and the sordid details of the 'marriage'. 
His aim was clearly to show that neither he nor his wife had really consented 
to marry and that they did not at the time have a mature understanding of the 
essential rights and duties of married life. This was therefore a paradigmatic 
story with a difference and shows how the legal rules can structure narratives 
of evil-doing as well as those which evoke a positive moral response. 
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When his turn came, the wife's lawyer brought the wife to tell the story of her 
life, emphasising her courtship and marriage. While she did not contradict 
any of the 'facts' stated by her husband, the wife threw a completely new light 
on them. Her story took three court sittings to recount and it is impossible to 
include all the details here. However its bare outline is that she was born into 
a large family of seven children, which had fallen on hard times following the 
early death of her father and mother. Her eldest sister used to look after her, 
but was very strict and would prevent her from staying out late at night. She 
met her future husband in a disco when she was eighteen years old and soon 
fell in love with him. He seduced her and encouraged her to come and live 
with him in a flat he had rented, away from the vigilance of her family. She 
followed him willingly, because she loved him and was happy to live with him. 
Once away from her family, her lover introduced her to another couple who 
were friends of his and were called Horace and Anna. Anna was actually a 
prostitute and Horace was her pimp. Her future husband started to drop hints 
that he needed money so as to encourage her to go and work as a prostitute 
with Anna. She initially resisted this, but then gave in when her lover 
explained that she would only go when necessary. Soon Anna had 
introduced her to the trade and though she did not like it, she was happy so 
long as her lover was content. 
After she became pregnant with his child, her lover decided to marry her.15 
Although she loved him and was eager to marry, she did not pressure him to 
do so for fear of annoying him. After her marriage was celebrated and her 
baby born, she continued to work as a prostitute as her husband urged her. 
She saw nothing wrong in this as long as her husband was happy, seeing it 
as her way to contribute to the family finances. It seems that they lived in this 
manner for eleven years and that the money she brought in even gave their 
marriage a veneer of respectability. In fact, she had another daughter and 
they bought a villa to live in. She sent her children to expensive private 
schools and her husband bought a bar and started to work as a barman. 
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During this period she still worked as a prostitute whenever her husband told 
her that this was necessary to help the family finances. She started to quarrel 
with her husband after the latter began to stay away from home late at night 
and she learned he was dating another woman. 
The wife's story was clearly a heart-breaking one which resonated with many 
key cultural themes in Malta. To begin with, there is the initial narrative of a 
naive young woman from a strict family corrupted by an older and more 
experienced man, who contrives to place her at his mercy. This is followed by 
the dominant narrative, which concerns the unconditional love of a woman 
ready to be exploited by the man she loves as long as he needs her. This 
story makes a direct appeal to the Christian ideals of love as self-sacrifice 
underlying the canonical rules of marriage which her husband tried to invoke 
against her. It transforms the wife into a sort of Mary Magdalen; one to whom 
'much will be forgiven because she loved much' (Luke 7, 36-50). Piquancy is 
added to this tale by the woman's attempt to fulfil traditional Maltese 
conceptions of the gender roles of wife and mother: working hard to buy and 
furnish a large house and giving her children the best education that money 
can buy. Finally, there is the dramatic denouement when her husband 
withdraws the only thing she asked from him: his company; which leads to the 
unravelling of the whole relationship. These themes have a deep resonance 
in Maltese culture, where it is an accepted justification for apparently 
unethical behaviour to claim that one is doing it 'for the family' and where the 
rate of marriage breakdown is below that of most European countries 
(Tabone 1995). 
Another reason why this testimony is so compelling is the way in which it was 
given. Consider the following extract, where the wife is replying to the 
important question as to whether she still intended to work as a prostitute 
when she married her husband: 
1
' Apparently. she had unprotected sexual intercourse only with her future husband. The child was 
therefore his. 
236 
"As far as I was concerned, I had no idea that things would change 
after marriage. So long as my husband was happy, I had in mind 
that we would continue with that sort of life -that is he would keep 
his bar and I would go there occasionally and when I could I would 
pick up a man to earn some money for the good of the family." 
In this extract the wife does not try to disguise the way she consented to 
marry while planning to act as a prostitute. Yet this admission, which should 
be so damaging to her claim to have given a valid consent to marry, becomes 
a touching sign of her ingenuous devotion to her husband when placed within 
the narrative context of her willingness to do anything that would make her 
husband happy and promote the well-being of her family. 
This story is also convincing because it is so coherent. There is no sign of 
any contradiction and it seems to fit into and supply the missing parts of the 
story produced by her husband. Naturally, I have re-told her story in a unified 
and coherent way. However this reflects the way the story is represented in 
the official record of the testimony produced by the court. Apart from a few 
questions designed to illustrate the degraded nature of her life-style, the 
husband's lawyer did not try to break up her story through cross-examination 
as happened in the case of the 'rented garage'. Yet he clearly had an 
incentive to prove that the wife did not give a valid consent to the marriage, 
as otherwise his client would be considered as the only spouse responsible 
for the nullity and condemned to pay maintenance to his ex-wife for a period 
of five years. 
There were various reasons why the plaintiffs lawyer could not really destroy 
the coherence of the wife's story. This story was largely pre-supposed in the 
husband's own story of his exploitation of his wife. Actually the wife's story 
supported her husband's, showing why it was so easy for him to exploit her. 
The main way in which the wife's story differed from her husband's was in her 
description of her feelings towards him and this is something which would 
appear difficult for the cross-examining lawyer to question. Moreover, the 
case might seem to be quite a straightforward one. Fidelity to the other 
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spouse is one of the essential rights and duties of marriage which the 
spouses must consent to. How could a woman who intended to act as a 
prostitute when she married give a valid consent to marry? Yet, on the other 
hand, there was the wife's tragic story of unconditional love and 
abandonment. Still, it must have seemed that the only remedy the legal 
system could provide was that of terminating her marriage. 
It is therefore instructive to look at how this case was decided. There were 
two consecutive assessments of the evidence. The first was produced by the 
legal referee. 16 In his report, the legal referee summarised the wife's story in 
his own words, underlining the husband's exploitative behaviour and 
contrasting it to her selfless devotion. He observed: 
"There is no doubt that the defendant on her part had a sincere 
intention and was in good faith when she gave her consent to the 
marriage. It is very evident that she was blindly in love with the 
plaintiff, so much so that she was ready to do anything to make 
him happy and to avoid losing him." 
The referee pointed to other features of the case, such as the speed with 
which the husband had managed to seduce his future wife and observed that, 
coming from a sheltered background, the young woman was naturally 
attracted to the fast life led by her lover. He commented on the fact that she 
had intended to act as a prostitute when she gave her consent to marry: 
"Certainly, for the defendant to say in the most sincere way that 
she saw nothing wrong in her physical infidelity shows that she had 
a serious defect in discretion of judgement on the rights and 
obligations of married life. The defendant claims that this was only 
work -a way to earn money and no feelings were involved. She 
sincerely believes that she remained faithful to her husband and to 
a certain extent one can begin to understand this attitude. Her 
husband was the prime mover behind the prostitution of the 
defendant. She used to go with men to earn money for her 
husband. She used to give him all the money. He used to take 
care of their financial administration. When they needed money, 
he even used to drop hints. In the particular circumstances of this 
case, however, the writer does not feel that he should go so far as 
1
'; According to the usual practice. this referee had to draw up a report giving his opinion as to what 
I he judge· s decision should be. on the basis of the evidence presented to him. 
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to say that the defendant was in some way guilty or responsible for 
the nullity of the marriage." 
This extract indicates the dilemma faced by the legal referee. If he opted for a 
strict interpretation of the law, he could not avoid the conclusion that a 
woman who married while intending to act as a prostitute could not give a 
valid consent to marry because she did not intend to remain faithful to her 
husband. This is why he echoes the words used by the law, saying that she 
had a 'serious defect of due discretion of judgement'. She would therefore 
become co-responsible for the nullity of the marriage and lose any 
entitlement to be paid maintenance by her husband. However, in the context 
of the wife's story, her faithfulness to her husband seemed even greater than 
ordinary and was reflected in her readiness to do things she disliked and to 
break conventional taboos in order to please him. To reward such devotion 
by financially penalising her appears doubly unjust and cruel. 
The referee resolved his dilemma in two ways. As the extract shows, he drew 
a distinction between physical and spiritual infidelity, implying that although 
the wife may have been guilty of the former, it is the latter which counts when 
assessing the validity of her consent to marry. 17 Simultaneously he kept 
recounting the story of the case in order to bring out the cynical behaviour of 
the husband and the constancy of his wife's devotion, as reflected in the 
coherence of her story. Appealing to these 'particular circumstances', he 
ultimately decided that the wife could not be held responsible for the nullity of 
the marriage and that her ex-husband should consequently be condemned to 
pay her maintenance over a five year period. In this way, he implicitly 
accepted that a prostitute could be faithful to her husband! 
In his judgement, the judge agreed with the report of the legal referee and 
with its conclusions. Like the referee, he also re-told the story of the case, 
highlighting its morally repellent aspects as he saw them. Thus, he observed: 
1
" He also obse"'ed: ··certainly this is an interesting field of investigation concerning the real 
significance of fidelity.·· 
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"The character of the plaintiff emerges in a truly disgusting way 
when, in the light of the thousands of pounds which she (his wife) 
earned for him and which allowed him to live like a rich man, he 
went so far as to explain, with great contempt that: 'for me the 
woman was better for nothing else apart from prostitution'. These 
were the words he used to refer to a woman who was less than 
twenty years old, who came from a serious family, had a job with 
the Wrangler (factory) in a post which is commonly considered as 
a good job and even had another boyfriend before him." 
On the basis of his re-telling of the story, the judge agreed that the wife was 
not responsible for the nullity of the marriage. 
This case is interesting because it illustrates in a particularly vivid way the 
potential of stories to evoke powerful feelings of moral approval or 
disapproval. They do so because they foreground culturally valued norms 
against which the actions of particular characters are assessed. In this case 
the story told by the wife was not a paradigmatic one in terms of the legal 
rules it sought to invoke. 18 On the contrary, a woman who intended to act as a 
prostitute when giving her consent to marry would seem on first glance to be 
precisely the opposite of the 'spouse who is in good faith' and 'was not 
responsible for the nullity of marriage'. The law only allows the award of 
maintenance in favour of a spouse who fits into one of these categories. Yet 
while the story told by the wife was a subjunctive story in regard to the legal 
rules, it was a paradigmatic one when viewed from the standpoint of the 
Maltese morality of inter-personal relations. 
This 'culturally paradigmatic' status of the narrative seems to have been 
partly an outcome of its internal coherence with respect to the norm of 
unconditional love which it evoked. The 'faithful prostitute' never acts in 
contradiction to her basic orientation, which is that of loving her husband. 
Cross-examination is incapable of destroying her credibility. As a result she 
becomes something of a 'character', whose life actions clearly illustrate the 
1 
K Her Iawver clearlY did not have the narrative resources with which to script a paradigmatic story in 
. . 
this case. His clicnt"s prostitution was a public activity which could have been proven by her husband 
had she denied it. 
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norm by which she lives, in the same way as the archaic heroes described by 
Maclntryre (1984) show no awareness of conflict between their subjective self 
and their socially dictated role. This is why her story challenged the legal 
rules, with which it could not easily co-exist. Through its coherence, this 
narrative condensed culturally valued dispositions in a normative, law-like, 
manner, directly contradicting the legal rules themselves by exposing their 
potentially immoral consequences. It created the sort of conflict of norms 
which Malinowski (1989) described in Trobriand society. 19 
As a result of this tension, both the legal referee and the judge were led to re-
interpret and develop the legal notion of fidelity in an attempt to 
accommodate the particular features of this story. This illustrates the 
culturally derived power of a coherent story which, if not fragmented by court-
room questioning or re-phrased by the efforts of the examining lawyer, is 
capable of stimulating the re-interpretation and development of legal rules. 
This is confirmed by the way both the legal referee and the judge re-told 
morally compelling aspects of the story of the case in order to authorise their 
re-interpretation of the rules of marriage annulment. Clearly if this story had 
been rendered incoherent and contradictory through cross-examination, it 
could not have had these results. 
19 As the father of functionalism in anthropology, Malinowski might have been expected to ignore 
situations of normative conflict. which do not easily co-exist with a view of societies as systematically 
coherent wholes. However his analysis of law in the Trobriands shows a keen awareness of such 
situations and their implications for. social analysis. In particular, one should note his description of 
the tense relationships between what he saw as the fundamental Trobriand legal principles of Mother-
right and Father-love. as reflected in the relationships between a father, his biological son and his 
matrilineal nephew. This description is contained in a chapter of "Crime and Custom in Savage 
Society:· evocatively labelled: .. Systems ofLaw in Conflict" (Malinowski 1989: 100-111). 
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4. Narrative and Legal interpretation. 
The two cases here discussed illustrate different aspects of legal story-telling 
and adjudication. The case of the 'Pain in the Neck' exemplifies how the gap 
between litigants' stories -produced when they 'script their selves' before 
their respective lawyers- is reproduced when these stories are re-told in 
court. It was shown how these conflicting stories place a moral pressure on 
judges, who try to iron out contradictions to create one official narrative of the 
'facts of the case'. The roots of this moral pressure were further explored in 
the case of the 'Faithful Prostitute'. Here a 'subjunctive' story which did not 
easily fit into existing legal categories, but which preserved its coherence and 
was not destroyed by court questioning, provoked a re-interpretation of the 
legal category of fidelity. Thus in the same way as clients' stories could 
subvert the professional detachment of lawyers and force them to operate 
within their perceptions of the case, 20 these stories could also lead judges to 
reinterpret the legal rules to accommodate them. 
This explains why the Maltese courts try to construct a single official narrative 
of the facts in a case. The participants to litigation all operate on the 
assumption that court-room questioning must ultimately produce only one 
story, because stories are powerful and have the potential of moulding legal 
rules. If the subjunctive story of the 'faithful prostitute' can induce judges to 
re-think the meaning of legal rules, then clearly courts cannot afford to 
officially recognise Jackson's (1991) point that there is a: "plurality of 
narrative discourses at work in the trial" (ibid.: 85). Acknowledging this could 
make it impossible to determine which rules would apply to the case, since 
even the most subjunctive story may have potential juridical consequences. 
Another implication of the above is to change our thinking about the process 
of reaching a judgement in a case. Often this is conceived as an initial 
process of fact-finding aimed at determining the 'facts-in-issue', followed by 
~o Sec chapter five on this point. 
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legal argument aimed at establishing which rules, if any, apply to these facts 
(Jackson 1991). It may be more appropriate to see this process as one in 
which different narrative frameworks for understanding the evidence are 
pitted against one another. 21 The story which maintains its coherence at the 
end of this process would itself provoke investigation of the legal framework 
to discover which interpretation of which set of rules is best suited to cater for 
the particular demands the story makes on the legal system. 
Finally it would seem possible to make some provisional conclusions about 
the kinds of cases in which judges resort to what has been called 'expansion' 
(Mather & Yngvesson 1981 ), and those where they engage in 'narrowing' 
(ibid. )22 It appears that the emergence of coherent narratives which are 
subjunctive from the standpoint of the legal rules but evoke powerful moral 
feelings within a particular culture are a necessary condition which spurs 
judges on to the task of developing the interpretation of legal rules. 
21 I am grateful to Professor Michael Carrithers for suggesting this point to me. 
~2 ·Expansion· refers to the process of developing the interpretation of legal rules to cope with new 
factual situations. ·Narrowing· refers to the converse operation of reducing the complexities of a 
particular factual situation so as to fit them into the scope of operation of specific legal rules which are 
rigidly applied and conservatively interpreted. 
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Chapter 9: The Problematisation of Evidence 
1. Introduction. 
The cases discussed in the previous chapter have exposed the divergent 
practical relationships of lawyers and judges to the stories told in litigation. 
Lawyers represent their clients on the basis of the stories told by the latter. 
Yet clients' self-scripting is usually achieved by denying aspects of the untold 
shared narrative which relates them to their opponents. By contrast litigation 
and adjudication are oriented towards the creation of a single official 
narrative from these discordant stories. Judges' attempts to recover a pre-
existing shared narrative are fuelled by the desire to morally legitimate their 
decisions, which stories are capable of challenging. This means that while 
lawyers tend to downplay the links between their clients' stories and those of 
the other party, these links are precisely what judges stress and build upon. 
The wider structural implications of these contrasting dispositions will now be 
illustrated by showing how they motivate ongoing tensions within the Maltese 
judicial apparatus. 
Attention will here focus on the controversy surrounding recent reforms to 
Maltese procedural law, which aimed at reducing delays in the trial of cases. 
In particular the opposed reactions of lawyers and judges to affidavits will be 
seen to reflect their respective, structurally determined, relationships to the 
stories told in the case. Thus the preferred form of consumption of litigants' 
narratives will be explained by reference to the story-telling relationships 
between clients, lawyers and judges. This discussion will in turn serve to 
launch the final chapter, which will further explore the role of the over-arching 
social context in shaping the attitudes of Maltese legal professionals to court 
room story-telling. 
244 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. The Reforms and their Outcome. 
As the fourth chapter showed, court delays are pervasive in Maltese litigation. 
In recent years much media attention has been dedicated to this issue. It is 
increasingly acknowledged as a serious problem which results in the denial 
of justice and alienates people from the courts. 1 Partly as a reaction to this 
growing public concern and also with the aim of increasing the efficiency of 
the courts, the Nationalist Administration in July 1995 enacted a law 
reforming the Maltese procedural code. 2 This law amended various 
procedural rules. Yet it was those amendments relating to the trial of law-suits 
which caused controversy. In particular attention has focused on the 
amendments to section 202 of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure, 
which define the new procedure to be followed by judges when compiling 
evidence in civil trials. 
In terms of this new procedure, a pre-trial hearing was to be held before the 
first sitting in the case. The aim of this hearing in the words of the 
government minister -himself a lawyer- who introduced the amendments, 
was to allow the court to: "identify and record the points of law and fact in 
contention and the proof to be given by each witness" (Fenech: 1996b). The 
second major innovation was that after the pre-trial hearing, judges were 
given the option of choosing the system by which evidence was to be heard. 
1 A good example of the tone of the comments made by the Maltese newspapers are two newspaper 
editorials which both appeared during June 1997, while I was writing this thesis. On the 22nd June, 
the editorial of the pro-Government weekly "lt-Torca' claimed: 
·The general impression in this country is that a Power dominates the courts which 
nobody has been able to tame. It seems that here we really have a 'state within a 
state·.... The electoral manifesto of the Labour Party was expressing the voice of the 
masses when it said: "In the administration of justice, the citizen expects the legal 
process to be efficient (my italics). comprehensible and really just. The citizen is not 
satisfied on any one of these points ... 
Two weeks before the editorial of the pro-Opposition 'The Times· was entitled: "A Time for Reason." 
The opening statement observed that o\·er the previous four years the courts had not suffered from 
lack of advice on how to speed up proceedings. 
c The law in question is Act 2-t of 1995. 
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Previously the principle was that all testimony had to be heard orally. Instead 
judges were now given the option of compiling all3 evidence by means of 
written affidavits prepared by parties and their witnesses and deposited in 
court. However, even if this 'affidavit system' were to be chosen, the opposing 
lawyer was to continue to enjoy the facility of conducting an oral cross-
examination of parties and witnesses on the testimony contained in their 
affidavits. Finally the third innovation was that judges were then to fix a date 
for a full hearing of testimony (if the evidence was to be compiled 'viva voce') 
or for hearing by cross-examination (if the affidavits system was selected). 
During this sitting all the oral testimony to be presented in the case was to be 
heard uninterruptedly. There were to be no adjournments except in very 
special circumstances. This contrasted with the previous system, in which 
witnesses were heard on several different sittings and adjournments were 
frequently granted. In the words of the minister who introduced the reforms: 
"Advocates cannot be granted an adjournment simply because 
they do not happen to be present in court for whatever reason. If 
any witness is sick, the law establishes how his evidence is to be 
heard and collected so that the case continues to be heard 
uninterruptedly to a conclusion" (Fenech: 1997). 
Before exploring the rationale of these innovations, it is instructive to 
consider their immediate outcome. Since the amendments to section 202 
were brought into force in October 19964 and this thesis is being concluded in 
1998, only the initial effect of the amendments can be described. I must also 
admit that my discussion of this point is mainly based on letters and articles 
which appeared in the Maltese newspapers during my period of fieldwork. 
However, as many of these articles were written by prominent lawyers and 
judges, they can be considered a fairly accurate guide to events. 
·
1 Previously the usc of affidaYits tended to be restricted to the testimony of the actual parties to the 
law-suit. 
1 They came into effect as from the 1st October 1996 by Legal Notice 115, which replaced section 202 
of the Code of Organisation and Civil Procedure by a new section 104. 
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The collective response of judges to the amendments in question was to 
introduce a new judicial role: that of the Master, which was not contemplated 
in the amendments. 5 By agreement among the bench, one of the judges 
assumed this role and was entrusted with around 3,000 cases in which, to 
quote the current chief judge: "very little was being done" (Said Pullicino 
1997). His task was to be that of conducting a pre-trial hearing in this case 
and in all new cases to be filed in the future. After he had clarified the points 
in issue and the proof to be made by different witnesses, he was to transfer 
these files to the other judges before whom the actual court sittings would be 
held. Consequently while the amendments had contemplated that all judges 
would hold a pre-trial hearing in every law-suit they adjudicated, the effect of 
the judges' decision was that only one of the judges would conduct the pre-
trial hearings. Moreover this judge would not be the one before whom these 
cases were actually heard. According to the Chief Justice, the reason for this 
was that although: 
" ... the amendments were well intentioned. Posited in an ideal 
situation, they could have been an efficacious instrument in order 
to expedite proceedings. In a situation like ours where the 
administrative infrastructure is lacking, where the number of judges 
was inadequate and the culture of accepting certain systems of 
control on the compilation of evidence and the regulation of the 
cause by the judge objected to, all these amendments, rigidly 
applied, could not have the desired beneficial effect without 
bringing about a traumatic experience. There was, on the contrary, 
the danger that tbis would bring about a total collapse of the 
system" (Said Pullicino: 1997). 
He continued: 
"It was principally for this reason, therefore, that through an 
administrative process -which was not contemplated in the 
amendments and introduced clandestinely- the system of the 
Master was introduced" (ibid.) 
In November 1997 there was a change of Government. On meeting with the 
new minister of justice, the president of the Chamber of Advocates called for 
the abolition of the affidavits system: the second plank of the newly 
" The notion of a master system was adopted from English law. 
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introduced reforms. He claimed that this worked against the conscience and 
professional training of lawyers. He hoped, however, that the Master system 
"would be operated more effectively" (Cremona: 1996). A month later, in 
December 1996, the minister who had introduced the amendments wrote an 
article observing that concurrently with the introduction of the amendments he 
had intended to conduct: 
" ... a strong PR exercise to ensure that the judges strictly apply the 
law and create the culture to change" (Fenech: 1996a). 
He lamented the fact that his successor in office6 had not seen the need for 
such an exercise and urged judges to apply the law approved by Parliament, 
using their powers to eliminate delays. Three weeks later the new minister of 
justice conducted an interview with the press, in which he said that he aimed 
to re-assess the recent changes in the law of procedure. He also intended to 
eliminate the 'problems' with the Master system and further develop it. 
However he echoed the previous minister's words when he argued that 
judges should be stricter in controlling lawyers who: 
"tend to use delaying tactics when they believe it is beneficial for 
their clients" (Mangion: 1996). 
A week later the former minister wrote another article in which he explained in 
detail the new system introduced by the amendments. He argued that if 
judges failed in their duty to apply the law as amended, other bodies such as 
the Commission for the Administration of Justice and ultimately Parliament 
must intervene to ensure that they do so. He attacked the way the Master 
system had been adopted 'only in name', so that: 
"A judge was just assigned to supposedly perform the functions of 
Master and was lumped with 3,000 cases to look after, thereby 
further aggravating the courts' delay" (Fenech 1996b.) 
The next development occurred four months later, on the 12th April 1997, 
when the Chief Justice organised a closed seminar to discuss the 
implementation of the new amendments. In the opening speech he gave at 
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the start of this seminar, the chief judge reportedly said that it was mainly the 
effect of the amendments on the trial of cases which had sparked off the 
seminar. As already noted, he observed that the amendments could not be 
brought into effect without a trauma and that in order to avoid this, the Master 
system had been introduced. However, the chief judge admitted that even 
with this system there had been: 
"a great difference between the ideal and the reality. Not due to 
lack of commitment but because the courts are not being given the 
necessary means to make the system function properly" (Said 
Pullicino 1997). 
At this stage there was a clear consensus that the master system had not 
substantially reduced court delays. Indeed, a month later, the former minister 
returned to the fray, by means of an article entitled: "Wake up minister!" 
(Fenech 1997), in which he claimed that the situation had worsened, partly 
due to the inactivity of the judges and the new minister. He claimed that 
judges were: "adopting their own rules of procedure in defiance of the 
express provisions of the law'' (ibid.) and failing to apply the new rules. He 
also attacked the Master system they had adopted, pointing out that it was 
humanly impossible for one judge to hold pre-trial hearings in three thousand 
cases as well as all the new cases filed in court. He added: 
"We have at present a serious situation where there are about 
1,500 cases which have been presented for hearing during the last 
eighteen months and which have not yet been set a date for 
hearing" (ibid.) 
Other lawyers who wrote in the newspapers were far more pessimistic about 
the new reforms. One prominent lawyer attacked their conceptual basis, 
arguing that: "you cannot legislate to reform an ingrained mentality" (Brincat 
1997 a.). Another questioned whether the judges were "responsible for the 
abortion of this system of Master" (Said 1997). However, all were agreed that 
the master system had not improved the delays and in effect created another 
bottle-neck. It was in this context that, on the 3rd June 1997, the minister of 
A Bv the time these amendments were enacted in 1995. the Minister who introduced them had already 
be~n replaced in a Cabinet reshuffie. In 1997 the Minister of Justice was replaced again following the 
change in GO\·emment. The new Minister was in tum replaced, following his resignation in 1998. 
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justice held a press conference. He announced that following the recent 
seminar organised by the chief judge he was setting up an 'Advisory 
Committee for the law-Courts'. The members of this committee were two 
members of the judiciary and leading representatives of the legal profession. 
The committee was given an extensive brief, which included continuous 
monitoring of the situation and recommending changes to the laws, 
administrative set-up and the Master system in order to increase the 
efficiency of the courts. At the time of writing it is not known if the Committee 
has made any recommendations, nor what their content might be. Clearly, 
however, this is not the end of the saga. 
3. Analysis. 
My reason for recounting the ongoing history of these procedural reforms is 
to draw attention to the relationship all the protagonists draw between court 
delays and the manner in which evidence is compiled. This debate suggests 
that there is a Maltese culture or "ingrained mentality" (Brincat 1997a.) which 
resists greater control on the process of compilation of evidence. This 
mentality is so powerful that it induced judges to introduce the Master system, 
so as to avoid a: "traumatic change" (Said Pullicino 1997) which could: "lead 
to the total collapse of the system" (ibid.) It has even subverted the Master 
system itself. This requires further investigation of the causes of this mentality 
and its manifestations. 
During my fieldwork I decided to use the so-called 'affidavits question' as a 
vehicle to investigate these issues further. Since the chamber of advocates 
had taken a stand against the introduction of the 'affidavits system', lawyers, 
clients and judges were interviewed so as to elicit their opinions and chart the 
resulting trends. As already noted, 7 lawyers objected to affidavits because 
they saw them as both a threat to their professional detachment from clients 
and an obstacle hindering them from adequately representing them. There is 
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a widespread perception among lawyers that affidavits are bad because 
lawyers write them for clients. Lawyers also stressed that clients often 
change their stories when questioned in court and that they could not adapt 
their representation to the changed version if they had previously committed 
their clients in writing to their original accounts of 'what happened'. 
Having discussed affidavits with lawyers, my interviews with clients came as 
quite a surprise. They complained that their lawyers had not paid enough 
attention to their affidavits and had left them to write them on their own, 
hardly glancing at them when they were finished. 8 This chimed with my own 
observations, since I had also noted a certain lack of interest towards 
affidavits on the part of established lawyers. Actually these lawyers tended to 
leave their drafting to secretaries or junior assistants, almost as if they wished 
to avoid contamination from the affidavits. Since their professional 
independence was safeguarded by these means, it seemed that there might 
also be other motives behind the continuing opposition of lawyers to 
affidavits. 
These motives became clearer after my interviews with judges. As a rule, 
they tended to be less negative about affidavits than lawyers. This is because 
some see them as an effective way of tackling court delays, which judges link 
quite clearly to the dynamics of the compilation of evidence. Thus one judge I 
interviewed generally presides over marriage breakdown law-suits. He told 
me that it is impossible for him to hear all the testimony which parties would 
like to present in such cases. If he let them they would spend twenty or thirty 
court sittings telling their stories and bringing new witnesses. He also said 
that it is often difficult to judge between these stories. Often both are true, so 
that it is simply: 'the same life being recounted from different angles'. At the 
same time, he recognised that parties need a safety valve in order to vent 
their frustration and anger. He was therefore in favour of affidavits, as long as 
Reference is made to the sections entitled: 'the Professional Ideal' and 'Two Styles of 
Representation· in the sixth chapter. 
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the ultimate decision as to whether to allow them or not remained in the 
hands of judges and as long as lawyers retained the facility of conducting an 
oral cross-examination of witnesses on the testimony contained in their 
affidavits. He favoured affidavits since they give parties a chance to have 
their say without wasting the court's time. He pointed out that he does not 
take affidavits literally, but always keeps in mind that they might have been 
doctored by lawyers. There are also various means by which he can assess 
the credibility of the testimony contained in the affidavit. Similarly, another 
judge told me that affidavits are useful as part of the evidence presented in a 
law-suit, but should not be the only proof. 
Judges constantly evoked the wider picture of an over -burdened judiciary 
which does not have the time to listen to all the testimony lawyers would like 
to bring. One judge pointed out to me that a big difference between judges 
and lawyers is that lawyers face less pressure, having more time to prepare 
their case if it is adjourned for another sitting. Judges, by contrast, are under 
more pressure to decide cases. Consequently if lawyers delay and do not 
appear for court sittings, this adds to the judge' work and means that he has 
less time to dedicate to law-suits. He observed: 
"If you have the time, then you can study a case and decide which 
testimony is relevant and which is not. In this way you can better 
direct the case. The less time you have, the more delays are 
caused, because you cannot cut out irrelevant testimony in 
advance." 
This judge complained that many lawyers make useless pleas or appeals just 
to gain time. They also tend to contest all the facts alleged by the other party, 
so that it is unclear what the real factual points at issue are. Since lawyers 
also reproduce their 'citazzjoni' when drafting the initial 'declaration of the 
facts', 9 it is even more difficult to discover what these facts in issue are. He 
pointed out that the mentality of Maltese lawyers does not predispose them to 
co-operate with regard to evidence, since they tend to interrupt one another 
MSee the section on ·writing the Case· in chapter six. 
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and to argue aggressively, taking a short-sighted view of the case. Moreover, 
lawyers stretch out and dilute their work in a case, staggering witnesses and 
material evidence, so that: 
"law-suits proceed drop by drop, in hiccups. Every now and then 
there is a court sitting and the lawyers give the judge a document 
to satisfy him. Then, when finally the bag (i.e. the case-file) is 
really full, they let the judge open it. Often these documents 
contain no useful information." 
From the judges' perspective, therefore, the compilation of evidence appears 
as a fertile field for the exercise of lawyers' delaying tactics. Court-room 
story-telling is potentially manipulable by lawyers in a diverse ways, which 
range from the telling of a never-ending story by the party represented to the 
summoning of large numbers of witnesses to testify to the same fact. In this 
context, it is clear why affidavits are les's negatively perceived by judges than 
lawyers. To the extent that affidavits reduce the time which has to be devoted 
to hearing testimony, judges are predisposed to receive them favourably. 
But how do affidavits reduce time? The case of the 'Rented Garage' reveals 
how it takes less time to read a coherent story printed as a single text than to 
laboriously create that story from the disjointed utterances of witnesses in the 
litigious atmosphere of the court. There is, however, a less obvious reason, 
which leads directly to the central hypothesis here examined. Consider the 
following example which was mentioned in the local press by another 
prominent lawyer when recommending a possible use for affidavits in helping 
to prepare the file of the case for the trial: 
"Let's imagine a personal injury claim in a motor accident. There 
should be no contestation about the age of the alleged victim, his 
income, his employment, where the accident happened, and 
similar details. The problem may be how it happened. The injured 
party has one version, the other party has another version. From 
their two versions some common ground should appear. as place 
of accident. time. number of vehicles involved ... The disparity may 
be restricted to certain aspects which define responsibility. The 
parties should be ordered to delimit their contentions, and if a 
party wants to drag his feet, then the extra costs should be on his 
" Sec chapter six on this point. 
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side. Delaying tactics mav be beneficial to one party only. and s/he 
should be penalised for them" (Brincat 1996) 
One should here note that this lawyer describes judicial fact-finding in terms 
of the same process of recovery of an untold shared narrative which I 
employed in the case of the 'Pain in the Neck'. Such establishment of 
'common ground' is seen as a necessary preliminary to the smooth resolution 
of the case. In this context, the party (for which read lawyer) who "drags his 
feet" (ibid.) does so by denying the existence of this common ground and 
stressing the particularity of his client's story. Some indications of how and 
why this is done are given obliquely in this text. If one reads between the 
lines, it seems clear that the claim that there should be no contestation about 
common sense details 10 is being made precisely because these details are 
frequently contested. The party who 'drags his feet' is therefore one who 
refuses to delimit his contestations and contests irrelevant details. Such 
delaying tactics are utilised by lawyers when they are beneficial to their 
clients. 
If insisting on the specificity of their clients' stories increases lawyers' ability 
to delay cases, then their aversion to affidavits becomes more 
comprehensible. By externalising parties' stories in a common written 
medium, affidavits make it much easier for judges to identify the narrative 
linkages between them, so as to rapidly decide their cases. 11 They do so by 
tying the parties down to two written stories, restricting their lawyers' 
opportunities to narratively re-interpret their claims and hence their control 
over the duration of litigation. 
Reactions to affidavits suggest that the resistance within the Maltese courts 
to greater control over the compilation of evidence is largely motivated by the 
10 Such as the age of the injured party, his income and so on. See the section on 'the Relations of 
Production of Testimony" in chapter seven. 
11 As Foucault (1990: 10 I) observes: ·'Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but 
also undermines and exposes it. renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it. In like manner, 
silence and secrecy arc a shelter for power.·· 
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desire of lawyers to preserve their narrative space for manoeuvre, by leaving 
clients' stories in a shadowy and inchoate oral form. This also means 
retaining their ability to delay litigation. lawyers can utilise this oral narrative 
space to stress the specificity of their clients' stories, by: 
a) Increasing the distance between the story told by their client and that of the 
other party. As the case of the 'Pain in the Neck' shows, this is done by 
emphasising the significance of even minor differences between the parties' 
stories and ignoring the similarities. 
b) Magnifying the gap between the client's story and legally valid 'facts'. The 
volume of evidence required can be easily augmented if the lawyer insists 
that even the smallest and most banal details of the stories of the parties 
must be proved in court. This can also be achieved if she brings a large 
number of witnesses to tell the same story, or if the stories themselves are 
spun out so that entire life-histories are recounted in court. All these tactics 
are legitimated by the implicit assumption that the distance between judicial 
reality and ordinary social life is so large that a correspondingly high level of 
proof is required to ensure the conversion of oral stories from everyday life 
into written facts in the judicial realm. 
A convenient way of describing the combined effect of these delaying tactics 
is in terms of the 'problematisation of evidence'. By referring to 
'problematisation', my aim is to underline the way in which these attitudes to 
court-room story-telling complicate the simplest 'facts' so that they require 
high levels of proof. Referring to evidence implies standing on its head the 
claim that: "when the facts are clear, it is not difficult to apply the law" (Brincat 
1997b.). This assertion, made by a Maltese lawyer arguing in favour of 
reforms in the system, explains why the problematisation of evidence is so 
tempting to some lawyers. If the facts are rendered opaque, then the law 
becomes more difficult to apply, increasing the scope for delay and the 
lawyers' collective power over the progress of the case. The strategic uses of 
such factual problematisation are also revealed by another practice lawyers 
resort to, which involves the concealment of relevant documents from the 
opposing party at the start of a lawsuit. Thus while lawyers are supposed to 
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file copies of all the documentary evidence which their clients give them at 
the start of litigation, they tend instead to avoid revealing them at this stage. 
These documents are disclosed later, at moments when their shock-value 
and strategic utility are highest. As one rural lawyer told me: 
"In Malta it's different from England, where lawyers exchange the 
facts between them at the start of the law-suit. The Maltese lawyer 
likes to keep all his cards up his sleeve and keep his opponents 
guessing, telling them: 'now you'll see what we'll come out with'."12 
When the legal issues involved in a case are clear-cut, then such factual 
problematisation is one of the few remaining routes by which a lawyer set to 
lose may exert some control over the proceedings. 
The validity of this analysis is confirmed by its ability to explain the perceived 
need for reforms in the system of compilation of evidence, the precise content 
of the reforms themselves and the obstacles to their implementation. To start 
with the need for reforms, historical analyses show that the problem of delays 
has long haunted the Maltese courts. Consider the startlingly contemporary 
flavour of the following extract from a report on the state of the Maltese courts 
prepared by a British Royal Commission in 1812: 
"The arts and evasions by which a suit could be prolonged were 
various and were practised daily with success by fraudulent and ill-
disposed persons ... By these subterfuges and artifices, litigations 
were extended indefinitely" (Harding 1980: 36). 
Before the introduction of the recent reforms, court delays had accumulated 
to such an extent that it was quite common for the judge who finally decided 
the case to be a different person from the one who originally heard the 
evidence, due to the retirement or death of the original judge (Brincat 1996). 
Significantly it seems that the system by which evidence was heard by court 
experts or legal referees was introduced in an attempt to resolve these 
I' 
- Another lawyer recently wrote that: 
··our (i.e. lawyers) ·southern· practice of keeping a document up our sleeve, so to speak, 
to get it out when we feel that we should. must be stopped ... we should reveal all our 
cards at the initial stage of the case so that each party would know exactly what the 
other has in store·· (Schembri 1998). 
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problems (ibid). 13 This underlines the role of the compilation of evidence as a 
fertile source of court delays. The content of the ·reforms themselves also 
reveals a concern to prevent future problematisation of evidence. Indeed the 
common conceptual basis of pre-trial hearings, affidavits and the master 
system is that they are all means through which the facts to be contested can 
be precisely defined at the start of litigation. The aim is clearly to restrict the 
possibility of the subsequent creation of confusion about what must be 
proved and how. In this they followed the path blazed by previous procedural 
amendments in 1913, which had for similar motives introduced the 
requirement of presenting a written declaration of the facts in issue at the 
start of litigation. 
Finally the obstacles to the implementation of these reforms become clearer 
once it is understood that they ran counter to lawyers' desire to retain their 
narrative space for manoeuvre and their ability to delay litigation. This oral 
narrative space had already been preserved in the teeth of the 1913 
amendments, by making the declaration of facts a carbon copy of the legal 
claims contained in the 'citazzjoni'. 14 This suggests that the persons who, 
according to the chief justice: "objected" (Said-Pullicino op. cit.) to the 
"greater judicial control on the compilation of evidence" (ibid.) required by the 
recent reforms, were mostly lawyers. After all judges would hardly have 
objected to reforms on the basis that they increased their powers! At the 
same time, they would have had few incentives to rigidly apply reforms which 
were set to collectively antagonise lawyers as a class. 
To understand judicial attitudes, one must remember that Maltese judges are 
all drawn from the pool of practising lawyers, 15 with whom they share the 
1
·
1 This also explains the ease with which I was appointed legal referee in the case of the Pain in the 
Neck. 
11 On this refer to the discussion in the section on "Writing the Case' in chapter six. 
15 As explained in chapter four. one must have practised as a lawyer for twelve years in order to be 
eligible to become a judge in Malta. 
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same professional background and assumptions. Together with lawyers, they 
belong to a 'court community' of the sort described by Blumberg (1975: 
328). 16 While their professional training disposes them to avoid harsh 
reactions to lawyers' attempts to problematise evidence, it also promotes 
cautious and guarded responses to the administrative reforms promoted by 
successive governments. Such administrative reforms could easily be 
classified as 'interference' threatening the independence of the judiciary. 17 In 
this context, the recent reforms must have seemed too many and too radical 
for judges to fully implement in the face of the certain resistance of lawyers. 
There are two further qualifications which must be made to this analysis. The 
first relates to the issue of court delays as a whole. While problematising 
evidence appears as a major cause of court delays, it must be clear that it is 
not the only one. However many of the other causes can be seen as deriving 
from the earlier-mentioned strategy, by which lawyers magnify the gap 
between clients' stories and legally known facts and therefore the distance 
between everyday and legal versions of the truth. 18 This can be illustrated 
with regard to two of the other major causes of delays, which are: the 
absence of lawyers from court sittings and notification problems. As shown in 
chapter four, the non-attendance of lawyers, can enable them to delay the 
final judgement in a case in the interests of their clients. Here too it is by 
stressing his detachment (and therefore that of the law) from his client that 
11
; Sec chapter one for a summary of Blumberg's argument. 
1
- Thus a pre-electoral leaflet issued by the Malta Labour Party in 1997 accused the previous 
Nationalist Minister of Justice of working "hand in hand· with the then Chief Justice to introduce the 
unpopular legislative reforms to court procedure. The leaflet argued that this threatened the 
independence of the judiciary. In 1998. after the Labour Party won the election, the new minister of 
justice wrote an article (Gulia 1998b.) in which he said that he was in London at the time, together 
with the present Chief Justice and that together they were engaging in talks to try and improve the 
·Master System·. In an earlier article. he had observed that the reforms would not work if all lawyers 
and judges did not co-operate with the Government's efforts to improve the system, arguing that: 
··Government is an easy target for criticism .. (Gulia l998a.). Thus although different people were 
involved. the underlying stmctural conflict of roles remained. 
IK Another cause is the multiplication of appeals on minor issues, such as the procedural decisions 
taken by a judge in the course of hearing a law-suit. Here it is the law. rather than the facts which is 
problematised. 
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the lawyer can represent him better. 19 Similarly, the legal requirement that 
clients must be personally notified of certain judicial acts gave rise to endless 
manoeuvres for ensuring the social invisibility of the client at the moment 
when notification is attempted. Foiling the court marshal's efforts to effect 
service creates delays by generating communicative difficulties between the 
legal realm of the courts and normal social life, effectively distancing law from 
everyday reality. Moreover, the strategic non-disclosure of documentary proof 
at the start of litigation serves to maintain the distance between the client's 
story and that of her opponent in litigation. This is because such non-
disclosure keeps the other party in the dark regarding the story of one party, 
preventing a convergence between their opposed narratives. 
The second qualification relates to the responsibility of lawyers for 
problematising evidence. My analysis may seem to imply that the only 
purpose for which lawyers might desire to retain their oral narrative space for 
manoeuvre is in order to increase their ability to delay litigation. However 
consideration of the case of the 'Rented Garage' indicates that in this way 
lawyers also retain a certain flexibility in representing their clients, which 
enables them to adapt the stories they tell on their behalf to incorporate new 
details which emerge during court-room questioning.20 It is also clear that a 
full 'viva voce' trial should in principle21 make it easier to assess the credibility 
of witnesses. 
19 When I asked them about this. most lawyers would explain their non-attendance by opening their 
diaries and showing how many court sittings they had programmed, which made it physically 
impossible for them to attend each hearing in every clients' case. While this is certainly true, this 
situation also creates scope for the strategic selection on their part of which particular hearing to 
attend. Clearly some lawyers did usc their non attendance as a way to stretch cases out in their clients' 
interests. 
~o In this case. for example. the examination-in-chief had revealed that John Zammit had leased the 
gamgc before apparently buying it. This fact was then taken up by the lawyer for the defence, who 
later wove it into his story that Zammit had good grounds for believing that he owned the garage. 
~ 1 If it were not for the multiplication of court delays which means that the impression made by 
particular witnesses when testil)'ing must often be unknown to or forgotten by the judge who, years 
later. finally delivers judgement (Brincat 1996). 
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There are therefore good professional reasons why lawyers should seek to 
avoid tying themselves down to complete written statements of the factual 
basis of clients' claims at the start of litigation. One should also keep in mind 
that the impulse to stress the specificity of clients' stories comes from the 
clients themselves. Downplaying shared narrative backgrounds is precisely 
what is required by the narrative self-scripting which has, in chapter five, 
been shown to motivate clients' descriptions of their cases to their lawyers. 
The eagerness with which many clients try to detach their story from that of 
their opponents in litigation can be exemplified by the story told by the 
plaintiff in the case of the 'Pain in the Neck'. In his affidavit, he took care to 
state that the defendant, who had crashed into him, appeared unconcerned 
about any damage that might have been caused to him. He observed that he 
even had to persuade her to remain on the site of the accident until the police 
turned up to make a Road Accident Report. This statement could also have 
been used by the defendant to support her account of the trivial nature of the 
accident. Yet it seems to have been remembered with such clarity by the 
plaintiff because of its utility in confirming his story, which revolved around 
the opposition between the defendant's careless attitude and his own 
responsible behaviour. This illustrates the creative labour by which clients 
seek to produce their own separate stories out of shared social experience. 
The pressure which clients' self-scripting places on their lawyers has already 
been discussed in chapter six. It was there shown how this induced one 
lawyer to completely identify his representation of a client with his client's 
story, so that this story formed the central organising framework in terms of 
which the lawyer crafted his statement of the legal claims being made. It was 
also argued that while most Maltese lawyers do not go so far as this, they 
usually have to balance between the distance from clients stories required by 
the ideal of professional detachment and the narrative endorsement 
demanded by patronage. From this standpoint one can reach a deeper 
understanding of the delaying tactics by which evidence is problematised. It 
has been shown how these can be usefully categorised into those tactics 
which increase the distance between the stories of the opposing parties and 
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those which magnify the gap between everyday reality and legal reality. it 
should here be observed that these tactics reflect precisely the same effort to 
balance between the needs of clients and the professional ideal which was 
noted in the sixth chapter of this thesis. In fact, while increasing the distance 
between the stories of the parties responds to the needs which clients seek to 
achieve through narrative self-scripting, increasing the gap between Jaw and 
everyday life satisfies lawyers' own need for professional detachment. Both 
these tactics work in the interest of clients insofar as they enable lawyers to 
delay cases in their favour and in that of lawyers insofar as they allow them to 
stress the distance of the judicial system from everyday reality, thus 
increasing their work while living up to their professional self image. 
It seems, therefore, that a complex mixture of self-interest and professional 
idealism motivates the durable resistance Maltese lawyers have displayed to 
all attempts to compel them to externalise their clients' stories in writing at the 
start of litigation. This highlights the social embodiment and latent social 
effects of professional ideals themselves. In Malta, it seems that lawyers' 
insistence on living up to a particular understanding of the requirements of 
their professional role derives a great deal of its energy from their resistance 
to the social pressure placed on them to act as their clients' patrons.22 
Paradoxically enough, this same stress on professional detachment has itself 
become part of the services which lawyers offer clients, providing the 
conceptual basis justifying attempts to delay litigation on their behalf! By 
authorising the problematisation of evidence, professional ideals, which 
appear as ways of eluding social pressure, become the vehicle through which 
this social pressure is complied with. Moreover, the noble idealistic 
inspiration of these professional models can blind adherents to their actual 
social effects, ensuring that they are tenaciously adhered to and justifying 
lawyers' resistance to reforms which appear to undermine them. 
~~ This is also why lawyers object to affidavits. as observed in chapter six. 
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In conclusion it could be observed that the outcome of the recent reforms to 
the compilation of evidence in Malta illustrates the structural implications for 
the administration of justice of the specific social relationships through which 
legal representation is carried out. The ingrained attitudes of lawyers and 
judges have been shown to derive their force not from a generic and 
capitalised Culture, but from the specific social relationships between judges, 
lawyers and clients and their respective practical involvement with clients' 
stories. These attitudes favour the problematisation of evidence, which 
promotes court delays and amplifies litigiousness. In this way, court-work is 
increased together with the potential bones of contention between litigants. 
Factual problematisation must therefore be one of the ways by which a small 
island community with no major cultural, religious or ethnic differences has 
maintained a thriving legal tradition, with a large number of lawyers and 
courts which are deluged with work. To a large extent, the litigiousness of the 
Maltese, mentioned by many of the lawyers I spoke to, is amplified and 
propagated by the judicial system. This analysis also suggests the utility of 
relating the specific practices of lawyers and courts to the wider social and 
cultural context in which they originate. Such an investigation will be 
conducted in the next and final chapter of this thesis. 
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Chapter 1 0: Condusion 
"For this Law which I am laying down for you today is neither obscure for 
you nor beyond your reach. It is not in heaven, so that you need to 
wonder, 'Who will go up to heaven for us and bring it down to us, so that 
we can hear and practise it?' Nor is it beyond the seas, so that you need 
to wonder, 'Who will cross the seas for us and bring it back to us, so that 
we can hear and practise it?' No, the word is very near to you, it is in 
your mouth and in your heart for you to put into practice" (Deuteronomy 
30: 11-14). 
My aims in this conclusion are three-fold. First it is intended to summarise the 
research findings and to show how they relate to the initial theoretical 
hypothesis. This will be followed by an attempt to embed my observations on 
legal representation within the context of Maltese society and the 
Mediterranean region as a whole. Finally the main contributions this research 
has made to anthropological understanding and the study of law in society will 
be identified. Suggestions for further research will here be made and the 
effects of this study on my own understanding acknowledged. 
The initial chapters of this thesis set out the theoretical background which 
motivated my inquiry. In chapter one, previous studies of lawyer/client 
interaction were criticised for their excessively narrow focus and reliance on a 
legalistic conception of power. This made it impossible to accept that clients' 
perceptions might significantly effect the way their cases are represented by 
lawyers. Instead a holistic approach was advocated, which would utilise 
anthropological techniques to describe the social relationships by which legal 
representation is carried out in a Maltese context. This meant broadening the 
field of investigation beyond lawyer/client office conferences, to encompass 
the specifically legal work of drafting judicial acts, court questioning of 
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witnesses and adjudication. It also required greater sensitivity to the cultural 
context in which legal representation occurs. 
These concerns were echoed in the second chapter, which argued that such 
an anthropological study of Maltese legal representation should pay special 
attention to clients' narratives and the way in which lawyers orchestrate their 
re-telling in court and judges incorporate them in judgements. This emphasis 
on narrative was justified by reference to the studies of Ricoear (1984), which 
define narratives as discursive vehicles mediating between generic 
legal/moral rules and individual experience. In other words, narrative analysis 
militates against the drawing of rigid boundaries between the legal knowledge 
possessed by the lawyer and the cultural competence of the client. Instead 
the issue becomes how one is narratively transformed into the other and 
attention is drawn to the social uses of narration as a way of appropriating 
legal/moral rules so as to legitimate individual experience. This approach 
appeared analytically fruitful because it does not make any assumptions 
about the relative power of lawyers and clients and it blends well with an 
anthropological effort to explain the format of particular narratives by 
reference to the social context of narration. A narrative spectrum becomes 
visible, ranging from 'paradigmatic' narratives (which are closely modelled on 
the legal rules and serve a conservative function) to 'subjunctive' narratives 
(which challenge accepted rules from the standpoint of individual experience). 
The next two chapters set out to describe my research methodology and to 
introduce Maltese society and its legal system. In particular, chapter four 
outlined the ordinary course of litigation and the occupational differentiation of 
lawyers and then gave special attention to legal training. It explored the 
transmission of professional attitudes in the process of becoming a lawyer. 
Here the challenge was to trace the genesis of specific conceptions of the 
nature of law and the lawyer/client relationship to their origins in legal 
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education. It was shown how law students achieve the right to articulate the 
law by learning to suppress their subjective narrative voice, while the legal 
rules are also imparted through the medium of paradigmatic stories. Legal 
training therefore encourages lawyers to maintain a certain distance from the 
subjective narratives of their clients, while developing their ability to transform 
these stories into paradigmatic ones which more fully engage with the legal 
rules. 
Chapter five was a detailed investigation of client story-telling. Particular 
stories were analysed so as to show how they refract important cultural 
themes, while also being attempts by clients to control their lawyers by 
engulfing them in patronage relationships. This was most noticeable in the 
case of rural and working class clients, whose narratives enable them to 
author their selves as honourable individuals. By narratively evoking a 
continuum between legal rules and moral ones, these clients try to base the 
patronage of lawyers on a recognition of their own honour; creating 
dependence by asserting autonomy. By contrast lawyers tend to avoid fully 
endorsing these stories and often question the claims they make; evoking the 
difference between clients as authors and as characters in their own stories. 
Even when lawyers confirm clients' stories, they generally do so in terms 
which transform them into paradigmatic narratives. The reasons for clients' 
attempts to create patronage relationships were traced to sharply polarised 
perceptions of lawyers, reflecting their ambiguous social role. It was 
suggested that the attraction of patronage lies in the control it allows clients to 
exert over socially distant lawyers. 
These themes were further explored in chapter six, which discussed lawyers' 
reactions. These were in turn related to professional ideals of a detachment 
from clients' stories which reflects an attachment to the legal rules. Lawyers 
therefore describe their representation as largely restricted to the writing of 
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the legal issues involved, leaving the oral proof of the facts in the hands of 
their clients. These ideals are spatially encoded in the organisation of legal 
offices and physically embodied in lawyers' self-presentation, which is 
characterised by the dramatic evocation of professional autonomy. Yet they 
are belied by Maltese legal practice, which finds it impossible to draw a neat 
division between legal issues and factual ones. 
Various social factors were discussed which induce lawyers to provide some 
confirmation of clients' stories and to operate within their understanding of the 
case. Consequently most Maltese lawyers have to balance between the 
conflicting demands of patronage and professionalism in selecting a particular 
style of handling clients. They do so in a manner which reflects their own 
occupational status, with sole-practitioners showing a stronger tendency to 
act as patrons than firm lawyers. Finally it was shown how the tension 
between patronage and professionalism also finds expression in the way 
lawyers draft the judicial acts necessary to open a law-suit. Those sole 
practitioners who most fully adopt the 'patron' style of client-handling tend to 
inscribe the legal claims of their clients within the narrative framework of their 
subjunctive stories, as opposed to the paradigmatic stories favoured by most 
other lawyers. 
In the seventh chapter, the locus of investigation shifted to the court-room, 
following the ordinary sequence of Maltese litigation, where a litigant's story 
has to be re-told to the judge after having been communicated to her lawyer. 
This chapter opened with a description of the court environment, which 
emphasises the organisation of legal work and the roles of judges, lawyers 
and laymen. This was followed by a discussion of the relations of production 
of testimony, which outlined the processes by which testimony is usually 
elicited in court. The divergent interests of lawyers, judges and witnesses 
were identified and their effects on the contestation of evidence explored. 
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These issues were then exemplified by a detailed study of the production of 
testimony in the case of the 'Rented Garage'. 
In this case, the questions asked by the judge and the defendant's lawyer 
tried to create a paradigmatic story out of the defendant's testimony. This 
process provoked the resistance of the witness, who tried to assert the validity 
of his subjective understanding of events, which could not easily be accepted 
since it did not mesh with legal logic. At the same time, this gap between the 
defendant's testimony and the paradigmatic story evoked by his own lawyer's 
questions was exploited during cross-examination by the plaintiff's lawyer. 
The latter tried to emphasise the subjunctive features of this testimony, so as 
to detach it from its anchorage in legal paradigms. Consequently this chapter 
showed how court-room representation is often 'double-voiced' (Bakhtin 
1994 ), insofar as it reproduces, while denying, the distance between clients' 
understandings of their stories and those of their lawyers noted in chapter 
five. Legal entitlement appeared closely related to the ability to defend the 
paradigmatic status of the client's story. Furthermore the different stories told 
during the production of testimony are dialogically linked and conflicting 
accounts cannot be given equal credence. Court-room story-telling operates 
to produce a single official version of the facts and does not tolerate 
alternative narratives. 
Chapter eight also looked at the stories told during court testimony, but it did 
so by trying to identify their influence on adjudication. A reflexive analysis of 
adjudication was carried out in the case of the 'Pain in the Neck'. This showed 
how judges operate on the assumption that there is only one correct version 
of events. They consequently seek to maintain a certain distance from the 
conflicting stories elicited by the opposing lawyers and to build on the 
narrative linkages produced by cross-examination. This helps to create a 
sense of the legitimacy of judgements which is derived from the way they 
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recover parts of the untold shared narratives which both the opposing litigants 
had experienced. These shared narratives are selectively denied by the 
parties when, as shown in the fifth chapter, they narratively script their selves 
before their respective lawyers. Such attempts to justify judgements by 
reconstructing shared stories are fuelled by the moral pressure which even 
the most subjunctive stories of litigants can place on judges: creating a sense 
of injustice if they are not responded to. 
This point was taken up again in the analysis of the case of the 'Faithful 
Prostitute'. In this case the court was not faced with conflicting stories, as the 
testimony brought by the litigants substantially agreed. Here the plaintiff 
produced a paradigmatic story based on his own exploitative behaviour, 
which was complemented by his wife's subjunctive story about her devotion to 
him. The outcome of this case showed how the moral pressure created by the 
wife's story led the court to reinterpret and expand the legal categories. Thus 
even if they do not mesh with legal categories, coherent narratives may 
normatively condense key cultural themes. This in turn provokes a sense of 
normative conflict which may induce judges to alter the legal framework. This 
culturally derived power of stories explains why judges try to reduce all the 
stories told in the case to one official narrative; refusing to acknowledge 
competing accounts even if these are not paradigmatic and seem to have no 
anchorage in the legal rules. 
The ninth chapter explored the cumulative effects of the practical 
relationships which lawyers maintain towards litigants' stories. This was done 
by analysing reactions to recent legislative reforms of the system of 
compilation of evidence in the Maltese courts. This analysis showed that 
lawyers have tried to maintain their oral narrative space for manoeuvre and 
have therefore successfully resisted reforms which aimed to compel them to 
externalise clients' stories in writing at the start of litigation. Preserving this 
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oral space conforms to professional ideals and allows lawyers more leeway in 
representing their clients. Yet it also allows them to problematise the 
production of evidence to create court delays. This is achieved by contesting 
minor details so as to preserve and magnify differences between the stories of 
litigants. It is also done by inflating the quantity of proof required to give 
stories legal credence and by the strategic concealment of documentary 
evidence. 
The motivation for these practices was primarily traced to the strategic 
advantages they give to lawyers in representing their clients. They constitute 
a response to the pressure which clients' narrative self-scripting places on 
lawyers. The two forms taken by this response reflect lawyers' overall attempt, 
observed in chapter six, to balance between the demands of patronage and 
those of professional detachment. As the case of the 'Pain in the Neck' 
shows, Maltese lawyers act as their clients' patrons when they downplay 
shared narrative backgrounds: stressing the specificity of their clients' stories 
as against those of their opponents in litigation. They assert professional 
detachment when they inflate the quantity of proof, since this implicitly 
increases the distance between the law and the facts by asserting the need to 
supply more facts to bridge this distance. Thus it seems that lawyers' vigorous 
stress on their professional detachment, which derives its energy from the 
need to counter the moral pressures imposed by clients' narrative self-
scripting and itself stimulates it, can serve to authorise the problematisation of 
evidence in their favour. Consequently, the causes of court delays are rooted 
in the social relations of legal representation in Malta. 
This thesis has illustrated the inter-relationship of the processes and relations 
through which legal representation is carried out. Legal training, lawyer/client 
interaction, the production of evidence, adjudication and court delays could be 
fruitfully analysed if they were not treated as discrete and autonomous 
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processes, but as socially and systematically related. Simultaneously, 
however, there is also a wider social context which informs and conditions the 
carrying out of legal representation. 
A handle on this wider social context is provided by Herzfeld (1993), in a 
recent book concerned with exploring the beliefs and social relations which 
underpin Western bureaucracy. He observes that paradoxically societies like 
Greece, which pride themselves on giving warm hospitality to strangers, are 
often the sites of the most abrupt and high-handed displays of bureaucratic 
indifference. The reason is that hospitality and indifference are symbolically 
and socially related. Both appeal to a symbolic vocabulary of shared traits 
(such as common blood, nationality or descent) in order to affirm the 
boundary between insiders and outsiders. Furthermore they are both ways of 
handling ambiguous relationships with strangers. Thus the hospitality shown 
by Greeks to strangers is often an attempt to involve them within patronage 
relationships by "inverting the political dependence (of Greeks) in the moral 
sphere" (Herzfeld 1987: 86). Bureaucratic indifference arises when officials, 
who are faced by cases which differ from routine ones, revert to the symbolic 
classifications which are at the basis of the official discourse so as to justify 
their inactivity. In this way, they deny their shared humanity with clients and 
therefore the rights of the latter to be treated differently. The only route by 
which clients can contest this exclusion is if they themselves appropriate the 
symbolic vocabulary implicit in official discourse, so as to prove that they too, 
are 'Greek', 'Christian' or 'active responsible citizens' and therefore entitled to 
the protection of the rules. 
Herzfeld sees such practices as somehow characterising all Western 
bureaucracies. However, he is also clear that the association of warm 
hospitality with cold bureaucratic indifference is more noticeable in 
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Mediterranean societies like the Greek one. He ascribes this to a number of 
causes, among which are: 
1) These societies have not developed fully integrated capitalist economies and 
there is therefore a greater need for mechanisms of social incorporation. 
2) Social relations outside the sphere of the family are highly competitive and 
premised on a generalised hostility. 
3) The concept of the nation-state has not absorbed into itself all the idioms of 
social identity, so that these can function independently of (and be employed 
to contest) the state structure. 
Herzfeld's argument provides a useful reference point because of the 
parallels between his observations and mine. In Malta, lawyers' clients -like 
those of the Greek bureaucracy- attempt to create patronage relations in 
order to morally reverse their politically inferior status in regard to their 
lawyers. Thus, on one level, it is clear that the ambiguity inherent to 
lawyer/client relations is socially addressed using the same tactics adopted 
for relations with strangers. Similarly the stress lawyers place on their 
professional detachment, which is often dramatically displayed, appeals to the 
symbolic division between law and fact which underpins the legal rules. It is 
therefore analogous to the socially produced indifference of the Greek 
bureaucrats. Here too clients can contest lawyers' detachment by translating 
legal discourse back to its symbolic roots; a conversion which is neatly 
epitomised by the way clients shift from talking about 'drift' as a metaphor for 
honourable moral behaviour to 'drift' as a legal right. 1 
My material also complements Herzfeld's account in a number of ways. 
Firstly, I have tried to explore the narrative media through which legal 
categories and individual experience are translated into one another. 
Highlighting the mediating role of narrative makes it easier to comprehend 
1 Sec the case of the 'Honourable Businessman· in chapter five. 
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how this process of translation occurs; being reflected in the form of 
'paradigmatic' or 'subjunctive' stories depending on the type of conversion 
attempted. It also makes it possible to discern how incomplete this translation 
often is, as this incompleteness is reflected in an uneasy over-lapping of both 
types of story. Secondly, my study indicates a much more intimate 
relationship between hospitality and indifference, or between patronage and 
detachment. In fact, I have argued that clients' attempts to cast their lawyers 
as patrons are both a reaction to Maltese lawyers' emphasis on their 
professional detachment and themselves induce lawyers to stress their 
detachment. Patronage and detachment appear as locked in a mutually 
reinforcing loop. Moreover, the problematisation of evidence shows how the 
professional detachment of lawyers may be put to work in the context of a 
patronage relationship with clients, so that legal practice appropriates 
bureaucratic delay/indifference in the service of patronage. 
In Maltese legal practice, therefore, indifference is not so much the result of a 
generic stance towards strangers, as a valuable commodity which has to be 
internally produced within the society and which can be put to use in the 
service of patronage relationships. The occupational prestige of legal practice 
enables Maltese lawyers to produce themselves as professionally detached 
strangers. Certainly here clients' narrative efforts to script themselves as 
honourable individuals constitute what Herzfeld describes as attempts to 
morally englobe lawyers. However, they are more than that. As Du Bouley 
(1991) has observed in regard to her own Greek fieldwork, the complete 
stranger provides an opportunity for Greek villagers to enact their idealised 
selves, as reflected in the generosity of disinterested gift-giving. This is 
because the generally hostile and competitive nature of interaction with 
unrelated fellow villagers means that all gift-giving will be interpreted as 
ultimately self-interested. This in turn creates a conflict with the villagers' 
Christian beliefs, which affirm the salvific nature of disinterested generosity. 
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Hence the attraction of giving gifts to complete strangers who, by definition, 
are not in a position to reciprocate. 
This suggests that the impersonality of law, to which corresponds the 
professional detachment of lawyers, provides an opportunity for clients to 
narratively portray their idealised selves. This certainly allows them to 
appropriate the moralistic underpinnings of the legal rules. This was clearly 
illustrated by the case of the 'Faithful Prostitute', where both spouses 
characterised themselves in an extreme way in order to engage with the legal 
rules. In that case, the wife's story of her self-sacrificing love hinged around 
the claim that she viewed her prostitution as a means of gaining money for the 
family. She thus scripted herself as a sort of Mary Magdalen; directly evoking 
the underlying moral referents of the canonically based legal rules. Here the 
success of her narrative was reflected in its ability to bridge the distance 
separating her from the protection of the legal rules, in the same way as other 
moralistic stories were used to bridge the distance separating clients from 
their lawyers. These are all instances of what Herzfeld (1985} has described 
as the use of the state rhetoric against the state. 
It seems, however, that it would be mistaken to see such story-telling in an 
overly cynical light: as equivalent to attempts to symbolically bribe lawyers. As 
observed in the fifth chapter, clients' stories often evoked genuine emotions 
on their part. Much of the attraction of Ricoeur's (1984} study of narrative was 
his recognition that while all stories are socially fabricated, this does not 
prevent them from being experienced as true. In this context, what seems 
most striking about the case of the 'Faithful Prostitute' is the way in which her 
story referred to money as a symbolic vehicle capable, once introduced within 
the family, of transforming her public prostitution into private virtue. Sant 
Cassia has observed similar rhetoric in Greece. He notes: 
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"It is hardly surprising, therefore, that as many observers have noted, 
two very different types of morality operate in modern Greek culture: a 
highly charged and competitive public context in which men try to get 
the better of one another, especially when legitimated by reference to 
family interests (to synferon) (Campbell, 1964; Loizos 1975; 
Peristiany, 1965), and the family context characterised by extreme 
self-sacrifice, self-abnegation, and disinterested gift-giving. Money, 
that symbol of immediate exchange and strict equivalence, is 
embedded in a dual rhetorical opposition. On the one hand it is held 
up as the highest eroding factor of trust in the outside public world, 
even threatening relations between kin, while on the other hand it 
becomes the most potent symbol of love" (Sant Cassia 1992: 250). 
The implicit background of the prostitute's story is therefore a view of the 
public sphere of social interaction as corrupt and flawed. In fact, it is because 
her story distances, by exalting, the disinterested realm of the family from the 
inevitably flawed and self-interested domain of extra-familial relationships, 
that she is able to discursively link her prostitution in the public domain to her 
fidelity in the familial one. As Sant Cassia (1991) observes, the 'naturalistic 
pessimism' about the social world which is so pervasive in the Mediterranean 
itself creates a need for certainty, which people try to satisfy by personalising 
their interactions with others. In this light, honour appears as a form of self-
constitution in which individualised narratives are a mode of creating 
personalised truth (based on the truth of one's person) out of collective 
scepticism (including scepticism about the collective). 
In Malta, clients' stories are therefore best viewed as being both a way to 
construct legal entitlement and a form of self-constitution which allows 
individuals to assert the idealised truth of their selves against a corrupt world. 
This explains why the institutionally grounded detachment of lawyers 
provokes the assertion of honour. Law provides a detached stage on which 
idealised selves can be dramatically asserted. The social pressure which 
finds a narrative outlet in the legal forum is generated by the constraints of life 
in a small, densely populated, island-state. Here, as in Greece, there is no 
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fully developed capitalist economy, the idioms of social identity are not 
monopolised by the nation-state, and the realm of extra-familial social 
interaction is a competitive one, with trust in short supply (Campbell 1964). 
Consequently most Maltese are adept at creating personalised fiduciary ties 
of quasi-kinship, manipulating networks of friends and 'friends of friends' 
(Boisseivan 1974) in order to achieve their aims. Given the small-size and 
dense population of the archipelago, social relationships tend to be durable 
and 'multiplex' (Gluckman 1955). Quite simply, people depend on one another 
for a variety of services over long time periods. There is a concomitant 
emphasis on conflict avoidance, since one cannot just 'move away' from 
potential enemies. In this society, a high value is placed on secrecy, as a 
means to shield information from the scrutiny of competitive and potentially 
hostile neighbours (Du Bouley 1974). Yet despite one's best efforts, secrets 
often emerge and will be eagerly observed. 'Malta is small and people are 
known,' as one ever-popular Maltese saying puts it. 
In such a social context where, as one of my lawyer informants put it: 
'everybody keeps a huge file on everyone else', there is a high level of 
scrutiny directed at the smallest details of personal behaviour. These are 
interpreted against a long historical background and seen as sending ripples 
through a complex web of social relationships. Consequently minor details 
acquire a disproportionate symbolic significance. This has been noted with 
regard to the factionalism which often accompanies the feast, or 'testa', 
staged in honour of the patron saint of each village. As Boissevain (1965) has 
observed, the feuding behaviour of competing village factions finds 
expression in a state of 'pika', where the smallest actions of the opposing 
faction are responded to. During my fieldwork, lawyers often told me that 
particular litigants were 'ippikati', or engaged in a state of 'pika'. This term was 
usually used to suggest that these litigants were more interested in fighting 
one another than with obtaining the most rationally appropriate outcome from 
275 
the courts. Not surprisingly, one sign of the presence of 'pika' is a tendency 
towards aggressive litigation over minor details. Thus, when it does occur, the 
intensity of conflict reflects the extent to which people are socially involved 
with each other. 
Another effect of the perceived lack of anonymity is that it limits the space for 
individuals to present themselves in different ways, so as to "evoke 
themselves as being members of different categories of people which may be 
contradictory and cut across each other'' (Machin & Carrithers 1996: 53). As I 
discovered during my fieldwork, my ability to adopt a multiple-native strategy 
progressively diminished as people whom I had met in one context observed 
me in another. 2 People are quick to note discrepancies between present 
posturing and past actions. It follows that the assertion of idealised selves is 
simultaneously encouraged and contested within Maltese society. This 
motivates individuals to the creative labour of latching on to the smallest 
details3 so as to narratively affirm the truth of their idealised self-image. This 
process can be exemplified by the case of the 'Pain in the Neck', where both 
plaintiff and defendant worked to downplay aspects of an untold common 
story. Both parties involved in this case, which itself originated from a lack of 
physical space, tried to expand the social distance between their stories so as 
to present their idealised selves. They did so by recounting such petty details 
as the comments passed by the defendant after the collision. 
All these factors operate to increase the attractiveness of the detached legal 
forum to clients and to ensure that they will recount detailed stories in order to 
manufacture their social distance (Merry 1990) from opponents. As Gluckman 
long ago observed, if people are involved in multiplex social relationships with 
2 Sec chapter three . 
. ~ According to the competitive logic of 'pika·. 
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one another, then disputes will also tend to be multiplex: reflecting a 
constellation of interests and conflicts rather than revolving around a single 
issue (Gluckman 1955; Comaroff & Roberts 1986). Consequently it seems 
that the critical difference between Maltese litigation and the Barotse cases 
discussed by Gluckman, lies in the way stories are legally processed more 
than in the volume of story-telling per se. While both Maltese and Barotse 
litigants tend to embed particular disputes within wider narrative frames, their 
stories are not elicited in the same way by the courts. During the Barotse 
litigation described by Gluckman, litigants would tell their story directly to the 
adjudicating body of the 'kuta', without the intervention of an intermediate 
class of lawyers. For this reason, the notion of what constitutes relevant 
evidence was expanded far beyond the proof of events connected with the 
original dispute, to encompass the entire history of relations between the 
litigants. 
In Malta, by contrast, litigants have to funnel their stories through the medium 
of lawyers, who emphasise a professional detachment based on the 
separation of legal issues from factual ones. While lawyer's professional 
detachment itself provokes clients' story-telling, it also ensures that there is 
not such a noticeable expansion in the criteria of evidentiary relevance. As 
shown in the seventh chapter, what can be proved in a case is largely 
restricted by lawyers to the issues at stake in it, as legally defined. Their 
response to clients' narratives is instead to engage in what I have called the 
'problematisation of evidence'. 4 Here rather than extending the boundary of 
what facts are to be proven, lawyers work so as to complicate the proof of the 
facts. The strategies by which this is accomplished reflect lawyers' own 
balancing-act between (a) a patronage which panders to clients' efforts to 
assert their idealised selves and (b) an emphasis on professional detachment 
which reflects lawyers' own attempts to avoid entanglement in clients' stories. 
·• See chapter nine. 
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The outcome is an inflation in the quantity of proof and in the time spent 
contesting it, which helps create court delays. 
There are two types of criticism, which have been the Scylla and Charybdis of 
my intellectual voyage. The first generally comes from lawyers and tends to 
downplay the influence of socio-cultural factors on legal processes in Euro-
American societies. In terms of this perspective, 'Western' legal systems have 
a lot in common and any differences should be explained by reference to 
formal legal history and different institutional arrangements. The second 
critique is more anthropological. It goes in the opposite direction, emphasising 
the importance of particular socio-cultural settings so as to argue that even 
legal systems which are formally alike are applied differently at ground-level. 
While the two approaches might seem mutually exclusive, they can also be 
considered as complementary. After all a balanced legal anthropology should 
be capable of perceiving the similarities between legal systems. Such 
similarities increase the relevance of anthropological observations, 
suggesting that observed features are not restricted to one society. At the 
same time, they are themselves the basis for comparison. Thus while this 
thesis has tried to delineate some of the distinguishing features of legal 
representation in Malta, it should be equally clear that many of the features 
observed seem to be shared by other legal systems in the Mediterranean and 
beyond. 
This appears to be the case with regard to the dialectical relationship I have 
described between paradigmatic legal rules and subjective narratives, in 
which clients use stories to involve their lawyers and invoke the morality 
embedded in legal rules. Recent socio-legal research has described 
comparable practices in Anglo-American litigation. This can be illustrated by 
Twining's (1994) study on the way stories are employed to appeal to extra-
legal moral norms in English adjudication and by Sarat and Felstiner's (1995) 
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analysis of the stories told by divorcing clients in California. 5 However, these 
examples themselves suggest points of contrast. The stories collected by 
Sarat and Felstiner are replete with psycho-analytical jargon, while those of 
Maltese clients tend to make more reference to individual honour. Also 
Twining's categorisation of moral norms as 'extra-legal' is subtly different from 
a rhetorical approach which appeals to a morality embedded within the law 
itself. 
This highlights the utility of further research aimed at exploring the way the 
interface between rules and stories is traversed in different social/legal 
settings. Since my research has primarily focused on civil litigation, it would 
be interesting to conduct a study of legal representation in criminal cases. 
Moreover, there is clear scope for comparative ethnographic studies of legal 
representation in other societies with different cultures and legal institutions. 
In England, for instance, it would be useful to see how the doctrine of 
precedent and the institutionalised separation between barristers and 
solicitors combine with culturally specific conceptions of self-hood, obligation 
and the state to condition the story-telling relations of legal representation. 
Another benefit of such research is that it would lead us to confront 
anthropological and legal categories, exposing the latent assumptions of both. 
Thus, this thesis has confronted 'patronage' with 'professional representation' 
and found that they are not such separate categories as might be supposed. 
Indeed, the distinct compartmentalisation of these categories could tell us 
much about the implicit geo-politics of an academic division of labour 
reluctant to acknowledge the similarities between (Mediterranean) patronage 
and (Western) legal representation. 
This thesis has sought to make an original contribution to the anthropological 
study of law by concentrating on the social relations of Maltese legal 
5 Sec chapter one for a rcYiew of Sarat and Felstiner·s research. 
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representation. In so doing, it has followed a path cleared by such thinkers as 
Gramsci, who observes that a widespread mistake in the sociological 
characterisation of intellectuals is: 
"that of having looked for this criterion of distinction in the intrinsic 
nature of intellectual activities, rather than in the ensemble of the 
system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the 
intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the 
general complex of social relations" (Forgacs 1988: 304). 
Rather than describing the social role of lawyers in terms of the 'intrinsic 
nature' of their work, legal work has therefore been explained by referring to 
the social relations within which it is produced. Indeed narrow essentialist 
definitions of law, which authorise lawyers' detachment and diminish the 
professional relevance of social relations, have been seen to reflect and 
respond to pre-eminently social needs. Here a direct parallel exists between 
professional imaginings of law and traditional definitions of language by 
linguists. 6 In this context it is also interesting that many of the lawyers to 
whom I spoke complained that the Maltese are litigious. While there is no 
reason to doubt the truth of this assertion, its making by lawyers also 
suggests strategic motivations (Greenhouse 1989). It shifts responsibility for 
delays in litigation, by constructing them as an outcome of the external social 
pressures placed on the courts. Thus this claim obviates the role played by 
the courts (in general) and lawyers (in particular), in nourishing and amplifying 
litigiousness. Yet this thesis has shown how lawyers stretch out litigation by 
problematising evidence; making the law more difficult to apply. While lawyers 
rationalise their work as catering to a fixed pre-existing need for legality, they 
also collaborate in producing the need they cater for. Consequently 
essentialist definitions, based on the intrinsic nature of legal work, risk 
reproducing professional smoke-screens. 
"As Pierre Bourdieu (1992) has observed. idealistic constructions of language as a self-contained asocial 
system reflect the social position occupied by linguists as functionaries of an impersonal, bureaucratically 
organised. nation-state. They facilitate the political project of linguistic homogenisation which secures the 
consolidation and extension of state power. 
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This thesis has argued that concealment is intrinsic to legal processes. Thus 
learning the law, while projected as the study of abstract rules, involves 
acquiring familiarity with a fund of stories (chapter 4). Similarly lawyers 
depend on their clients' stories to found their representation, while often 
disguising this dependence behind an attitude of selective inattention to the 
'facts' (chapters 5 & 6). Concealment occurs when lawyers transform clients' 
stories into paradigmatic ones (chapters 6) and also when they deny the 
existence of a gap between clients' subjunctive stories and the ones they tell 
on their behalf in court (chapter 7). In all these cases, the application of legal 
rules is made possible through negating the cultural labour of story-
transformation by which the gulf between legal categories and social 
experience is bridged. Yet this objective dependence of legal rules on the 
subjective stories of clients was clearly illustrated by the case of the 'Faithful 
Prostitute' (chapter 8), where a persuasive story was seen to be generating a 
new legal rule by expanding the category of fidelity. 
Litigation therefore appears as the site of hidden processes of abstraction and 
contextualisation, where narratives are used both as an abstracting device, 
(to align subjective experience with legal rules), and as a contextualising one, 
(to apply legal rules to individual experience). This suggests that legal 
rules/processes are much more responsive to social experience than they 
seem and than some sociological theories allow. In particular, the Marxist 
definition of law7 as a cultural superstructure superimposed over an economic 
base would seem prone to obscure the sort of constant inter-change between 
law and social experience which has been observed in Maltese legal 
representation. Rather than viewing law solely as a process and treating legal 
texts as a mystifying discourse detached from socio-economic foundations, it 
seems more fruitful to embed the study of the content of legal rules within that 
of society. Narrative analysis provides a promising avenue for this, since it 
Briefly re\'iewed in chapter one. 
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draws attention to the implicit juridical potential of the stories told in a 
particular society, while also exposing the narrative potential of legal texts. 
The latter can be seen to provide a cultural grammar through which action is 
narratively understood and therefore conceived. 
The view of law that I am here promoting is one which considers it as primarily 
a cultural and linguistic phenomenon. Clearly legal processes have important 
social effects which are independent of the actual content of written rules and 
one should not entertain a na"ive belief that these rules determine social 
action in a transparent and predictable manner. However, it seems arrogant 
and misguided to dismiss the detailed linguistic labour by which Jaws are 
drafted, promulgated and applied as simply the production of a mystifying 
discourse. As my thesis shows, litigation is characterised by a constant 
tension between legal categories and the experience of clients. Here the 
social effect of law appears to be cultural: conditioning the sort of stories 
which may be told with any hope of validation in legal settings. Conversely the 
case of the 'Faithful Prostitute' showed how cultural competence, or the ability 
to tell a persuasive story, in itself tends to generate legal entitlement. This 
view of legal entitlement as the ability to pronounce the 'right word' is found in 
the Bible quotation which opened this chapter. Bourdieu puts it elegantly: 
"Benveniste pointed out that in Indo-European languages the words 
which are used to utter the law_are related to_ the verb 'to speak'. The 
right utterance, the one which is formally correct, thereby claims, and 
with a good chance of success, to utter what is right, i.e. what ought 
to be ... the most rigorously rationalised law is never anything more 
than an act of social magic which works" (1992: 41-42). 
If legal rules are both abstracted from culturally specific narratives and 
themselves condition the type of stories that can be told, then concealing the 
real nature of these operations increases their effectiveness (Herzfeld 1993: 
65). In this way, acts of literary creativity can be disguised as the automatic 
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application to the facts of inflexible rules. 8 Moreover, if terms like 'language' or 
'culture' seem appropriate for describing the domain where laws achieve their 
primary social effects, this does not mean embracing an idealistic theory 
which bases legal entitlement on some innate, universally available, linguistic 
ability. Instead law appears as a central arena for the 'politics of truth' 
(Foucault 1980) in a given society: externalising social power relations in a 
linguistic form. This is why this thesis has emphasised the social relations of 
legal representation, following recent trends in the sociology of language, 
which have sought to transcend the opposition between economism and 
culturalism to develop an "economy of symbolic exchanges" (Bourdieu 1992: 
37). In short, if law is a form of language, this is not because of its abstract 
communicative nature, but because it illustrates the way power relations are 
discursively generated and reproduced. 
Highlighting the continuously traversed interface between legal rules and 
culturally specific stories also brings out certain similarities between legal and 
anthropological representation. Like lawyers, anthropologists must also: "see 
broad principles in parochial facts" (Geertz 1983: 170-171 ). To do so, they 
must question informants in a way which is as influenced by anthropological 
categories, as that of lawyers is by legal ones. As Layton (1983) notes, both 
law and anthropology often use concepts which are: "not exactly matched in 
local thought" (ibid.: 226). This questioning therefore resembles the 
examination of witnesses by lawyers, insofar as it implicitly encourages the 
production of paradigmatic stories (Bourdieu 1997: 91 ). 9 Moreover 
x This also explains the often competitive relationship between lawyers and novelists (or anthropologists). 
The latter arc also in the trade of creating culturally persuasive descriptions. For this reason, there is a 
tendency on the part of legal practitioners to criticise the 'impractical' and 'subjective' character of 
literary description. which enables them to differentiate their own work on the grounds of its 'practical' 
and ·objective· character. This reflects a deep unease with the subjective and creative literary features of 
legal work itself. These features are exposed by the ease with which former lawyers have become 
no,·clists. as shown by the lives of novelists like Samuel Richardson, Charles Dickens or Franz Kafka. 
"Sec the section on ·court-room Storytelling· in chapter seven. 
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anthropologists have also explored the cultural significance of the 
conceptualisations behind paradigmatic legal categories {Strathern 1996). 10 
The ultimate aim of anthropological questioning is to generalise and therefore 
to abstract descriptive theoretical statements of a normative/paradigmatic kind 
out of the stories of informants {Carrithers 1992). In a context where 
descriptive anthropological categories are increasingly reformulated as part of 
prescriptive legal rules 11 and where anthropologists engage in advocacy 
{Albert 1997) or witnessing (Apthorpe 1996) it may seem difficult to define the 
boundary between legal and anthropological representation. 
One difference between lawyers and anthropologists lies in their attitude to 
facts. A study comparing law and anthropology students has observed that 
while law students are taught to accept highly selective versions of the 'facts' 
as absolutely true, anthropology students are trained to be: "critical of the 
presentation of facts" (Rigby & Sevareid 1992: 19). Greater sensitivity to the 
problematic nature of factual representation explains the agonising over 
modes of representation which is such a prominent feature of contemporary 
ethnography (Clifford & Marcus 1986). If anthropologists like Abu-Lughod 
( 1993) have opted to structure books around informants' narratives, this is 
because stories are seen as more suitable than law-like generalisations for 
conveying the partial, situated and uncertain nature of anthropological 
knowledge. Here anthropologists are exploiting the power of suojunctive 
stories to make the world strange by evoking alternative views on reality 
(Bruner 1986). 
10 In a recent article. Strathem observes with regard to the legal category of intellectual property rights: 
··for non-lawyers the legal category as much serves as a vehicle for experimenting with new 
conceptualisations of ownership as it delimits a recognisable phenomenon" (Strathem 1996: 
17). 
11 As seems to have happened with the anthropological concept of a 'descent group' incorporated in the 
Australian "Ahoriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act' of 1976 (Layton 1983). 
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Yet while the gap between anthropological and legal modes of representation 
might seem an unbridgeable one, this thesis has emphasised the hidden 
connections between stories and rules. In Maltese litigation the most 
subjunctive story-telling is always implicitly juridical, since such stories 
challenge the legal rules and may lead to the creation of new ones. 12 In the 
light of this research, one is led to explore the trends which have led some 
contemporary anthropologists to emphasise narrative as a preferred mode of 
description. This was not always so. In the heyday of functionalist 
anthropology, a more rule-oriented mode of description prevailed (Evans-
Pritchard 1951: 46). This was at a time when the scope of anthropological 
research was clearly restricted to the 'traditional' cultures of non-Western 
peoples. Yet as anthropology has come closer home, its rule-making ability 
seems also to have diminished, making way for more reflexive and less 
authoritarian styles of representation. 
A recent article by Apthorpe ( 1996) suggests a reason for this shift. Trying to 
identify the difficulties preventing anthropologists from making a contribution 
to policy, he talks about anthropology's preoccupation with: "rich descriptive 
and interpretative analysis as, opposed to efforts supposed to lead to law-like 
generalisations and predictions" (ibid.: 176). Yet he suggests that while this 
might seem to be an obstacle, it is actually a strength, since: 
"An interpretative and narrative account pays attention to processes 
and explanations for these processes. Some of these will be 
recognised and readily seen to be crucial by various actors and 
observers. A study which plays down prescription while emphasising 
description is also harder to ridicule: it leaves room for stakeholders 
to learn and benefit from the enriched understanding offered without 
feeling directly threatened. So policy anthropology should put its best 
narrative powers forward to succeed in performing expert witness 
well" (ibid). 
1
: Sec chapter eight. 
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It follows that increased resort by anthropologists to narrative modes of 
representation allows contributions to policy making because it avoids a 
head-on confrontation with other disciplines which utilise law-like 
generalisations. This is clearly the case with regard to economics, sociology 
and political science, which all utilise law-like language to move from 
description to prescription. 13 Thus as anthropologists have come closer home, 
they have also had to come to terms with an academic division of labour 
dominated by subjects utilising law-like generalisations. In this context, resort 
to narrative appears to be more of a way of carving out a niche for 
anthropological claims to expertise than the outcome of a sudden insight into 
the complex relativity of contemporary social life. Consequently 
anthropological narratives have a direct relevance to legal reform and other 
forms of policy making. Like the stories told by Maltese clients and witnesses, 
these narratives are implicitly juridical. Anthropology is a disguised site of 
emergence of the rules and other cultural generalisations by which social life 
is understood and acted upon. 
In the context of this broadened perception of the scope of anthropological 
representation, I would like to highlight the utility of a legal anthropology 
which would incorporate narrative analysis to explore the modes of production 
of social order in contemporary societies. One of the advantages of such an 
approach is that it would make it possible to overcome the long-standing 
opposition within legal anthropology between rule-centred and processual 
models for understanding human action (Comaroff & Roberts 1986). A view of 
humans as story-tellers gives due weight to the role played by social/legal 
rules in conceptualising and explaining action, while also fore-grounding the 
importance of the individual histories within which these rules are evoked, 
13 This process is illustrated by the progressive reification of 'nonns· which commence as convenient ways 
of describing patterned social behaviour and eventually come to mean that this behaviour is itself 
nonnative. or carried out in obedience to explicit nonns (Bourdieu 1997). 
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denied or selectively lived. 14 As earlier recommended, this approach would 
interrogate the potentially juridical principles evoked by individual stories as 
well as the narrative possibilities present in the formal legal rules. 
This thesis has sought to contribute to legal anthropology by exploring the 
intersection of legal rules and stories within Maltese legal representation. In 
so doing certain observations have been made which could help orient future 
research. In particular it seems useful to consider the description of 
adjudication in the case of the 'Pain in the Neck', where it was perceived as 
the recovery of an untold shared narrative selectively denied by the parties. 
Such a process of recovery only works because of the over-lapping and 
dialogic inter-relationship between the story-telling of different individuals. Yet 
it is easily obscured by a relativistic perspective on narrative, which sees 
culture as a multitude of detached, individual stories. By contrast, this thesis 
has argued that it is the social inter-locking of stories, both with other stories 
and with the legal rules, which makes them a useful target for analysis. 
I would like to end on a reflexive note. If I have tried so laboriously to rescue 
the subdued voice of clients stories from the bland anonymity of legal rules, 
this is also because of my own identification with their efforts to assert the 
significance of their individual experiences against indifferent legal 
categories. In choosing the doubly detached forum of an anthropology thesis 
in an English university, I have tried, as a Maltese lawyer, to weave my own 
narrative departing from established ways of writing about law. To the extent 
that this work provokes a more critical awareness of the concealed cultural 
impact of contemporary legal systems, I will consider myself vindicated. 
11 As observed in chapter two. 
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